Opinion
March 27, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aiello, J.).
Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed.
The defendant's conviction for the crime of murder in the second degree emanated from the strangulation killing of his former girlfriend's grandmother on the evening of June 15, 1979, in her Brooklyn apartment. He contends, on appeal, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during his retrial (see, People v. Sanchez, 92 A.D.2d 595, affd 61 N.Y.2d 1022), based upon his attorney's failure to request a jury instruction with respect to the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. We disagree.
It is well settled that the courts must look at the totality of the evidence, the law and the circumstances of a particular case in determining whether a defendant has been provided with the effective assistance of counsel (see, People v. Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796). The "most critical concern in reviewing claims of ineffective counsel is to avoid both confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis" (People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 146). Guided by these standards, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel provided him with less than meaningful representation (see, People v Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705; People v. Benn, 68 N.Y.2d 941). A review of the record indicates that trial counsel's refusal to request a charge on extreme emotional disturbance constituted legitimate trial strategy. In any event, we note that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant (see, People v. Moye, 66 N.Y.2d 887), did not warrant the submission of the defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury (see, People v. Deresky, 137 A.D.2d 704).
Additionally, we find, after balancing the factors set forth in People v. Taranovich ( 37 N.Y.2d 442), that the defendant's claim of a deprivation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial is devoid of merit.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his CPL 440.10 motion and supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.