We note that, under the scenario adopted by the dissent, the defendant voluntarily came to the front door, stood behind his mother, stuck his head out of the door, inquired as to what was happening, and was arrested when the police grabbed him by his hand. The doorway to a private house is a public place for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, since a defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy while standing there, exposed to public view ( see People v. Anderson, supra; People v. Schiavo, 212 A.D.2d 816). Since the defendant was arrested at the threshold of his residence, the defendant's arrest did not implicate Payton rights ( see People v. Schiavo, supra). The defendant further contends that the admission of his codefendant's statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under the rule enunciated in Bruton v. United States ( 391 U.S. 123).
People v Mendoza, 49 Misc 3d 1007, 1012 [Sup Ct, NY County 2015]), the current rule has failed to protect New York citizens from illegal searches (Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761; Riffas, 120 AD3d 1438; Mendoza, 49 Misc 3d 1007 [finding that police had violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights]; see also Correa, 55 AD3d 1380; Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769; Anderson, 146 AD2d 638 [declining to suppress evidence gathered by police who breached the threshold]). For the same reason, it has failed to safeguard the court system from constant appellate litigation (see, e.g., People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761 [1987]; People v Spencer, 135 AD3d 608 [1st Dept 2016]; Garvin, 130 AD3d 644; People v Riffas, 120 AD3d 1438 [2d Dept 2014]; People v Pearson, 82 AD3d 475 [1st Dept 2011]; People v Correa, 55 AD3d 1380 [4th Dept 2008]; People v Rodriguez, 21 AD3d 1400 [4th Dept 2005]; Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769; People v Andino, 256 AD2d 153 [1st Dept 1998]; Mauceri v County of Suffolk, 234 AD2d 350 [2d Dept 1996]; People v Schiavo, 212 AD2d 816 [2d Dept 1995]; People v Francis, 209 AD2d 539 [2d Dept 1994]; People v Min Chul Shin, 200 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1994]; People v Rosario, 179 AD2d 442 [1st Dept 1992]; People v Lewis, 172 AD2d 775 [2d Dept 1991]; People v Marzan, 161 AD2d 416 [1st Dept 1990]; People v Anderson, 146 AD2d 638 [2d Dept 1989]; People v Brown, 144 AD2d 975 [1st Dept 1988]; People v Nonni, 141 AD2d 862 [2d Dept 1988]). As this Court's first sustained consideration of the validity of threshold arrests, today's opinion may resolve some of that ambiguity by defining the threshold to mean only the narrow space between the doorjambs.
s Fourth Amendment rights]; see also People v. Correa, 55 A.D.3d 1380, 864 N.Y.S.2d 643 [4th Dept.2008] ; Reynoso, 309 A.D.2d 769, 765 N.Y.S.2d 54 ; People v. Anderson, 146 A.D.2d 638, 536 N.Y.S.2d 543 [2d Dept.1989] [declining to suppress evidence gathered by police who breached the threshold] ). For the same reason, it has failed to safeguard the court system from constant appellate litigation (see e.g. Kozlowski, 69 N.Y.2d 761, 513 N.Y.S.2d 101, 505 N.E.2d 611 ; People v. Spencer, 135 A.D.3d 608, 24 N.Y.S.3d 48 [1st Dept.2016] ; Garvin, 130 A.D.3d 644, 13 N.Y.S.3d 215 ; Riffas, 120 A.D.3d 1438, 994 N.Y.S.2d 136 ; People v. Pearson, 82 A.D.3d 475, 918 N.Y.S.2d 409 [1st Dept.2011] ; Correa, 55 A.D.3d 1380, 864 N.Y.S.2d 643 ; People v. Rodriguez, 21 A.D.3d 1400, 804 N.Y.S.2d 160 [4th Dept.2005] ; Reynoso, 309 A.D.2d 769, 765 N.Y.S.2d 54 ; People v. Andino, 256 A.D.2d 153, 681 N.Y.S.2d 518 [1st Dept.1998] ; Mauceri v. County of Suffolk, 234 A.D.2d 350, 650 N.Y.S.2d 788 [2d Dept.1996] ; People v. Schiavo, 212 A.D.2d 816, 623 N.Y.S.2d 273 [2d Dept.1995] ; People v. Francis, 209 A.D.2d 539, 619 N.Y.S.2d 71 [2d Dept.1994] ; People v. Min Chul Shin, 200 A.D.2d 770, 607 N.Y.S.2d 369 [2d Dept.1994] ; People v. Rosario, 179 A.D.2d 442, 579 N.Y.S.2d 12 [1st Dept.1992] ; People v. Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775, 569 N.Y.S.2d 152 [2d Dept.1991] ; People v.Marzan, 161 A.D.2d 416, 555 N.Y.S.2d 345 [1st Dept.1990] ; Anderson, 146 A.D.2d 638, 536 N.Y.S.2d 543 ; People v. Brown, 144 A.D.2d 975, 534 N.Y.S.2d 278 [1st Dept.1988] ; People v. Nonni, 141 A.D.2d 862, 530 N.Y.S.2d 205 [2d Dept.1988] ). As this Court's first sustained consideration of the validity of threshold arrests, today's opinion may resolve some of that ambiguity by defining the threshold to mean only the narrow space between the doorjambs.
Here, the record supports the suppression court's determination that defendant was arrested at the threshold of his apartment after having voluntarily answered the door and that the police did not cross into defendant's home in order to effectuate the arrest. Thus, defendant was not arrested without a warrant in violation of the Payton rule (see Reynoso, 2 NY3d at 821; People v Evans, 132 AD3d 1398, 1399 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1087 [2015]; People v Schiavo, 212 AD2d 816, 816 [2d Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 942 [1995]). Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that the police immediately "pushed or guided" him three feet inside the apartment after he was arrested in order to search him does not establish that the arrest itself occurred inside the house in violation of the Payton rule (see People v Correa, 55 AD3d 1380, 1380 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 924 [2009]; see also People v Rosario, 179 AD2d 442, 442 [1st Dept 1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1053 [1992]).
Here, the record supports the suppression court's determination that defendant was arrested at the threshold of his apartment after having voluntarily answered the door and that the police did not cross into defendant's home in order to effectuate the arrest. Thus, defendant was not arrested without a warrant in violation of the Payton rule (seeReynoso, 2 N.Y.3d at 821, 781 N.Y.S.2d 284, 814 N.E.2d 456 ; People v. Evans, 132 A.D.3d 1398, 1399, 17 N.Y.S.3d 576 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1087, 23 N.Y.S.3d 644, 44 N.E.3d 942 [2015] ; People v. Schiavo, 212 A.D.2d 816, 816, 623 N.Y.S.2d 273 [2d Dept. 1995], lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 942, 627 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 651 N.E.2d 929 [1995] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that the police immediately "pushed or guided" him three feet inside the apartment after he was arrested in order to search him does not establish that the arrest itself occurred inside the house in violation of the Payton rule (seePeople v. Correa, 55 A.D.3d 1380, 1380, 864 N.Y.S.2d 643 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 924, 874 N.Y.S.2d 9, 902 N.E.2d 443 [2009] ; see alsoPeople v. Rosario, 179 A.D.2d 442, 442, 579 N.Y.S.2d 12 [1st Dept. 1992], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1053, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1021, 596 N.E.2d 419 [1992] ).
The evidence at the Payton hearing established that, when the police approached defendant's house, defendant was standing in the open doorway and that the police entry into the house was minimal, to enable them to take control of defendant before removing him from the house. "The doorway to a private house is a public place for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, since a defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy while standing there, exposed to public view . . . Since the defendant was arrested at the threshold of his residence, the defendant's arrest did not implicate Payton rights" ( People v Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769, 770, affd 2 NY3d 820; see People v Brown, 13 AD3d 1194, lv denied 4 NY3d 828; People v Schiavo, 212 AD2d 816, lv denied 85 NY2d 942). In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that the police entered defendant's house, we conclude that the evidence at the Payton hearing established that there were exigent circumstances to justify their warrantless entry ( see generally People v Kilgore, 21 AD3d 1257, 1257-1258).
05; People v. Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19). In any event, the argument is without merit ( see People v. Schiavo, 212 AD2d 816; People v. Anderson, 146 AD2d 638, 640). The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is also unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.
In his affidavit and answers to interrogatories, Hand merely asserted that he and plaintiff Cynthia B. Dekar had been arrested without a warrant. Plaintiffs offered no evidence indicating where the arrest took place and, in fact, the proof submitted by defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' cross motion seems to indicate that the arrest occurred at plaintiffs' doorway ( see People v. Andino, 256 AD2d 153, 154, lv denied 93 NY2d 922; People v. Schiavo, 212 AD2d 816, 816, lv denied 85 NY2d 942; People v. Min Chul Shin, 200 AD2d 770, 770-771, lv denied 83 NY2d 913). In any event, inasmuch as it was plaintiffs' initial burden to "tender sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact" ( Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324; see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., supra at 853; Robinson v. Robinson, supra at 854), we cannot conclude, on this record, that Stray Haven or its agents committed a trespass by effectuating a warrantless arrest inside of plaintiffs' home.
Once at the defendant's door, the police could arrest the defendant once he opened the door and appeared in the doorway. People v. Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769 (2nd Dep't 2003); People v. Shiavo, 212 AD2d 816 (2nd Dep't 1995); People v. Francis, 209 AD2d 539 (2nd Dep't 1994); People v. Anderson, 146 AD2d 638 (2nd Dep't 1989). Additionally, although an arrest in the doorway would have been permissible, the credible evidence establishes that the defendant stepped outside his doorway.
Further, "the doorway to a private house is a public place for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, since a defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy while standing there, exposed to public view." People v. Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769, 770, 765 NYS2d 54 (2nd Dept. 2003) aff'd 2 NY3d 820 (2004), citing People v. Anderson, 146 AD2d 638, 639, 536 NYS2d 543 (2nd Dept. 1989) and People v. Schiavo, 212 AD2d 816, 623 NYS2d 273 (2nd Dept. 1995.) The police did not resort to ruse or misinformation in the instant case, however, nor did they arrest defendant in the doorway of his home.