Opinion
1518 KA 15-00570
12-22-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. LATROY D. SAMPSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (JOSEPH R. PLUKAS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT:
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (JOSEPH R. PLUKAS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered January 30, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Defendant's valid, general waiver of his right to appeal forecloses his challenge to County Court's suppression ruling (see People v Sanders, 25 NY3d 337, 342 [2015]). Contrary to defendant's contention, his "waiver [of the right to appeal] is not invalid on the ground that the court did not specifically inform [him] that his general waiver of the right to appeal encompassed the court's suppression ruling[]" (People v Brand, 112 AD3d 1320, 1321 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 961 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Goodwin, 147 AD3d 1352, 1352 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1032 [2017]). Contrary to defendant's further contention, his " monosyllabic affirmative responses to questioning by [the court] do not render his [waiver of the right to appeal] unknowing and involuntary' " (People v Harris, 94 AD3d 1484, 1485 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 961 [2012]; see People v Hand, 147 AD3d 1326, 1326-1327 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 998 [2017]). Finally, there is no authority supporting defendant's assertion that a waiver of the right to appeal tendered in connection with a plea to the top count of an indictment should be automatically subjected to "higher scrutiny" on appeal.
Entered: December 22, 2017
Mark W. Bennett
Clerk of the Court