Opinion
B298738
02-19-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRENT CHARLES SCHNEIDERS, Defendant and Appellant.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General and Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Nathan Guttman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA103224) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert P. Applegate, Judge. Affirmed. James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General and Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Nathan Guttman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
After the trial court granted the People's motion to dismiss three counts of assault with a deadly weapon against Brent Schneiders for driving his car into several stopped cars, Schneiders filed a petition under Penal Code section 851.8 for a finding he was factually innocent and an order destroying his arrest records. The trial court denied the petition. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2018 Schneiders was driving a car when he collided with another car that was stopped at a red light, which in turn collided with other cars. Several of the cars' occupants were injured.
Schneiders walked away from the accident scene, but the police soon found and detained him. When officers asked Schneiders why he had walked away from the accident, Schneider told the officers they would "find out at the end of the day." Schneiders denied he had drunk any alcohol, but said he had smoked "one hit of Obama Kush" marijuana that morning from a pipe. Schneiders told the officers that the victims involved in the collision were demons and that "a 'feeling' told him there were . . . 'bad people' inside of the vehicle directly in front of him." Schneiders said he "was being tested" that day and had decided not to use the car's brakes before hitting the car in front of him. Traffic camera footage showed Schneiders did not attempt to stop before the collision. Officers arrested Schneiders for assault with his car as a deadly weapon.
The People charged Schneiders with three counts of assault with a deadly weapon. On January 11, 2019 the court, on the People's motion, dismissed all three charges in furtherance of justice under Penal Code section 1385. On February 20, 2019 the court granted Schneiders's petition under sections 851.91 and 851.92 to seal the records of his arrest.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On March 6, 2019 Schneiders filed a petition to destroy the records of his arrest under section 851.8, subdivision (c), on the ground he was "factually innocent of the charges for which the arrest was made." Schneiders argued the case was "riddled with evidence that proves [he] did not act willfully," as required for the offense of assault with a deadly weapon. Schneiders contended that he "was suffering from a serious medical episode brought about by insomnia, exhaustion and severe dehydration at the time of the traffic collision" and that, according to his treating psychiatrist, "the traffic collision was caused by sleep deprivation due to an altered sleep wake cycle known to occur in patients experiencing a manic/psychotic episode." Schneiders claimed that he "was asleep at the time of the accident and for almost two minutes afterwards" and that the video evidence and witness statements supported his version of the accident. Schneiders also argued that the police withheld exculpatory evidence (including his statements he did not hit the cars on purpose and did not mean to hurt anyone) and that he passed a polygraph examination. The evidence, Schneiders concluded, pointed "to only one reasonable conclusion": He "did not have the intent, general or otherwise, to commit an assault with a deadly weapon . . . ."
Schneiders submitted a declaration in support of the petition stating that he fell asleep at the wheel of his car and that he did not deliberately or intentionally drive into the cars in front of him. Schneiders also submitted a September 19, 2018 letter from his attorney to the prosecutor explaining in nine pages of detail the "problems of proof in the case" and the failure of the police "to do a thorough, fair, or complete investigation of this case." In the letter, counsel stated she was attaching the results of Schneiders's polygraph examination, character letters written on Schneiders's behalf, and "critiques" of the recordings and police reports. Counsel claimed there were "repeated violations" of Schneiders's rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 "by multiple members" of the police department. Counsel asserted that Schneiders "was suffering from a serious medical episode when this accident happened" and that the evidence showed Schneiders did not act willfully.
At the hearing on the petition, counsel for Schneiders argued that "there was nothing to suggest [Schneiders] committed a crime" and that, as confirmed by Schneiders's doctor, "this was an accident caused by a medical episode." Counsel emphasized the misconduct by the police and the lack of injuries to any of the victims. Counsel argued that, while Schneiders "may have made certain inculpatory statements," he also "made an equal number of exculpatory statements showing that he did not have the intent to hurt anybody." Counsel for Schneiders stated that, while Schneiders's flight from the scene was "evidence of consciousness of guilt," there was "an equally valid interpretation with respect to what [Schneiders] was doing when he was walking away; and that is, he was disoriented."
The prosecutor argued the People dismissed the charges against Schneiders, not because he was factually innocent, but in the interest of justice and "even though there was evidence establishing the defendant's guilt." The prosecutor explained that "there was an issue" about whether Schneiders's statements to the police, which showed he was guilty, would be excluded under Miranda and that the People "elected to dismiss the matter" because they believed they "would not be able to use those statements against the defendant at trial."
The trial court denied the petition. The court cited the facts that Schneiders told a police officer he caused the accident on purpose because "something in his gut told him to do it" and that Schneiders's flight from the scene indicated consciousness of guilt. The court stated it was deciding whether there was "reasonable cause to believe that a crime was committed," not "choosing between two competing interpretations" of the evidence. Schneiders appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
"There are three classes of persons who may petition the court for a finding of factual innocence. (§ 851.8, subds. (a), (c), (d) & (e).) 'Those classes are (1) persons who have been arrested but no accusatory pleading has yet been filed [subd. (a)]; (2) persons who have been arrested and an accusatory pleading has been filed but no conviction has occurred [subds. (c) & (d)]; and (3) persons who are "acquitted of a charge and it appears to the judge presiding at the trial . . . that the defendant was factually innocent" [subd. (e)].'" (People v. Mazumder (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 732, 738.) Because Schneiders was arrested and the People filed an accusatory pleading but dismissed the charges before trial, Schneiders is in class (2), and section 851.8, subdivision (c), is the applicable provision here.
Section 851.8, subdivision (c), provides: "In any case where a person has been arrested, and an accusatory pleading has been filed, but where no conviction has occurred, the defendant may, at any time after dismissal of the action, petition the court that dismissed the action for a finding that the defendant is factually innocent of the charges for which the arrest was made." Section 851.8, subdivision (b), which prescribes the procedure for petitions under section 851.8, subdivision (c), states in relevant part: "A finding of factual innocence and an order for the sealing and destruction of records pursuant to this section shall not be made unless the court finds that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the arrest was made. In any court hearing to determine the factual innocence of a party, the initial burden of proof shall rest with the petitioner to show that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the arrest was made. If the court finds that this showing of no reasonable cause has been made by the petitioner, then the burden of proof shall shift to the respondent to show that a reasonable cause exists to believe that the petitioner committed the offense for which the arrest was made."
"A petitioner's burden to establish factual innocence has been described as '"incredibly high."'" (People v. Mazumder, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 738; see People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1459 ["'the record must exonerate, not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt"' (italics omitted)].) "[S]ection 851.8 precludes the trial court from granting a petition 'unless the court finds that no reasonable cause exists to believe' the defendant committed the offense charged. [Citation.] In other words, the trial court cannot grant relief if any reasonable cause warrants such a belief. [Citation.] '"'Reasonable cause'"' is a well-established legal standard, "'defined as that state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.'" [Citations.] To be entitled to relief under section 851.8, '[t]he arrestee [or defendant] thus must establish that facts exist which would lead no person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or conscientiously entertain any honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested [or acquitted] is guilty of the crimes charged.'" (People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 (Adair).)
In particular, "'much more than a failure of the prosecution to convict is required in order to justify the sealing and destruction of records under section 851.8.'. . . 'Establishing factual innocence . . . entails establishing as a prima facie matter not necessarily just that the [defendant] had a viable substantive defense to the crime charged, but more fundamentally that there was no reasonable cause to arrest him in the first place.'" (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905; see People v. Forest (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1110 ["'To meet this burden, the petitioner must show more than a viable defense to the crime.'"]; People v. Bleich (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 292, 300 ["[The] inquiry involves resolving whether the evidence shows appellant was actually innocent and under no set of circumstances could be subjected to the criminal process or whether the evidence on the record, while inadequate for a bindover, still leaves a person of ordinary care and prudence believing there is an honest and strong suspicion appellant was guilty."].) "Even a magistrate's order discharging a defendant after a preliminary hearing does not establish [the defendant's] factual innocence, because 'it still might be the case that another person of ordinary care and prudence could view the evidence differently and have some suspicion of the defendant's guilt.'" (Forest, at p. 1110.) Similarly, "a dismissal in the interests of justice" under section 1385 "does not necessarily imply factual innocence . . . ." (People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1056.)
An appellate court reviewing an order denying a petition under section 851.8 "must apply an independent standard of review and consider the record de novo in deciding whether it supports the trial court's ruling." (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905; see People v. Laiwala (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1069; People v. Chagoyan (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 810, 817.) "[A]lthough the appellate court should defer to the trial court's factual findings to the extent they are supported by substantial evidence, it must independently examine the record to determine whether the [petitioner] has established 'that no reasonable cause exists to believe' he or she committed the offense charged." (Adair, at p. 897.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Schneiders's Petition Under Section 851 .8
There was ample evidence and plenty of circumstances that would lead a reasonable person of ordinary prudence to believe and harbor a strong suspicion Schneiders committed a crime. Schneiders told the police the people in the cars he hit were demons and "bad people." He admitted he made a decision not to use the brakes on his car before driving into the other cars. A video recording of the accident confirmed Schneiders did not try to stop before the accident. (See People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 458 ["cars can be deadly weapons," and evidence the driver of a car "deliberately aimed at a couple in a car" because he "'was just going crazy and felt like freaking them out'" supported a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon]; People v. Aznavoleh (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1189 ["'any operation of a vehicle by a person knowing facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize a battery will probably and directly result may be charged as an assault with a deadly weapon'"].) Schneiders also admitted he had smoked marijuana that day before driving. (See Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f) ["It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any drug to drive a vehicle."].) And Schneiders fled the scene of the accident. (See People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 169 [flight may support an inference of the defendant's consciousness of guilt]; People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 391-392 [an instruction on flight as evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt is "permissible even though there was a possible innocent explanation for his actions"].) A reasonable person could safely conclude from these facts Schneider was guilty of multiple crimes.
There was a possibility, as counsel for Schneiders argued in her letter to the prosecutor and as the prosecutor conceded at the hearing on the section 851.8 petition, the trial court would have excluded some of the evidence against Schneiders had the prosecution proceeded with the case. Schneiders made incriminating statements to the police about his conduct before the police had given Schneiders any Miranda warnings. But in determining whether the defendant is factually innocent under section 851.8, the court may consider inadmissible evidence, including "evidence suppressed pursuant to section 1538.5." (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905 & fn. 3; see People v. Medlin (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1102 ["[e]ven suppressed evidence is considered" on a petition under section 851.8].)
Schneiders argues he "presented substantial evidence in support of his motion for factual innocence." Perhaps he did. For example, Schneiders submitted evidence that he was suffering from a medical condition and that the collision was an accident. But substantial evidence is not the test. To prevail on his section 851.8 petition, Schneiders had to do more than submit substantial evidence he was innocent. He had to show not just that he had a meritorious defense, not just that he never would have been convicted or held to answer, and not just that the police made a mistake in arresting him. Schneiders had to show that under no circumstances would any reasonable person suspect he committed a crime. The evidence, admissible and inadmissible, of Schneiders's statements and conduct precluded him from making that showing. As the People aptly state, "Nothing in [Schneiders's] innocent version of events eliminated the contrary, reasonable inference of guilt based on his own admissions and conduct."
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
SEGAL, J. We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
ZELON, J.