Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04F10025
ROBIE, J.
Defendant Rodrigo Sandoval was charged with one count of possessing an inmate-manufactured “stabbing weapon” while confined in a penal institution. The amended information also alleged that defendant had two prior felony convictions. The court bifurcated the two prior felony allegations from the possession charge.
Before trial the court denied defendant’s two motions to strike one of his prior felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530. A jury subsequently found defendant guilty of the possession charge. Defendant waived a jury trial on the prior felony allegations and the trial court found those allegations to be true. The court then denied a renewed Romero motion to strike one of the prior felony convictions. Subsequently, the court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life in accordance with the three strikes law.
On appeal, defendant contends “the trial court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss one of [his] strike priors.” Specifically, defendant contends the court “did not give sufficient weight to the nature and circumstances of [his current] crime, but instead based its denial of [his] Romero motion on the nature of his [prior felony convictions].” Upon review of the proceedings, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s multiple motions to dismiss one of his prior felony convictions. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant is an inmate at Folsom State Prison. On July 9, 2004, correctional officers conducted a search of defendant and his cell. During the search, the officers encountered an inmate-manufactured “stabbing weapon” hidden in defendant’s shoe. The weapon consisted of a nail that had been fused with a plastic pen. Officers confiscated the weapon and placed defendant in restraints.
Defendant requested that the preliminary hearing magistrate strike one of his prior felony convictions. The court denied the motion without prejudice so that the trial court could rehear it. The trial court held a Romero hearing before trial and ultimately denied defendant’s motion to strike one of his prior felony convictions.
In December 1998, defendant was convicted of assault with a firearm after shooting a rival gang member in the back, chest, and arm with a shotgun. In 2002, defendant was convicted of inflicting great bodily injury after stabbing another person in the back twice in a gang-related altercation.
Defendant’s criminal history also includes at least two nonstrike offenses where he was found to be in possession of a weapon.
Defendant waived a jury trial as to the prior allegations and the trial court found them to be true. Immediately following this finding, the court held another Romero hearing where defendant testified that he had fashioned the weapon strictly as a means of self-protection, in light of recent race riots that had taken place at the prison. Defendant submitted that the weapon was for protection only and should not be seen as indicative of his alleged aggressive and violent nature. The court heard further arguments and, again, decided not to exercise its discretion to strike one of defendant’s prior felony convictions.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his multiple Romero motions. He contends the court “did not give sufficient weight to the nature of the circumstances of [his current] crime, but instead based its denial of [his] Romero request on the nature of his [prior felony convictions].” We disagree.
A trial court has discretion to strike a prior serious felony conviction only if the defendant falls outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (Pen. Code, § 1385; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161; People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-532.) In deciding whether to do so, the court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Williams, at p. 161.)
The trial court’s “failure to . . . strike a prior [felony] conviction allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [citation].” (Id. at p. 378.) In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are “guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve the legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’ [Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at pp. 376-377.)
Thus, only in “an extraordinary case--where the relevant factors described in Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable minds could differ” -- would the failure to strike a prior felony conviction be an abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
In support of his motion to strike the prior felony convictions, defendant testified that his cell block had been placed on lockdown as a result of a recent race riot and that he constructed and possessed the weapon only as a means of self-protection. Defendant then adverted to what he considered the rather de minimis nature of this “victimless” crime, pointing out that he had “merely possess[ed] [the] weapon” and had not attempted to use it on anyone.
The trial court conceded that defendant’s current offense, in and of itself, is “not a highly serious crime”; however, when cast against the backdrop of his previous violent convictions, the current offense is certainly demonstrative of defendant’s “very strong violent tendencies.”
In his brief, defendant argues that the trial court erred by overemphasizing his criminal history and did not give sufficient weight to the nature of the current crime. Defendant cites People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968 and People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s criminal history is relevant, but not singularly dispositive. We disagree with defendant’s contentions. The trial court gave appropriate consideration to both the nature of the current crime and to his criminal history.
Given the fact that both of defendant’s prior felony convictions were violent in nature, it is incontrovertible that defendant has displayed extremely violent tendencies. Defendant’s criminal history also includes at least two other instances, in addition to his strike offenses, where he was found to be in possession of a weapon. In this case defendant once again armed himself with a “stabbing weapon.” It is in this light that any “de minimis” nature of the current offense becomes overshadowed by defendant’s prior felony convictions and violent nature.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant is an individual with “very strong violent tendencies” who has “an affinity to be armed.” This determination, coupled with the high level of deference given to the trial court, leads us to conclude that the trial court’s decision is not “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant’s Romero motions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., MORRISON, J.