Opinion
2019–11024
12-08-2021
PEOPLE of State of New York, respondent, v. Warren SATORNINO, appellant.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Amanda E. Schaefer of counsel), for appellant. Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Timothy P. Finnerty of counsel), for respondent.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Amanda E. Schaefer of counsel), for appellant.
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Timothy P. Finnerty of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, WILLIAM G. FORD, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County (Karen M. Wilutis, J.), dated September 5, 2019, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6–C.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In 1984, the defendant was convicted, upon a jury verdict, of attempted rape in the first degree and reckless endangerment in the second degree. Following a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6–C; hereinafter SORA), the County Court assessed the defendant 135 points, and designated him a level three sex offender. The defendant appeals.
The defendant contends that certain records relating to his Sex Offender Counseling and Treatment Program were obtained in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ( Pub L 104–191, 110 U.S. Stat 1936) and its accompanying privacy rules (45 CFR parts 160, 164). Thus, he contends that those records should not have been admitted into evidence at the SORA hearing with regard to the assessment of points under risk factor 12 (acceptance of responsibility). This contention is unpreserved for appellate review, since the defendant did not raise this ground at the SORA hearing (see generally People v. Mosqueda, 172 A.D.3d 1412, 1413, 99 N.Y.S.3d 636 ; People v. Destio, 145 A.D.3d 1047, 1048, 45 N.Y.S.3d 487 ). In any event, any error in the admission of those records was harmless (see People v. Young, 186 A.D.3d 1546, 1548, 129 N.Y.S.3d 490 ). The other evidence presented by the People, which included, inter alia, statements contained in the case summary (see People v. Mingo, 12 N.Y.3d 563, 573, 883 N.Y.S.2d 154, 910 N.E.2d 983 ) that the defendant was previously expelled from two sex offender treatment programs (see People v. George, 142 A.D.3d 1059, 1060, 38 N.Y.S.3d 561 ; People v. Grigg, 112 A.D.3d 802, 803, 977 N.Y.S.2d 84 ), provided ample basis for the County Court's determination as to that risk factor (see People v. Young, 186 A.D.3d at 1548, 129 N.Y.S.3d 490 ; People v. O'Connor, 156 A.D.3d 442, 64 N.Y.S.3d 536 ).
Although the defendant contends that 15 points should not have been assessed under risk factor 1 (use of violence, inflicted physical injury), an elimination of those points would not change the defendant's presumptive risk level.
The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination. Accordingly, the County Court properly designated the defendant a level three sex offender.
RIVERA, J.P., CHAMBERS, FORD and DOWLING, JJ., concur.