Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. 06WF3224, Michael J. Cassidy, Commissioner.
Jamie L. Popper, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
FYBEL, J.
1. Introduction
Larry Lee Salazar filed a notice of appeal with this court after the trial court accepted his guilty plea to one count of failing to register (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (g)(2)) and he admitted a prior strike (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(2)(A)). The trial court sentenced Salazar to a prison term of six years, which was the upper term doubled pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A).
We appointed counsel to represent Salazar on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel suggested we consider two issues: (1) whether the trial court had discretion to impose a sentence other than the upper term, and, if so, did the court err in failing to recognize its discretion; and (2) whether the record established a factual basis for Salazar’s plea.
Salazar was given 30 days to file written arguments in his own behalf. We have not received anything from Salazar.
We have examined the entire record and counsel’s Wende/Anders brief, and find no arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.
2. Facts and Proceedings in the Trial Court
The amended felony complaint, filed December 29, 2006, alleged one count of failure to register in violation of Penal Code section 290, subdivision (g)(2) and alleged seven prior felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e)(2)(A) and section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c)(2)(A). Five of the prior convictions were in Los Angeles County Superior Court case No. A454552 and are dated August 11, 1982. The two others were in the Superior Court of the State of Colorado, in and for the County of Otero, case No. 91CR140 and are dated March 18, 1992.
On the same day the amended felony complaint was filed, Salazar pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted one of the prior felony convictions from Colorado. In exchange, the remaining prior felony allegations were to be stricken. The plea form states that Salazar understood the trial court would sentence him to a six-year prison term.
As the factual basis for his plea, Salazar stated: “In Orange County, California, on 9-15-06, I failed to register as a sex offender pursuant to . . . P[enal] C[ode] section 290. I was required to register based on [a] 1992 felony conviction for sexual assault on a child. [¶] I admit a prior felony conviction for sexual assault of a minor & in Colorado. The factual basis equivalent of a P[enal] C[ode section] 288(c)(1).”
On March 28, 2007, the trial court sentenced Salazar to a prison term of six years, the upper term doubled pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A). The court ordered Salazar to pay a $200 restitution fine and a $20 court security fee, and ordered and suspended a $200 parole revocation fine. The court struck the five prior California felony convictions and one of the two prior Colorado convictions.
Salazar timely appealed. He did not obtain a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5) on the ground the appeal “is based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.”
3. Analysis of Potential Issues and Issues Raised in Counsel’s Wende/Anders Brief
Appointed counsel suggested a possible issue is: “Did the plea agreement leave the [trial] court discretion to impose something below the maximum sentence of six years, and if so, did the court fail to recognize and exercise its discretion?” We find no merit in this possible issue. The record discloses the trial court exercised its sentencing discretion by striking six of the seven prior felony convictions and by sentencing Salazar to a shorter prison term than he might otherwise have received.
Appointed counsel suggested as a second potential issue whether the record established a factual basis for Salazar’s guilty plea. Specifically, counsel argues the record contains no evidence of Salazar’s felony conviction in Colorado or establishing that felony conviction required Salazar to register as a sex offender in California. Salazar did not obtain a certificate of probable cause pursuant to Penal Code section 1237.5. His claim of a lack of factual basis for his guilty plea—a challenge to the validity of the plea—therefore is not cognizable on appeal. (People v. Zamora (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1627, 1633; see also People v. Jones (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1093-1094.)
Nonetheless we find no merit in this potential issue. As facts forming the basis for his plea, Salazar stated on the plea form he “was required to register based on [a] 1992 felony conviction for sexual assault on a child. [¶] I admit a prior felony conviction for sexual assault of a minor & in Colorado.” This statement was a sufficient factual basis for the plea. (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432.)
We have examined the entire record and have found no other potential issues. (See Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.)
4. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J., ARONSON, J.