Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 06CF3626, Gregg L. Prickett, Judge.
Anita P. Jog for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SILLS, P.J.
Luis Salmeron appeals from the judgment sending him to prison for four years following a jury’s verdict of guilt for first degree burglary. (See Pen. Code, §§ 459-460.) Salmeron claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of guilt, alleging there was no evidence he entered the residence with the intent to indecently expose himself or commit a theft. We disagree and affirm.
The jury acquitted him of the special allegation that a person was present in the residence at the time of the burglary who was not an accomplice. (See Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)
I
FACTS
On November 11, 2006, about 6:00 p.m. in the evening, Luis Salmeron arrived at the residence of his former girlfriend, Cecilia Medina. Cecilia rented the house from Salmeron’s sister, sharing it with four other people including her cousin Marlene Medina, and Salmeron’s brother. Cecilia had been renting the house for three months, during which time Salmeron neither lived nor stayed there. Cecilia claims that on the evening of November 11, Salmeron came over uninvited at about 6:00 p.m., and she told him not to come to the house anymore. Salmeron subsequently left the house.
Later that evening, Cecilia left her house to go to a party with her cousin, Marlene. No one else was home at that time. While Cecilia was gone, Salmeron entered the house and went into Cecilia’s bedroom. Cecilia stated that the house was locked when she left, and Salmeron did not have a key. Cecilia also stated that she locked her bedroom door before she left for the party. Cecilia testified that, when they left for the party, the window in Marlene’s bedroom had been left open.
When Cecilia returned home about 11:15 p.m., she unlocked and opened her bedroom door, observing Salmeron sitting on her bed with his pants unzipped, watching a pornographic movie and masturbating. As soon as Salmeron saw Cecilia, he zipped up his pants and attempted to shut the bedroom door. Cecilia observed a kitchen knife on her vanity, which was not there when she left for the party. She also observed some white particles on the tip of the knife as if from a wall. Cecilia returned the knife to the kitchen and then escorted Salmeron out of the house. Cecilia stated that Salmeron appeared to have been drinking at the time.
Marlene called the police who contacted Salmeron in the front yard of the house. During a search of Salmeron, officers found four pairs of women’s underwear in Salmeron’s pocket, three of which belonged to Cecilia. She stated that the underwear were previously in her dirty clothes basket in her bedroom. Furthermore, after an inspection of the house, Cecilia and Marlene observed that the window screen on Marlene’s bedroom window was bent, and the wall framing the door near the lock to Cecilia’s bedroom was chipped.
When speaking to the officers that night, Salmeron claimed that he had been invited over to the house by Marlene. Salmeron stated that he and Cecilia were in Cecilia’s room watching pornographic movies earlier in the evening, but that she had left, and when she returned, she kicked him out of the house. He declared that the panties that were in his pocket belonged to him.
II
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of Evidence
“The role of an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is limited. The court must ‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.].” (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138.)
Salmeron argues that there is no evidence that he entered the residence with the intent to indecently expose himself or commit a theft. The element of intent “is rarely susceptible of direct proof and must usually be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. [Citations.] The question here is whether the evidence, including that of defendant’s conduct during and after his entry, supports a reasonable inference that the intent to commit [theft or indecent exposure] existed at the time he entered the home.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 669-670, [internal quotation marks omitted].) We affirm the jury’s finding that it does.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent—as we must (People v. Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1138)—we hold that substantial evidence exists to support the conviction. When Cecilia left her house to go to a party, the front door was locked as well as the door to her bedroom. Salmeron did not have permission to enter Cecilia’s house; rather, she had told him specifically not to come over anymore. Nonetheless, he came to the house, entered without permission and remained there until she returned.
Moreover, there was evidence of forced entry: The window screen in Marlene’s room was bent back and damaged. In addition, Cecilia found a kitchen knife near Salmeron that had white particles on the tip of it which looked like they originated from the wall around the lock on Cecilia’s bedroom door. Furthermore, Salmeron was found to be in possession of three pairs of Cecilia’s underwear, which were previously in her bedroom that night.
The jury could readily infer from the evidence that the only way Salmeron could have gotten into the house was by bending the screen on Marlene’s window and crawling under it. Furthermore, the knife in the bedroom and the chip marks on the door around the handle would lead a reasonable person to conclude that Salmeron had entered the locked bedroom by prying the lock with the knife, and thereby damaged the wall at that point. Finally, Salmeron was found with the fruits of the theft from Cecilia’s bedroom: the three pairs of underwear.
Although Salmeron told police officers that he had been invited to the house by Marlene, and that the underwear that was found in his pocket belonged to him, we do not, “[i]n deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, . . . resolve[] . . . credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
In this case, although Salmeron proffered an explanation for his being at the residence, the jurors obviously rejected his story and believed Cecilia’s account of circumstances instead. Furthermore, “circumstances such as . . . the fact that the building was entered through a window . . . or through a doorway which previously had been locked . . . without reasonable explanation of the entry, will warrant the conclusion by a jury that the entry was made with the intention to commit theft.” (People v. Jordan (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 782, 786-787.)
Salmeron also contends that in his intoxicated state, his only intent was to masturbate with Cecilia’s underwear in her room. Evidence was presented that Salmeron was intoxicated that evening; however, Salmeron also entered the house through a window by bending back the screen, broke into a locked bedroom by prying the lock with a knife and spoke coherently with officers. Furthermore, the jurors were instructed that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication may be considered by them in determining whether a defendant acted with the requisite intent. (See CALCRIM No. 3426 (2007-2008), as given.) Therefore, viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the judgment below, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Salmeron entered the residence with the intent to commit a theft.
At trial, evidence was also presented that Salmeron entered Cecilia’s residence with the intent to commit the felony of indecent exposure. Salmeron was found in Cecilia’s room with his zipper down and his penis exposed. Cecilia testified that as soon as Salmeron saw her, he zipped up his pants and attempted to close the door. However, the jurors could reasonably infer that Salmeron knew Cecilia would be coming home and would see him, particularly as it was already 11:15 p.m. and the women had to enter the preceding rooms and unlock the bedroom door before encountering him in Cecilia’s room. These circumstances were sufficient to support the jury’s finding.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J., ARONSON, J.