Opinion
D083438
08-12-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant and Defendant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin H. Urbanski and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. SCE186438, Lisa R. Rodriguez, Judge.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant and Defendant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin H. Urbanski and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
IRION, Acting P. J.
Jose Sanchez was convicted of premeditated attempted murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a felon. His sentence for these crimes was enhanced in various ways, including a prison prior which was stayed at sentencing. He now appeals the trial court's denial of his request for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (a), which directs trial courts to resentence inmates currently serving a sentence, including a now invalid prison prior enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The trial court found Sanchez ineligible for relief because his enhancement was stayed at sentencing, as opposed to being executed, and therefore not "imposed" for purposes of the statute.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We agree with Sanchez's argument that a prison prior for a conviction other than a sexually violent offense need only be imposed to trigger resentencing relief.
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying relief to Sanchez and remand the matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because Sanchez's appeal relates solely to the trial court's denial of his request for full resentencing, we limit our discussion of the factual and procedural background accordingly.
A. Underlying Conviction
In 1998, a jury found Sanchez guilty of premeditated attempted murder (§§187, 189, 664), aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. (b)), and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found the special allegations to be true, including that Sanchez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that Sanchez served a prison term prior under section 667.5, former subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced Sanchez to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder, followed by a consecutive term of 25 years for the firearm enhancement. The trial court imposed and stayed a one-year enhancement for Sanchez's prison prior.
B. Petition for Resentencing Relief
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), identified Sanchez as an inmate serving a sentence that included a prison prior enhancement. Following its review, the trial court issued an order tentatively denying relief and appointing a public defender for further briefing on the issue.
Sanchez argued that the plain language, and alternatively the legislative history, of section 1172.75 requires full resentencing for all defendants with a prison prior "enhancement[ ] included in their judgement, whether [such] enhancements were executed or not." Further, he maintained that although the stayed prison prior constituted an unauthorized sentence, merely striking the prior is an insufficient remedy. The record before us does not contain the People's response to Sanchez's petition below.
The trial court rejected Sanchez's contentions, interpreting section 1172.75 to mean that resentencing is appropriate only if "a defendant is currently serving an additional year in prison because of the imposition of the punishment for enhancement." The trial court found that because Sanchez's prison prior was stayed and he "is not serving additional time . . . and never could be subjected to additional time for it," he was ineligible for resentencing relief. Moreover, the trial court found that because the original sentence was unauthorized, the appropriate remedy on review was to strike the enhancement. Having done so, the trial court determined there was no relief available to Sanchez under section 1172.75 and denied his request for resentencing. Sanchez timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
Sanchez argues the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for resentencing relief pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a). He contends that the trial court's interpretation of the statute is neither supported by its plain language nor its legislative history. Instead, Sanchez argues that a prison prior enhancement is "imposed" for purposes of section 1172.75 regardless of whether it is stayed, stricken, or imposed and executed.
The People reject Sanchez's interpretation. They assert section 1172.75 is logical and harmonious only when subdivision (a) is read to require a prison prior to be imposed and executed. They rely on our sister court's decision in People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 (Rhodius), review granted February 21, 2024, S283169, where the court concluded that a prison prior must extend a defendant's sentence to be considered "imposed." (Id. at p. 44.) The court in Rhodius reasoned that without such an extension, the section 1172.75 resentencing cannot fulfill its purpose of reducing a defendant's sentence upon recall. (Ibid.; § 1172.75, subd. (d) ["resentencing . . . shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement"].) Finally, the People contend that the trial court was not obliged to resentence Sanchez after it struck the unauthorized prison prior.
The question of whether a defendant, whose prison prior was imposed and stayed, is eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (a) has divided the Courts of Appeal. (Compare People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270 (Saldana), review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 [finding inmates with an imposed but stayed prison prior entitled to full resentencing]; People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300 (Christianson), review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 [same] with Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted [interpreting the statute to require a prison prior to be imposed and executed to qualify an inmate for resentencing].) The issue is now being considered by the California Supreme Court.
Pending resolution of the issue by the California Supreme Court, we adhere to our court's decision in Christianson and conclude Sanchez is entitled to a full resentencing.
A. Guiding Legal Principles
Section 667.5, former subdivision (b), instructed trial courts to "impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term" served by a defendant who failed to remain custody free for a minimum of five years. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65.) In 2020, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 amending section 667.5, subdivision (b). The amendment provided the enhancement applies solely to prior terms served for sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature added section 1172.75 to the Penal Code to enable retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 136. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) The stated purpose of the statute is to "ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing[.]" (Ibid.) Accordingly, section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that "any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid." (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
At the time of enactment, section 1172.75 was initially numbered section 1171.1, but was later renumbered without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) We refer to the provision by its current numbering, section 1172.75.
Subdivision (b) of section 1172.75 requires that the CDCR and the county correctional administrator of each county identify and refer to the original sentencing court "those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)." (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Upon reviewing and verifying the imposition of a now invalid prior prison enhancement, the trial court must recall and resentence the defendant. (Id., subd. (c).) Resentencing shall "result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement." (Id., subd. (d).)
Whether a now invalid prison prior enhancement, that was stayed at the time of sentencing, is considered "imposed" under section 1172.75 is a question of law, reviewed de novo. (People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61.)
B. Application
In Christianson, our court acknowledged that "[o]n its face, the word 'imposed,' in this context, is at least somewhat ambiguous." (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.) However, our court declined to endorse the interpretation of section 1172.75 that the People put forth in this appeal: namely, that the Legislature intended the word imposed to be limited only to those prison prior enhancements that were imposed and executed. (See Christianson, at p. 311.)
Rather, in referencing the plain language of section 1172.75, subdivision (b), Christianson observed that the section references only those whose judgment includes a prison prior enhancement, "regardless of whether it is imposed or stayed." (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.) Christianson made clear that:
"[A]ll that is required for the CDCR to identify an inmate under section 1172.75, subdivision (b) is for the enhancement to be included in the abstract of judgment, regardless of whether it is imposed or stayed. Had the Legislature intended for the language in subdivision (b) to limit the identification to those inmates that would necessarily be required to serve an additional term based on the enhancement, it certainly could have done so." (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.)
After the CDCR identifies the enhancement, the trial court "must then 'verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).' [Citation.] At this point, the incorporation of subdivision (a) requires that the current judgment include a sentencing enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). However, the use of the word 'verify' suggests that the sentencing court is doing just that, verifying that the individual the CDCR identified is in fact an individual described by the statute, not looking to see if the inmate meets an additional requirement (i.e., that the enhancement is imposed and not stayed.)" (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.)
Moreover, we have previously rejected the proposition that a prison prior must be executed so that removal of the enhancement on resentencing will result in a shorter term. Specifically, we held that because "the trial court retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the [enhancement] term under certain circumstance[s]" a stayed enhancement "remains as part of the judgment and continues to carry the potential for an increased sentence in certain circumstances[.]" (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.) Therefore, removal of the prison prior "does provide some relief to the defendant by eliminating that potential." (Ibid.)
Finally, the legislative history of section 1172.75 undercuts the People's assertion that the trial court was only required to strike Sanchez's prison prior to remedy his unauthorized sentence and now invalid prison prior. As noted in Christianson, the Legislature amended the legislation enacting section 1172.75 to require trial courts to conduct full resentencing for those with a prison prior enhancement. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 315.) Such change appears to be "driven, in part, by concerns over the legality of administratively amending abstracts, as opposed to the more common practice of conducting a full resentencing." (Id. at p. 314.) Furthermore, had the Legislature intended striking a prison prior to be an appropriate remedy, "it certainly could have included language to that effect in the statute." (Id. at p. 316.) Rather, the Legislature chose to amend the legislation enacting section 1172.75 "to remove the previous language directing the trial courts to administratively strike the enhancement without [including a] carveout for stayed enhancements suggest that [they] intended for section 1172.75 to apply equally in both cases." (Christianson, at p. 316.)
In sum, we adopt the analysis and conclusions from Christianson as though they were set forth in full in this opinion. It is apparent the trial court erred here when it declined to grant relief to Sanchez. The prior prison enhancement is legally invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a). Because a legally invalid prior prison enhancement was imposed, the trial court must recall the sentence and conduct a full resentencing proceeding. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c); see Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, review granted.) During the resentencing proceeding, the trial court "shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing." (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
DISPOSITION
The denial order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to recall the sentence and conduct a full resentencing proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d).
WE CONCUR: DATO, J., CASTILLO, J.