See Collins, 106 Ill.2d at 262, 478 N.E.2d at 277. Cf. People v. Williams (1976), 65 Ill.2d 258, 357 N.E.2d 525; People v. Savory (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 750, 379 N.E.2d 372. Defendant also argues on appeal that his sentence must be reversed because the trial court improperly considered his post-crime behavior toward Hicks' family and ignored his potential for rehabilitation. Again we disagree.

Defendant claims she was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because her conviction rests solely upon the testimony of Bernice Albright, an accomplice witness. (See People v. Kiel (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 1030, 394 N.E.2d 883; People v. Savory (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 750, 379 N.E.2d 372.) She argues that Albright's testimony is totally unbelievable and was motivated by defendant's own accusations that Albright was the perpetrator of the crime.

Accomplice testimony is therefore subject to careful scrutiny, and if uncorroborated, is sufficient to sustain a conviction only if it carries an "absolute conviction of the truth." ( Wilson, 66 Ill.2d 346, 349-50, 362 N.E.2d 291, 292; People v. Savory (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 750, 752, 379 N.E.2d 372, 374.) However, whether accomplice testimony is a satisfactory basis for conviction goes to the weight of the evidence, and is therefore a question for the finder of fact. ( Wilson, 66 Ill.2d 346, 349, 362 N.E.2d 291, 292; People v. Hansen (1963), 28 Ill.2d 322, 332, 192 N.E.2d 359, 364.

( People v. Kiel (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 1030, 394 N.E.2d 883.) It is also true, as defendant asserts, that accomplice testimony may be attended with serious infirmities, such as malice towards the accused. (See People v. Savory (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 750, 379 N.E.2d 372.) However, Mrs. Rettig was not even charged as an accomplice in this case, though her malice for her husband was attempted to be proved otherwise.