Opinion
E074527
12-15-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID MONTOYA SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Bosky Kathuria and Bosky Kathuria for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. INF1400117) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Anthony R. Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Bosky Kathuria and Bosky Kathuria for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted David Montoya Sanchez of first degree murder and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon (a knife) in committing the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that Sanchez suffered two prior strike convictions and two prior serious felony convictions, but the court then struck one of the prior strikes and one of the prior serious felony convictions. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a), (c), (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) Sanchez was sentenced to six years plus 50 years to life.
On appeal, Sanchez contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial error by invoking the prestige of her office to attack the credibility of a witness during closing argument. Because we conclude that any error was not prejudicial, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
A. The Stabbing
On January 13, 2014, Arthur C., a 57 year old man, was stabbed nine times and died from the resulting wounds. Four of the wounds were to his chest. Two of those were considered significant and deadly, including one that struck his aorta. Two other wounds were on his back, and three were defensive wounds on his arm.
We abbreviate the names of the victim and the witnesses to protect their privacy. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b).) No disrespect is intended.
The day after Arthur was stabbed, an investigator for the homicide unit of the Riverside County Sheriff's Department interviewed Deeana S. in connection with the killing. The same investigator interviewed Deeana again the following month. There were no signs that Deeana was under the influence of alcohol or any drugs during either interview.
Deeana told the investigator that she first met Arthur in December 2013. During their initial meeting, Deeana agreed to give Arthur a ride, and in exchange he would purchase groceries for her. Arthur purchased $67 worth of groceries on his government-issued debit card, and Deeana agreed to reimburse him $80 from her government-issued debit card, on which she expected to receive funds the next day. Deeana met with Arthur several days later and gave him her card so that he could purchase the agreed-upon amount of groceries.
Several days later, Deeana went to retrieve her card from Arthur and noticed that he had a car full of groceries. He did not return her card during that encounter, and Deeana provided two different accounts explaining that failure: Arthur said either that he had not yet had an opportunity to purchase his groceries or that he did not have the card because someone else had taken it. Deeana told Arthur to "make it right," so he left with a friend of Deeana's to retrieve the card, returned sometime later, and gave Deeana her card. Deeana learned that the card did not have any money left on it. At some point while Arthur was in possession of Deeana's card, Deeana received a letter from the State of California indicating that $668 had been credited to her card, which was more than she thought was available on it.
Within a few weeks after Arthur gave Deeana her card back, Deeana contacted Sanchez, the paternal uncle of her children, and asked him to help her get Arthur to repay her. Sanchez went to Arthur's residence and gave Arthur until Friday, January 10, 2014, to pay Deeana. Arthur did not comply. Deeana thought that Sanchez would at most beat up Arthur for not repaying her.
On the night of January 13, 2014, Sanchez, a male relative of his, and the relative's former girlfriend drove to Arthur's residence. The female passenger was seated in the backseat of the car. Sanchez and his relative exited the car at Arthur's residence and spoke with someone later identified as Arthur outside of the residence. The female passenger later told a law enforcement officer that from the car she saw Sanchez suddenly start swinging at Arthur, causing Arthur to fall to the ground. She thought that Sanchez was hitting Arthur with his fists. Arthur might have attempted to fight back, but he fell. The attack ended quickly, and Sanchez and his passengers drove away.
That night, V.P. was staying at Arthur's residence and was outside smoking when Sanchez's car pulled up. While Arthur spoke with the driver outside, V.P. went inside the house. Arthur and the driver were not arguing. Sometime in the next few minutes, V.P. "saw another person from inside the house run outside screaming." V.P. followed that unidentified person outside and saw Arthur lying on the ground and two men standing, one of whom was next to Arthur. From a photographic lineup, V.P. identified Sanchez as the man who was standing next to Arthur. Sanchez "looked [V.P.] in the eyes and said, 'Take him to the hospital if you want him to live. Take him to the hospital. Tell him tomorrow will be double.'" Sanchez then kicked Arthur. Law enforcement was called at approximately 7:20 p.m. and found Arthur lying in the front yard bleeding and unconscious. Arthur was wearing dark clothing, which a law enforcement investigator explained would have masked bloodstains to witnesses.
Five phone calls were exchanged between the cell phones of Sanchez and Deeana between 6:32 p.m. and 7:17 p.m. Between 8:03 p.m. and 11:31 p.m., another nine calls were exchanged between the two cell phones.
Later that night, law enforcement received a tip from a confidential informant identifying Sanchez and leading investigators to conclude that he was a possible suspect in the stabbing. Using global positioning system tracking data from Sanchez's cell phone, law enforcement officers located and detained Sanchez the next day. He had a knife in his front right pocket. Traces of blood from Arthur and Sanchez were found on the knife. The major source of blood on the knife's blade was Arthur. B. Deeana's Testimony
Deeana testified at trial. She claimed not to remember anything that she had told police in her two interviews with them, and she said she did not remember anything about the events preceding the killing of Arthur. She remembered speaking to the police but could not recall whether she was lying when she did so. She claimed to be under the influence of numerous drugs during her initial interview. She testified that she already knew Arthur before the day that she gave him a ride, and she claimed that he was her drug dealer. She could not remember anything about giving Arthur her debit card or about his owing her money. Deeana claimed to have fallen and hit her head on the ground approximately three months before testifying. C. Defense Theory of the Case
In closing argument, defense counsel conceded that Sanchez stabbed Arthur with the knife found in his possession the day after the stabbing. Counsel also conceded that Deeana had sought Sanchez's assistance in recovering money that Arthur owed her and that Sanchez had given Arthur a deadline to repay that debt. Counsel argued that the killing was not premeditated.
DISCUSSION
Sanchez argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by improperly invoking the prestige of the prosecutor's office in attacking a witness's credibility. The People counter that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct and that, assuming there was misconduct, Sanchez suffered no prejudice. We conclude that if there was error it was not prejudicial.
In general, a defendant waives the claim of prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument by not objecting in the trial court. (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 521-522.) The People argue that Sanchez forfeited the argument about the prosecutor's purported misconduct by failing to object to the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument. Sanchez asserts that the failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Because of this related ineffective assistance claim, we consider the merits of the misconduct claim. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433.)
Sanchez complains of the following italicized remarks made by counsel during her initial closing argument: "So I've been doing this a long time, and I've done a lot of trials, and I'm normally supposed to get up here and say something catchy and something with a theme. We call them attention grabbers. But instead, I'm just going to say what probably every person in this room was thinking at the beginning of this trial, and that is could Deeana [S.] be a bigger liar? [¶] Seriously. The woman wants us to believe that she has basically blacked out most of the months of December, January . . . ." (Italics added.)
It is generally "misconduct for prosecutors to vouch for the strength of their cases by invoking their personal prestige, reputation, or depth of experience, or the prestige or reputation of their office, in support of it." (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206-207.) "Reversal of a judgment of conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct [under state law] is called for only when, after reviewing the totality of the evidence, we can determine it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to a defendant would have occurred absent the misconduct." (People v. Castillo (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 364, 386; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
"A prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process." (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) Here, given the limited and isolated nature of the remarks, we conclude that the purported misconduct did not render Sanchez's trial so fundamentally unfair as to amount to a denial of due process under the federal Constitution. (Ibid.) We therefore reject Sanchez's argument that we should apply the more rigorous federal harmless error standard. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
Assuming for the sake of argument that the comments at issue improperly invoked the prestige of the prosecutor's office and constituted misconduct, we conclude that they were harmless. The prosecutor's remarks were isolated and made in the context of a much longer closing argument. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1344 (Seumanu).) And the putative vouching was limited to questioning the credibility of Deeana's testimony that she did not remember anything related to Arthur's killing, despite her extensive interviews with law enforcement after the killing. Any negative effect from those remarks was inconsequential because defense counsel conceded the very facts that Deeana claimed not to remember. Because defense counsel conceded that Arthur owed Deeana money, that Deeana asked Sanchez to help her get Arthur to pay her, and that Arthur failed to comply with the deadline Sanchez imposed for that repayment, it did not matter whether the jury believed Deeana's claim that she could not remember any of those things. And even if the jury had found Deeana credible, her testimony would have done little to undermine the prosecution's case. Deanna's claim that Arthur was her drug dealer, for example, had no probative value as to whether the killing was premeditated, which was the only contested issue.
In addition, there was strong evidence of Sanchez's guilt. (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1344 ["Despite this misstep, however, we find the prosecutor's misconduct in making a few remarks in a much longer closing argument, and an even longer trial, could not have prejudiced defendant, especially given the strong evidence of his guilt"]; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 619-620.) Defense counsel conceded that Sanchez stabbed Arthur, and that concession was supported by substantial evidence. Two witnesses identified Sanchez as attacking Arthur on the night of January 13, 2014, and one day after the stabbing law enforcement officers discovered a bloody knife in Sanchez's front pocket, which had Arthur's blood on the blade. Because Sanchez arrived at Arthur's residence armed with a knife, the jury could infer that he planned to stab Arthur. (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1250 ["the jury could infer that [the] defendant carried the fatal knife into the victim's home in his pocket, which makes it 'reasonable to infer that he considered the possibility of homicide from the outset'"].) The jury also could reasonably infer premeditation from the number of stab wounds Arthur sustained and from the location of some of those wounds—particularly those to his chest. (People v. San Nicholas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658-659.) The jury also could reasonably infer that Sanchez had a motive to kill Arthur based on the conceded facts of the outstanding debt Arthur owed Deeana, Deeana's request that Sanchez help get Arthur to repay her, and Arthur's failure to comply with the deadline Sanchez had imposed. (People v. Garcia (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Also, given the numerous phone calls between Sanchez and Deeana before the stabbing, the jury could reasonably infer that the outstanding debt motivated Sanchez to go to Arthur's residence that night.
In addition to this overwhelming evidence supporting the guilty verdict, the jurors were instructed that they were obliged to decide the case based on the evidence adduced at trial and not based on any "bias, sympathy, [or] prejudice," including any bias for or against the attorneys. (CALCRIM No. 200.) The jury was further instructed that nothing the attorneys said, including during closing argument, constituted evidence. (CALCRIM No. 222.) We assume that the jurors followed those instructions. (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1345.)
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Sanchez has failed to demonstrate that it was reasonably probable that he would have received a more favorable result absent the prosecutor's allegedly improper statements.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. CODRINGTON
J.