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People v. Sargeant

California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division
Sep 30, 2008
No. A112220 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LARRY BRANT SARGEANT, Defendant and Appellant. A112220 California Court of Appeal, First District, Third Division September 30, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

Alameda County Super. Ct. No. C149313

Siggins, J.

The California Supreme Court granted review in this case and transferred it back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 (Towne) and People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 (Sandoval). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Larry Sargeant was charged with and convicted of vandalism of a place of worship after he attacked a large religious statue at the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in Oakland. In March 2007, we affirmed his conviction but, in reliance on Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 850] (Cunningham), we reversed his sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. On June 13, 2007, the Supreme Court granted the People’s petition for review and deferred briefing pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2). On August 27, 2008, the court transferred the case back to this court with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Towne and Sandoval.

The Trial Court’s Sentencing Decision

The trial court imposed a three-year aggravated term based on factors not found by a jury: that defendant’s crime involved an act of great violence and callousness toward the many people in the vicinity; that defendant was armed with an axe and knife; that the manner in which the crime was committed indicated a depth of planning; that defendant had engaged in violent conduct now and in the past, indicating a serious danger to society; defendant’s willingness to commit similar attacks in the future; and his unsatisfactory performance on probation.

On appeal, we held the court’s reliance on the above factors implicated Cunningham, supra, and on that basis reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing. We now revisit that holding in light of the subsequent Supreme Court authority.

DISCUSSION

In Cunningham, our high court concluded that California’s determinate sentencing law violates the Sixth Amendment because it “allocates to judges sole authority to find facts permitting the imposition of an upper term sentence.” (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct at p. 870].) The court explained: “[T]he Federal Constitution’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.” (Id. at p. 860.)

Subsequently, the Court held in Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th 825 that the denial of the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances is reviewed under the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). To conduct this analysis we “determine whether, if the question of the existence of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances had been submitted to the jury, the jury’s verdict would have authorized the upper term sentence. . . . . ‘[S]o long as a defendant is eligible for the upper term by virtue of facts that have been established consistently with Sixth Amendment principles, the federal Constitution permits the trial court to rely upon any number of aggravating circumstances in exercising its discretion to select the appropriate term by balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, regardless of whether the facts underlying those circumstances have been found to be true by a jury.’ [Citation] By the same reasoning, if a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury, the Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless.” (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 838-839.)

Such is the case here. One basis for the court’s sentencing decision was its finding under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2) that defendant was armed with an axe and a knife when he committed the crime. Not only was this undisputed; defendant admitted at trial that he armed himself with these weapons to assault the statue because the “heavenly father insisted” that he do so. We are well aware of the dangers inherent in applying Chapman analysis to findings that depend on subjective and vague standards and “require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts,” such as whether the victims were particularly vulnerable or the crime involved “great violence” or “great bodily harm.” (See Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840.) Under such subjective standards, “it may be difficult to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” (Ibid.) In this case, however, the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance was uncontested and defendant admitted the relevant facts. We are therefore satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found the defendant was armed with an axe or knife. Accordingly, under Sandoval, the error was harmless.

DISPOSITION

Our prior decision in this matter is vacated. The judgment is affirmed in all respects.

We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Pollak, J.


Summaries of

People v. Sargeant

California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division
Sep 30, 2008
No. A112220 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Sargeant

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LARRY BRANT SARGEANT, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division

Date published: Sep 30, 2008

Citations

No. A112220 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)