Opinion
2d Juv. B319156
10-16-2023
IN RE S.C., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. S.C., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Los Angeles No. TJ23993) Melissa Widdefield, Judge
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CODY, J.
S.C. appeals the juvenile court's order sustaining a wardship petition alleging that he committed five counts of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). Appellant contends, and the People concede, that the evidence is insufficient to support the robbery charged in count 3. Accordingly, we shall order that finding reversed.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant was charged in an amended wardship petition with committing five counts of robbery (§ 211) and one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The named victim of the murder was also the alleged victim of the robbery charged in count 4. T.C. was the named victim in count 3.
To prove the allegations, the prosecution presented video surveillance footage purporting to depict four of the alleged robberies, which occurred in the same location over the course of approximately three hours. Los Angeles Police Detective Refugio Garza reviewed the video footage and testified at the adjudication hearing. The named victims in counts 1, 2, and 5 also testified and identified appellant as one of their assailants.
T.C., however, could not be located and thus was not called to testify at the adjudication hearing. Appellant asserted that count 3 could not be proven without T.C.'s testimony. The prosecutor offered that the charge could be proven by the video surveillance footage along with the testimony of a detective familiar with the case because there was a common modus operandi to all the charged robberies. The court agreed to "conditionally admit" this proffered evidence "and then we can argue later since we're not dealing with a jury."
Detective Garza proceeded to view the video surveillance footage, contained in People's Exhibits 18P and 18Q, that purportedly depicts the robbery of T.C. as charged in count 3. The detective then proceeded to describe the footage as showing appellant and two other individuals robbing T.C.
After Detective Garza completed his testimony, the prosecution moved to admit all exhibits into evidence. The court sustained appellant's objection to Exhibits 18P and 18Q and admitted all other exhibits. Appellant's motion to dismiss the murder count pursuant to section 701.1 was denied.
After the defense rested, the prosecutor moved to amend count 3 by interlineation to identify the victim as "John Doe" rather than T.C. The prosecutor also renewed its offer to admit Exhibits 18P and 18Q. Over appellant's objection, the court allowed the amendment and admitted the exhibits.
Appellant then asked the court to revisit whether the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence during its case-in-chief to prove the robbery counts, and in particular count 3. The prosecutor noted that appellant's Welfare and Institutions Code, section 701.1 motion to dismiss had only challenged the murder count. Appellant replied that in adjudicating his section 701.1 motion the court had to determine the sufficiency of the evidence as to all counts, even though his motion referred exclusively to the murder charge. The court ultimately found it did not have to address the robbery counts in adjudicating appellant's section 701.1 motion because "counsel didn't raise that."
At the conclusion of the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations as to all five robbery counts and dismissed count 6 for insufficient evidence. Appellant was ordered to serve seven to nine months in the camp community placement program.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the finding that he committed the robbery charged in count 3 must be reversed for insufficient evidence. The People correctly concede the issue.
"'The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of the evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases: we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653.) "'"We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]" [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence "is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support'" the [judge's] verdict.'" (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
"Robbery is 'the taking of personal property of some value, however slight, from a person or the person's immediate presence by means of force or fear, with the intent to permanently deprive the person of the property.'" (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 343.) To obtain a finding that appellant committed the robbery charged in count 3, the People thus had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant or one of his accomplices took property from the victim or the victim's immediate presence.
The People concede, however, that no such proof was offered. They aptly note "there was simply no evidence anything was actually taken from the victim. The victim did not testify that [they] had anything of value on [their] person or that the perpetrator took anything from [them] during the assault. No other witness testified that the victim in count 3 possessed property before the assault or saw anything taken from [them] during the assault. The evidence [Exhibits 18P and 18Q] shows the assailants looking for property, but there is no evidence they discovered anything or decided to take anything discovered." Accordingly, the true finding on count 3 must be reversed for insufficient evidence.
In light of our conclusion, we need not address appellant's claims (1) that count 3 should have been dismissed at the close of the prosecution's case pursuant to section 701.1; and (2) that the prosecution should not have been allowed to amend count 3 to identify the victim as John Doe rather than T.C. Appellant also notes in his opening brief that although Senate Bill 823 provides that his maximum base term should be three years rather than five years and that he is entitled to predisposition custody credits, he does not raise these issues on direct appeal and instead has sought relief directly from the juvenile court. (See People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 958-960.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's true finding on count 3 is reversed.
We concur: GILBERT, P. J., BALTODANO, J.