Opinion
B225780
08-17-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID LEE SAULS, Defendant and Appellant.
Sara H. Ruddy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA078680)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard R. Romero, Judge. Affirmed.
Sara H. Ruddy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant David Lee Sauls appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with personal use of a knife (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for 25 years to life plus one year. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
1. People's Evidence.
Viewed in accordance with the usual rules on appeal (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), the evidence established appellant lived in a van in an alley near 1210 Myrtle in Long Beach. Virginia Hadnot dated appellant and sometimes stayed in the van.
a. Events in Merced.
Hadnot testified as follows. In about April 2008, Hadnot went with appellant to Merced, where appellant worked on a farm. She stayed with him perhaps three weeks. After about a week, appellant began drinking and started battering Hadnot. Appellant told Hadnot that he was "gonna 'F' [Hadnot] up or kick [Hadnot's] ass[.]" Appellant repeatedly told her she could not go home, and later indicated she would have to get home herself.
On one occasion, a man named Sylvester, who was mentally retarded, was refusing to drink with appellant, Hadnot spoke to appellant about it, and appellant told her to mind her own business and battered her. Hadnot indicated she wanted to leave, but appellant refused to let her leave and continued battering her. Hadnot said she was going to call the police and appellant replied he would give her a reason to call the police. While Hadnot was calling, appellant took a knife and cuts the pants she was wearing, explaining he had done this so she could not leave. Appellant said he would "fuck [her] up real good" if she did not call the police and tell them not to come. Hadnot spoke to police when they arrived and police arrested appellant.
b. Subsequent Events Including the Present Offense.
Hadnot also testified as follows. After appellant's release from custody, appellant and Hadnot were on a bus and returning to Long Beach. Appellant told Hadnot that if she ever called the police again "he was gonna fuck [Hadnot] up" and kill her. Appellant battered her, choked her, and prevented her from leaving her seat.
When the two returned to Long Beach, Hadnot told appellant she did not want anything to do with him. Appellant indicated she could not end their relationship. Appellant, using profanity, used to tell her not to go over to the house of Charles Thomas (the decedent). Thomas lived at 1208 Myrtle. Appellant had accused Hadnot and Thomas of "messing around" at Thomas's house.
On or about June 2, 2008, Hadnot went one night to Thomas's house to pay him money she owed. Thomas indicated he wanted her to go to the store and get him a beer. Thomas told her to lock the door but before she could do so, appellant quickly pushed the door open and entered. Appellant asked Hadnot why she was there. Thomas told appellant to leave, and Thomas indicated he did not want any problems. Appellant replied, " 'Well, fuck you. I whoop your ass and hers.' " Appellant later left.
Appellant returned with a large two-by-four and said he wanted to talk with Hadnot. Thomas told appellant and Hadnot to leave, but she indicated she would leave after appellant left. Thomas told appellant to leave, but appellant sat next to Hadnot. Thomas told appellant to say whatever he was going to say to Hadnot and leave. Appellant replied he had only one thing to say to her, then repeatedly battered her, including her face, with the two-by-four. Hadnot's face began to swell. Appellant said, "I'm gonna fuck this bitch up. I know you guys fucking." Appellant left but said that when Hadnot left, he was going to "whoop her ass out here" again. Thomas indicated he would escort Hadnot to the hospital, but appellant, using profanity, told Thomas he was not taking Hadnot anywhere.
Hadnot remained in Thomas's house while Thomas left to get a beer. Appellant, using profanity, told her to come out and said he would "beat [Hadnot's] ass and [Thomas's]." Appellant said, " 'Don't make me come through this window.' "
Thomas returned with beers, gave one to appellant, and tried to calm him. Appellant told Thomas to have Hadnot come out of the house so appellant could apologize. Thomas tried to get Hadnot to come out, but she told him that appellant had been threatening her while Thomas had been gone, and appellant would get her if she came out. Thomas tried to persuade Hadnot to go to her aunt's house.
Thomas asked Hadnot to leave because appellant was talking about "kicking the door in and kicking [Thomas's] ass and [Hadnot's], too." Thomas opened the door to his house to tell Hadnot to leave. Appellant, still carrying the two-by-four, tried to enter and pushed Thomas. Hadnot prepared to leave, and appellant told her she was not going to her aunt's house. Appellant, using profanity, made her get in his van.
Hadnot, who was injured, tried to lie down in appellant's van. Appellant indicated she was not going to her aunt's house, Hadnot had brought everything on herself, and she should not have got him fired from his job. Appellant repeatedly battered Hadnot. Hadnot later went to sleep.
Gertrude Navarro was Hadnot's aunt who lived nearby. Thomas indicated to Navarro that Hadnot had been beaten up and was in the van. Navarro went to the van but appellant told her that Hadnot was asleep. Navarro left, later returned, and appellant said Hadnot was still asleep. Navarro denied Hadnot could have been asleep the entire time and Navarro threatened to call the police if appellant did not release Hadnot. Appellant told Hadnot to see what Navarro wanted and, using profanity, told Hadnot to come right back. Hadnot went to Navarro's house and remained there. About a day and a half passed from the time appellant beat Hadnot to the time she left the van.
On about June 4, 2008, appellant came to the alley near Navarro's house. Appellant looked "crazy like hell," told Hadnot that he was going to get her, and, using profanity, yelled to Hadnot to open the gate because he had something for her. He repeatedly, using profanity, told her to come downstairs. Appellant said, "Bitch, I'm going to kill you tonight." Appellant said he had peeped through Thomas's window and had seen her doing something. Appellant, using profanity, told her to stay out of Thomas's house or appellant would kill her. Appellant said he had something for Hadnot, he would kill her when he saw her, and "I got something for [Thomas], too." Appellant left. Hadnot learned that, the next day, Thomas was dead.
Thomas lived in a multi-unit complex and Errol Lowe's unit was next to Thomas's unit. Lowe testified appellant always had a knife and displayed it when appellant became upset. Hadnot testified appellant had three knives, including one with a white handle. Appellant stuck the knives in the roof of his van by its sliding door to hold in place a blanket that covered the van's window.
Lowe testified as follows. About 10:00 p.m. on June 5, 2008, Lowe was at home and Lowe heard sounds of a struggle coming from Thomas's unit. Lowe put his ear to the wall and heard Thomas speaking in a voice that was "gurgled, . . . like he was regurgitating." Thomas said, " 'Get off me, man. Leave me alone.' " Lowe called 911.
About 10:04 p.m., Long Beach Police Officer Parine South received a call about a family fight. She responded to the call and was looking for 1208 Myrtle. South arrived about 10:45 p.m., spoke with persons including Donnovan Spruell, but later left. Spruell went to Thomas's unit, looked inside its window, and saw Thomas inside lying on the floor. Spruell kicked open the door to Thomas's unit and saw Thomas was not breathing. It appeared Thomas was dead.
Prior to 11:00 p.m. on June 5, 2008, Long Beach Police Officer Todd Jenkins went to Thomas's unit. Thomas had been pronounced dead by rescue personnel. City of Long Beach Forensic Specialist Heather Galloway took a photograph of appellant near the rear of 1208 Myrtle. Appellant's arm was injured. Thomas's fists were towards his chest in a defensive position. Blood was on Thomas's T-shirt, face, arms, hands, and pants. Blood was also on the floor and carpet, and splattered blood was on the bathroom sink. The van was parked in the alley.
Sometime prior to 4:00 a.m. on June 6, 2008, Long Beach Police Officer Michael Hynes arrived at the scene. He saw appellant exit from the sliding door on the passenger side of the van. About 4:00 a.m., Long Beach Police Detective William Matsubara arrived. The van was nearby. About 8:00 a.m., Matsubara collected evidence from the van. A blanket was draped over the passenger side door of the van, and Matsubara pulled it away. When he did, a single-blade knife with a white handle fell. The blade of the knife was about two and a half to three inches long. Blood was on the blade and inside the knife's locking mechanism. Matsubara recovered, inter alia, blue jeans and white socks from the front passenger seat of the van. There were several bloodstains on the pants legs.
Police arrested appellant on June 6, 2008, and rearrested him on June 17, 2008. Sometime after June 6, 2008, Lowe saw appellant in the neighborhood. Lowe testified as follows. Appellant approached Lowe and said, " 'Tell that bitch Virginia she's next,' " and the same thing goes for [Lowe]." Lowe interpreted this as a threat because appellant had been arrested in connection with the killing of Thomas. Appellant asked Lowe about appellant's bicycle. Lowe indicated he did not have it. Appellant shook his head, walked away, and told Lowe that appellant was going to get his bike back. Lowe indicated he did not know where it was, and appellant replied, " 'History will repeat itself.' " Lowe interpreted this as referring to Lowe.
On June 8, 2008, Dr. Ogbonna Chinwah, a Los Angeles County Deputy Medical Examiner, performed an autopsy on Thomas and testified as follows. Thomas died from multiple sharp force injuries to his head, face, neck, chest, shoulders, and hands. There were 61 wounds on Thomas's body. Thomas suffered multiple wounds to his head and face, and at least three of the facial wounds were fatal. He suffered multiple fatal wounds to his neck. There were 23 injuries to Thomas's chest, including fatal stab wounds to his heart and lungs. Thomas also had cuts on the back of his left hand and on his right thumb.
Thomas's DNA was in blood found on the blade and handle of the previously mentioned knife with the white handle, and appellant was excluded as a contributor to that DNA. Thomas's DNA was in blood found on the previously mentioned white sock and was the major contributor to that DNA. There was also an unknown minor contributor. Thomas's DNA was in blood found on the front pants legs of the blue jeans, and that DNA was a mixture of Thomas's DNA as the major contributor and the DNA of a minor contributor. Thomas's DNA was found in another of those bloodstains. Appellant's DNA was the major contributor of four contributors to DNA recovered from the waist of the blue jeans, and Thomas was a possible minor contributor. Thomas's DNA was the major contributor to DNA found in blood in Thomas's home on the bathroom floor, the bathroom floor near the sink, and the sink, and appellant's DNA could not be excluded or included as a contributor to that DNA. Blood on a doorknob in Thomas's home contained his DNA.
Blood was on appellant's right hand, the DNA profile from that blood was a mixture consistent with at least three contributors, and appellant and Thomas were two of the possible contributors. Blood was on appellant's left hand, and the DNA profile from that blood was a mixture consistent with two contributors, and appellant and Thomas were possible contributors. The combined probability of inclusion for the sample from appellant's left hand was 1 out of 57.4 billion of the Caucasian population, 1 out of 1.44 billion of the African-American population, and 1 out of 73.6 billion of the Hispanic population.
2. Defense Evidence.
In defense, appellant presented evidence that no disturbance occurred on June 5, 2008. A physical evidence consultant testified to the effect probative evidence was lost in this case as a result of deficient forensic procedures employed by law enforcement.
ISSUE
Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted other crimes evidence.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Properly Admitted Other Crimes Evidence.
1. Pertinent Facts.
Prior to trial, appellant discussed evidence of two incidents involving appellant and Hadnot, an April 2008 incident in Merced, and a June 2008 incident that occurred shortly before the Thomas killing. Appellant represented the following as to the first incident. Appellant and Hadnot were in, or living in, Merced, the two argued and, according to Hadnot, appellant took a knife and cut off her underwear. Appellant did not injure Hadnot during this incident and no charges were filed based on it.
Appellant represented the following as to the second incident. Hadnot was appellant's occasional girlfriend and, during the second incident, appellant allegedly had a physical altercation with Hadnot although a knife was not involved. Instead, Hadnot claimed appellant hit her with a two-by-four.
Appellant sought exclusion of evidence of the first incident on the ground it was irrelevant since no harm had been inflicted with the knife during the first incident, the second incident did not involve a knife, and Hadnot was claiming with respect to the second incident that appellant hit her with a two-by-four even though he had access to knives in his van. Appellant also argued evidence of the first incident was unduly prejudicial. Appellant asserted the first incident might have been relevant if appellant had been charged with the second incident, i.e., the assault on Hadnot.
Appellant conceded the fact appellant and Hadnot had a "longstanding rocky relationship or volatile relationship" was perhaps relevant. Appellant essentially conceded the second incident was admissible on the issue of appellant's motive to kill Thomas.
The prosecutor argued the first incident was relevant to show appellant was a very possessive person with regard to Hadnot, and this in turn was relevant to show appellant's motive to kill Thomas. The prosecutor argued the fact appellant used a knife during the first incident was telling, but the main point was appellant acted possessively regarding Hadnot.
The court indicated evidence of the first incident was relevant and admissible to show appellant was very possessive of Hadnot, his girlfriend, and dominated her, and this, in turn, was relevant to the issue of appellant's motive to kill Thomas. The court also indicated the first incident was relevant and admissible to show appellant was ready to use violence against Hadnot.
The court further indicated there was no danger of undue prejudice, the court would give a limiting instruction, and the evidence of the first incident was not unduly inflammatory. The court noted the jury would hear evidence that appellant was violent towards Hadnot on the night of the Thomas killing; therefore, evidence of the first incident would not be evidence of an isolated incident. The court concluded the probative value of the proffered evidence was not outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.
During discussions concerning jury instructions, the court suggested it might give a modified CALCRIM No. 375 instruction on uncharged offense evidence, i.e., evidence of the first incident. The court indicated bench notes reflected the court was required to give the instruction when the defendant requested it in an extraordinary case when "unprotested evidence of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence" against the accused and said evidence was minimally relevant and highly prejudicial. Appellant objected to the giving of the modified instruction on the ground the uncharged offense evidence was not highly prejudicial. As a result, the court did not give the instruction.
2. Analysis.
Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted evidence concerning the first incident, i.e., evidence of the April 2008 incident involving appellant's use of a knife to cut off Hadnot's underwear, because said evidence was irrelevant, and excludable under Evidence Code section 352. We disagree.
Evidence Code section 210, states, in pertinent part, that " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness . . . , having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." Evidence Code section 1101, provides, in relevant part: "(a) Except as provided in this section . . . evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. [¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, . . . or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act."
Evidence Code section 352 states, "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." A trial court enjoys broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352, in assessing whether probative value outweighs undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time. (People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1337.) An appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence, including a ruling concerning relevance, Evidence Code section 1101, or Evidence Code section 352 issues. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717, 723-725; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864.)
Evidence of the first incident was relevant to show appellant was possessive of Hadnot. There was also evidence (i.e., evidence of the second incident) that appellant assaulted Hadnot because he was possessive and believed Hadnot and Thomas had engaged in a sexual relationship. Evidence of the first incident, considered with the evidence of the second incident, was relevant to prove appellant's motive to kill Thomas. This is true whether or not appellant was thinking about Thomas at the time of the first incident.
The evidence of the first incident was also relevant as relating to Hadnot's credibility, i.e., supporting her testimony that the second incident occurred. (See People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 230.) Evidence that the second incident occurred was relevant to appellant's motive to kill Thomas. In resolving an Evidence Code section 352 issue, a trial court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value, or even expressly state it has done so. All that is required is that the record demonstrates the trial court understood and fulfilled its responsibilities under section 352. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 213.) We agree with the trial court's analysis and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence.
Further, even if the trial court erred by admitting the challenged evidence, appellant effectively conceded to the trial court during discussions concerning jury instructions that evidence of the first incident was not highly prejudicial. Appellant concedes there was much stronger evidence of appellant's motive "in the form of Hadnot's testimony about Sauls's reaction when he found Hadnot and Thomas together in Thomas's apartment, and in the accusations and threats he made after that incident." If true, this militates against a conclusion the admission of the challenged evidence was prejudicial.
Further still, appellant concedes (1) Thomas's blood was on appellant's knife, (2) "Thomas's blood was on a pair of jeans that were found in the van and may have belonged to [appellant]," and (3) "Much of the DNA evidence collected from the bathroom was a mixture containing Thomas's DNA and the DNA of more than one other person," but appellant suggests the above evidence was insufficiently connected with appellant. However, we have recited in our Factual Summary the pertinent facts in this case and, in light of all of the evidence in this case, the jury reasonably could have drawn, as to the above three facts, inferences adverse to appellant.
Indeed, given all the evidence in this case, including the unchallenged evidence of appellant's conduct, and threats of violence towards, Hadnot and Thomas, we conclude the admission of the challenged evidence of the first incident, i.e., appellant's April 2008 use of the knife in Merced to cut Hadnot's shorts, was not prejudicial (cf. People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836) (and this includes appellant's related April 2008 conduct, i.e., his attempts to get Sylvester to drink and appellant's additional assaults upon Hadnot) and the application of the ordinary rules of evidence, as here, did not violate appellant's right to due process (cf. People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 427-428).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KITCHING, J. We concur:
KLEIN, P.J.
ALDRICH, J.