Opinion
B200414
4-23-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANK SANDERS, Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen M. Redmond, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Frank Sanders was convicted of one count of possessing cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and placed on probation under Proposition 36. He appeals, contending the trial court should have granted his Pitchess motion. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Los Angeles Police Department Officers Nhut Huynh and Norma Stang were on patrol near Skid Row when they noticed a tarp stretched over two shopping carts to form a temporary shelter, with two sets of feet sticking out at the bottom. As the officers approached the cart, Officer Huynh saw Sanders place a glass cocaine pipe under a blanket, then saw an off-white rock solid resembling cocaine base drop from Sanderss hand. Officer Huynh recovered the pipe and the rock.
Sanders was arrested and taken to the police station, where Officer Huynh advised him of his right to remain silent, which Sanders waived — and told the officer that he had the pipe and cocaine for his personal use, that he had made a mistake, and that he had "slipped." Officer Huynh wrote down Sanderss statements, which Sanders read and then signed. Sanders was charged with possession of the cocaine.
At trial, the People presented evidence of the facts summarized above. Sanders testified in his own defense, explaining that he was in the Skid Row area because he has a "relationship with God" and goes there to "minister to people [who are] down and out." The shelter belonged to a woman he knew who had invited him inside her "hut." He said he did not have a pipe or rock cocaine, and did not drop a rock. He said he told the police at the scene that the pipe and rock were not his, but Officer Huynh told him, "Dont give me that bullshit. This is yours." Sanders said he was "very freaked out" when he was told he was being taken to the station, and that he pleaded with the officers "to not do this because [he had] a wife, a job[,] . . . a relationship with [his] church," and he did not want the "embarrassment." He said he was "out of it" at the station, "scared to death" because he was being "falsely accused," and did not read or understand the statement he signed. He said he did not tell the officer that the pipe and rock were his.
On cross-examination, Sanders acknowledged that he had been advised of his rights and nevertheless agreed to talk to the officers, but he insisted that he signed the statement only because he "just wanted to get out of there." The jury rejected Sanderss testimony and convicted him as charged.
DISCUSSION
We reject Sanderss contention that the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial Pitchess motion.
A.
Sanderss Pitchess motion asked for all complaints against the two officers relating to racial, gender, ethnic or sexual orientation bias, coercive conduct, violation of constitutional rights, fabrication of charges, illegal searches, false arrests, and reports of dishonesty. In a supporting declaration, Sanderss lawyer offered the following statement in an attempt to establish good cause for the requested discovery:
"Upon information and belief, [Sanders] used to be a cook at the Mission. On the date in question he saw a woman who he recognized from the Mission. She was sitting in a hut between two shopping carts covered with blankets. The blankets reached the floor on the sides and came half way down in the front. [Sanders] layed [sic] down next to her to speak to her[, then] saw the officers feet as they approached. He was not in possession of a pipe or a rock. He never put a pipe under the blanket and did not drop a rock. The officer did recover a pipe and rock. [Sanders] was outside of the hut when the items were discovered and he doesnt know exactly where they were found. Defendant has been clean for several years and he didnt want his wife or job to find out about the arrest so he signed the statement because he thought he could escape going to jail. He initially told Officer Stang the truth but Officer Stang got very irritable with him. Officer Stang threatened that if [Sanders] did not sign the statement he would say [Sanders] was offering drugs for a sexual relationship. [Sanders] thought his chances of going home and not having people find out about the arrest were best if he signed the statement."
The trial court denied the motion.
B.
As the trial court pointed out, the affidavit filed in support of Sanderss Pitchess motion did no more than disagree with the officers version of the relevant events, and did not offer an alternative reason for Sanderss presence in the "hut" or an explanation for the source of the pipe or the cocaine. Accordingly, the motion was insufficient to justify an invasion into the officers privacy interests in their personnel records. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1227.) As our Supreme Court explained in Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019-1021, a defendant seeking access to law enforcement personnel records must provide a "specific factual scenario" establishing a "plausible factual foundation" for his allegation of police misconduct, a "logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge," and he must articulate "how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officers version of events." (See also City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81-84; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146-1147.)
Good cause does not exist in every case, and the trial court is entitled to exercise its discretion in favor of protecting the officers privacy when there is no showing that the requested materials will furnish a plausible justification for inspection. Conclusory assertions of misconduct are insufficient because they do not permit the trial court to determine whether the documents sought are material to the issues in the pending case. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1139, 1149.)
Sanderss motion did not establish the required good cause because it was not specifically tailored to the alleged misconduct, because there was no reason given, plausible or otherwise, for the presence of the pipe and the drugs, and because Sanderss assertion that he signed the confession to avoid embarrassment is simply not plausible. (People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1318 [the motion must include a factual account that is something more than "merely imaginable or conceivable"].) The motion was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, J.
JACKSON, J. --------------- Notes: Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.