Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. SCN164101, Marguerite L. Wagner, Judge.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
A jury convicted Antonio Sanchez of three counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The court sentenced him to 15 years to life in prison. Sanchez appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted statements related to a past uncharged crime and failed to give limiting instructions to the jury. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 26, 2003, Sanchez and a companion transported four illegal aliens in a van eastbound on California state highway 78. Highway 78 is a steep, two-lane road with one lane in each direction. The lanes are mostly divided by double yellow lines, indicating that cars may not pass slower traffic by entering oncoming traffic lanes. The highway is very narrow with many curves and switchbacks, and drivers cannot see oncoming traffic in many places.
At one point during the trip, there were two vehicles ahead of Sanchez: a pickup truck directly in front of him and an 18-wheel semitruck in front of the pickup truck. The driver of the pickup truck illegally passed the semitruck by traveling into oncoming traffic lanes and, in doing so, caught the attention of a passing California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer. The CHP officer made a u-turn and intended to pursue the pickup truck for the traffic violation. Believing the CHP officer was coming after him, Sanchez also illegally overtook the semitruck in the same manner as the pickup truck. The CHP officer refocused his attention to Sanchez and attempted to pull him over. Sanchez failed to stop and fled at a high rate of speed. As he did so, the undercarriage of his van struck the pavement as he drove through dips in the road, and the van fishtailed slightly as he fought to regain control. Sanchez drove into curves in the road at a high rate of speed and, although he applied his brakes, he drove into opposing traffic lanes as he maneuvered the curves. Sanchez drove into the last of approximately five curves in this manner at 82 to 88 miles per hour. Due to his speed, Sanchez was unable to negotiate the final curve and collided head-on with an oncoming car. The driver of the oncoming car was seriously injured and trapped in his vehicle, but survived the collision. Three of Sanchez's passengers died in the collision.
DISCUSSION
I
SANCHEZ'S 2000 INCIDENT STATEMENT
Sanchez contends the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 when it admitted portions of a presentencing probation report from a 2000 incident in order to establish Sanchez's knowledge that his actions endangered the lives of others. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Evidence of a defendant's other crimes or misconduct is admissible to prove, among other things, "knowledge" and "absence of mistake or accident," provided its potential prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its relevance. (Evid. Code, §§ 352, 1101, subd. (b).) We review the trial court's determination on admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's ruling, and will reverse only if the trial " ' "court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." ' [Citations.]" (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 437-438.)
B. Analysis
At trial, prosecutors introduced into evidence a probation officer's report of a 2000 incident where Sanchez led Border Patrol agents on a pursuit in a van containing 37 illegal aliens. The pursuit ended when officers deployed spike strips and deflated the van's tires. The agent who interviewed Sanchez wrote: "[Sanchez] realizes that by agreeing to be the driver of the van he exposed [his passengers] to unnecessary danger in the event of an accident." The court also admitted additional portions of the report to provide context for the statement. Specifically, the court allowed the following portions:
"The defendant agreed to drive the smuggling vehicle in lieu of paying a $1200 smuggling fee. He planned to travel to Lompoc, California and find work. He made arrangements with someone in downtown Tijuana to illegally cross into the United States. He admitted he crossed with a group of illegal aliens and assisted them in their travels through the desert. [¶] Upon arrival at a location near Interstate 8 in San Diego, California, the defendant entered the van as the driver. When asked why he did not initially stop when Border Patrol agents pursued him, he shrugged his shoulders and did not offer a response. He admitted he stopped the vehicle only after the tire deflation device had been activated. [¶] He regrets his involvement in the instant offense. He hopes he can be forgiven for all the problems he caused and wants to return to Mexico to be with his family. In hindsight, he admitted traveling across the desert was not a good idea. Furthermore, he realizes by agreeing to be the driver of the van he exposed those persons to unnecessary danger in the event of an accident."
The court believed that this statement was probative of knowledge but "sanitized" the original statement to exclude any mention of the number of people in the van and any mention of the conviction that resulted from the incident.
While admitting "there is no question . . . that the prior offenses of evading police and illegally transporting undocumented aliens are similar to the underlying acts in the present case," Sanchez argues the 2000 incident report was not relevant to any issue in question and should have been excluded.
In a vehicular homicide case, a defendant may be convicted of second degree murder if he or she acted with implied malice. (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296; People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 954-955.) Implied malice exists when the defendant "knowing that his conduct endangers the life of another, nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life." (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 296.) The mental state for implied malice is measured by a subjective standard; i.e., the defendant must actually appreciate the risk involved. (Id. at pp. 296-297.) Relevant evidence is evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210, italics added.)
The central issue at trial was Sanchez's actual knowledge that he placed his passengers' lives at risk when he fled from authorities. Sanchez's prior statement bore directly on this issue, as it demonstrated existing knowledge of the risks involved when he fled from authorities. Sanchez argues that minor factual differences between the 2000 incident and the instant offense render the statement irrelevant. However, these factual differences go to the weight of the evidence and are more properly presented to the jury, who can weigh the differences and reject the testimony if they so choose. Furthermore, any possible prejudicial effect was limited here since the jury knew from the testimony of the surviving passengers that Sanchez was smuggling aliens at the time of the collision. The jury would still have known Sanchez was a smuggler had the 2000 incident statement been excluded. Because Sanchez's prior testimony was probative of the knowledge element and the trial court limited its prejudicial effect, we cannot conclude the trial " ' "court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." ' [Citations.]" (People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 437-438.) The trial court did not err.
Sanchez points to the following factual differences: In the 2000 incident, he fled on a major highway at normal speeds and the freeway had no visibility issues or sharp curves. Sanchez also argues the statement does not accurately reflect what he said at the time because he had a third-grade education, spoke little English, and likely said anything to the probation officer in order to get the lowest possible sentence.
II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO GIVE LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
Sanchez contends the trial court erred by not instructing that prior uncharged offenses must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and by not instructing on the limited admissibility of the evidence. We disagree.
The trial court "shall [instruct the jury] on any points of law pertinent to the issue, if requested by either party . . . ." (Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. (f).) However, trial courts have no general duty to instruct sua sponte on the limited admissibility of evidence. (People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 875.)
Sanchez argues the trial court should have instructed the jury with CALCRIM 375. CALCRIM 375 specifically addresses uncharged offenses and instructs the jury that they may disregard evidence if the prosecution fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the uncharged offense occurred. CALCRIM 375 further instructs that the jury may only use this evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether a defendant has the requisite intent to commit the charged offense. Not only did the trial court here have no duty to instruct the jury, but Sanchez's desired instructions were actively discussed in the trial court.
The prosecution initially submitted CALCRIM 375 but later withdrew the instruction after determining it was inapplicable to the case. After discussion, Sanchez also agreed CALCRIM 375 was inapplicable and made no further arguments for the instruction. The court then offered to modify CALCRIM 303 to include a reference to "the prior conduct of smuggling aliens . . . ." The court noted that the modified instruction may "highlight" the prior conduct but left the choice to modify it to Sanchez. The choice to modify CALCRIM 303 to make it specifically address the 2000 incident fully belonged to Sanchez; both the court and prosecution gave Sanchez the opportunity to make this modification. Sanchez chose the unmodified version of CALCRIM 303, and cannot now complain about the inadequacy of the unmodified instruction.
CALCRIM 303 instructs: "During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and no other."
Sanchez's reliance on the narrow exception recognized in People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 (Collie) is misplaced. The Collie court emphasized the truly exceptional circumstances that must be present before such a sua sponte obligation could arise: "Neither precedent nor policy favors a rule that would saddle the trial court with the duty either to interrupt the testimony sua sponte to admonish the jury whenever a witness implicates the defendant in another offense, or to review the entire record at trial's end in search of such testimony. There may be an occasional extraordinary case in which unprotected evidence of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose.
In such a setting, the evidence might be so obviously important to the case that sua sponte instruction would be needed to protect the defendant from his counsel's inadvertence. " (Id. at p. 64, italics added.)
In stark contrast to the hypothetical extraordinary situation discussed in Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d 43, in the case at bar, the statement from the 2000 incident was highly relevant to the issue of subjective knowledge that was central to the case and, while highly probative, was not unduly prejudicial. The straightforward use of this evidence presented none of the extreme risks of improper use of "predisposition evidence" that would warrant a departure from the general rule recognized in Collie.
We conclude the trial court did not err because it did not have a sua sponte duty to provide limiting instructions after Sanchez agreed with the inapplicability of CALCRIM 375 and the reading of an unmodified version of CALCRIM 303.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J., AARON, J.