Opinion
F075986
10-10-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN SAECHAO, Defendant and Appellant.
Carla J. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Sally Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. VCF307820)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Joseph A. Kalashian, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Tulare County Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Carla J. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Sally Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant Steven Saechao was charged with sexual penetration of an unconscious person and other crimes against a woman with whom he was living. Criminal proceedings were suspended after defense counsel declared a doubt as to Saechao's competency to stand trial. A jury trial was held solely on the issue of competency and the jury found Saechao competent to stand trial. Saechao then entered a plea of no contest to four of the charges with an indicated sentence of 13 years. Prior to the date and time set for sentencing, Saechao brought a motion to withdraw his plea, which the trial court denied.
Saechao raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of competence. Second, he contends Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (f) unconstitutionally places the burden of proof on the defendant in a competency trial. Third, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 15, 2014, the Tulare County District Attorney filed a 12-count felony complaint alleging various charges, including six counts of forcible penetration of a spouse or cohabitant with a foreign object while intoxicated or unconscious (§ 289, subds. (d) & (e)).
In April 2015, defense counsel retained Dr. Yosef Geshuri to evaluate Saechao's intellectual capacity and mental health. Geshuri evaluated Saechao in May 2015. On June 16, 2015, defense counsel declared a doubt as to Saechao's competency to stand trial due to a developmental disability. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings and referred Saechao to the Central Valley Regional Center (CVRC) for evaluation of his intellectual functioning and competency.
On August 18, 2015, Dr. Thomas Middleton of CVRC evaluated Saechao but was unable to render an opinion as to his mental competency. However, Middleton did find Saechao was malingering.
On December 3, 2015, the court appointed Dr. Stephen Bindler to evaluate Saechao. On January 11, 2016, Bindler evaluated Saechao and opined he was incompetent to stand trial.
On January 21, 2016, the defense submitted on Bindler's report, but the prosecutor requested a jury trial on Saechao's competency. On May 6, 2016, a jury found Saechao mentally competent to stand trial. Following a preliminary hearing on June 14, 2016, Saechao was held to answer to the charges.
On June 27, 2016, the district attorney filed a 13-count information, charging Saechao with the following offenses: four counts of sexual penetration of an unconscious person by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (d); counts 1, 3, 5 & 7); four counts of sexual penetration of one who is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance (§ 289, subd. (e); counts 2, 4, 6 & 8); two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 9 & 12); one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 10); one count of making criminal threats (§ 422; count 11); and one count of misdemeanor domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 13). As to counts 9, 10, and 11, it was alleged Saechao was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offenses (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). In association with counts 9 and 12, it was alleged Saechao used a deadly and dangerous weapon during the commission of the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In association with counts 9 and 10, it was alleged that Saechao personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).
On March 28, 2017, Saechao pled no contest to counts 2, 6, 8, and 9 and admitted the allegations associated with count 9, in exchange for an indicated sentence of 13 years. The plea agreement also included a waiver of his appellate rights.
Saechao claims his plea was invalid because he was incompetent at the time he entered it. In light of this claim, we review all the issues he raises on appeal as if there had been no appellate waiver.
On May 8, 2017, the date set for sentencing, the court held a Marsden hearing. The court also construed the Marsden hearing to include a motion by Saechao to withdraw his plea. The court denied both the Marsden motion and the motion to withdraw the plea and sentenced Saechao to 13 years in state prison.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
On July 11, 2017, Saechao filed a timely notice of appeal and the trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Jury Trial on Saechao's Competency to Stand Trial
Dr. Stephen Bindler
Dr. Bindler, a clinical and forensic psychologist, was the first witness called by the defense. He was appointed by the court four months before the competency trial to evaluate Saechao's competency. On January 11, 2016, Bindler evaluated Saechao for an hour and then observed him in court. Bindler opined Saechao was incompetent to stand trial, but expressed reservations about that opinion.
Bindler's diagnostic impression was that Saechao was schizophrenic and suffered from a possible intellectual disability. The basis for the schizophrenic impression was that Saechao reported hearing voices and exhibited a limited emotional response in his interview with Bindler, as well as in court. Further testing would be required, according to Bindler, to determine whether Saechao had an intellectual disability.
In evaluating Saechao's mental competency, Bindler conducted a structured interview that measured Saechao's ability to understand and describe courtroom proceedings, as well as a clinical interview to detect any mental disorders that would interfere with Saechao's ability to understand or cooperate. Bindler opined that if Saechao had intellectual difficulties of some significance, then he might have some difficulty with understanding the court proceedings. Bindler also opined Saechao had a mental disorder that could interfere with his ability to understand the court proceedings.
Saechao told Bindler he had been prescribed antipsychotic medication by the jail but was refusing to take it because it was not helping. In Bindler's experience, when an individual has been diagnosed with the kinds of symptoms Saechao was reportedly experiencing but refuses to take his medication, this indicates a lack of capacity to understand the necessity of taking medication to ameliorate the symptoms. Saechao said he "didn't remember anything" about his case. At one point in the interview, Saechao said he had spoken with his defense attorney, but at another time in the interview he said he had never met his attorney.
Saechao spoke slowly and softly and mumbled at times such that it was difficult for Bindler to hear him. Saechao said he would sometimes try to control the voices he was hearing by talking very loudly to them, hoping they would go away. Saechao also said he did not tell people about the voices because he did not trust other people, which Bindler took to mean that Saechao did not trust others knowing about the voices. Saechao reported that prior to being in jail for the current offense, he had never received any mental health treatment, had never seen a psychologist or psychiatrist, and had never been treated for any sort of mental disorder.
Bindler testified that although auditory hallucinations could affect a person's ability to concentrate, he did not see any evidence in his interview with Saechao that Saechao's reported auditory hallucinations were affecting his ability to concentrate.
The basis for Bindler's opinion that Saechao may have been suffering from an intellectual disability was that Saechao was a very poor historian, even about basic personal information, and that he reported being in special education classes for a period when he was younger. Bindler added that Saechao's history of substance abuse also could have contributed to, or created, an intellectual deficit.
Bindler testified he had concerns about whether Saechao was being forthright during the interview and felt there was a possibility Saechao was attempting to exaggerate the effect of any intellectual limitation he had. To that point, Bindler said he rarely encountered individuals who were as poor a historian as Saechao during his interview.
Additionally, during the mental status evaluation, a number of the difficulties Saechao had with carrying out simple cognitive tasks were presented in an atypical manner. For example, when Saechao was asked to count backwards from 20, he counted as follows: 20, 19, 16, 14, 10, 9, 7, 6, 5, 3, 1. Bindler said people are typically able to count from 20 down to 1 without skipping numbers; however, a person experiencing confusion due to a thought disorder or an inability to concentrate would be unable to count backwards in numerical order like Saechao did. Instead, a confused person would be expected to count backwards in a more random order such as: 20, 19, 3, 7, 12, 11. Bindler also said Saechao performed similarly in his recitation of the alphabet from A to Z; Saechao was able to recite the alphabet in alphabetical order, albeit with some missing letters. Bindler said there was "no confusion" in Saechao's recitation of the alphabet. Bindler said a truly confused person's recitation of the alphabet would be "mixed up" and "jumbled." Bindler also asked Saechao to perform a simple addition test where he had to start at one and count by threes until asked to stop. Saechao only made it to the number four. He gave little effort to the task and showed no signs of confusion with it.
Bindler thought Saechao was potentially malingering because he showed no sign of confusion or lack of concentration on the three cognitive tests (i.e., counting backwards, reciting the alphabet, and counting by threes). Of Saechao's performance on these three cognitive tests, Bindler testified:
"So these raise real questions in my mind. Is this a person who really is having basic thought disorder issues or is he trying to look like he's having it? I can't, in the short period of time I had with him, rule those things [out]. So I had to raise the issue of magnifying reporting psychiatric symptoms, trying to look confused when he's not, trying to magnify the degree of his mental disorder.
"I couldn't, in the time I had with him, verify or determine for myself in my own confidence that it was actually a problem of intellectual disorder or thought disorder based on a psychiatric illness. My reasoning was to say I'm not certain he was competent, in which case I'm going to opine that he is not competent and recommend that he get further study to determine that in observation and treatment and in [a] training program that will restore competence and bring him to a level of competence."
Bindler reported that he did not administer a test for malingering or a test to determine Saechao's intelligence quotient (IQ), but did state that he expressed numerous times in his report the possibility Saechao could be claiming symptoms of a psychiatric disorder he did not have. Bindler also said "[he] didn't see any psychiatric basis for thinking that [Saechao] wasn't able to rationally cooperate" with his attorney. What Bindler said he meant by this was that there were not any disturbances in Saechao's manner of thought where Saechao "would think that his attorney was working against him or that somehow she was in collusion with everybody to throw him in prison." When asked if a person could malinger but still be incompetent, Bindler said it was "almost impossible for [him] to imagine how those two things could coexist."
Bindler recommended Saechao be referred to either a regional center or the Porterville Development Center so his competency could be restored.
Dr. Yosef Geshuri
Dr. Geshuri, a clinical and forensic psychologist who also had a law degree, was the defense's next witness. Geshuri was retained by Saechao's defense attorney's office to evaluate Saechao's intellectual capacity, as well as his mental health issues, but Geshuri was not retained to perform a competency evaluation. Geshuri spent three hours with Saechao in May 2015. At the beginning of the interview, Saechao correctly wrote down his date of birth but incorrectly wrote down that he was 32 years old instead of 33.
Geshuri concluded Saechao had an IQ between 50 and 70, which put him at a "mild mental retardation level." Saechao performed in the range of a nine- to 12-year-old child on the tests Geshuri administered. Geshuri said the tests he used were "pretty much" accepted by other professionals in the field. However, Geshuri used the 1967 version of one of the tests, even though a newer version of the test had come out four years earlier. Geshuri also determined Saechao has some mental issues of an emotional or psychological type.
Geshuri explained that, because of Saechao's mental retardation, Saechao would have problems with obtaining more skilled employment, communicating verbally and in writing, understanding instructions, processing information, and remembering things. Saechao reported he had worked as a packer, a machinist, a residential aid, and a forklift driver.
While Geshuri did not evaluate Saechao's competency to stand trial, he did say Saechao's ability to communicate with his attorney would be limited because of his language and thinking limitations. Geshuri also said he "suspected" Saechao's ability to understand courtroom proceedings would be "very limited," but Saechao could be trained to become competent to stand trial.
Saechao told Geshuri he experienced childhood trauma from being abused, and Geshuri reported Saechao was displaying symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Saechao also reported growing up in a violent neighborhood in Long Beach with gang activity and an unstable home life. Geshuri explained that childhood trauma can affect brain development.
Geshuri evaluated Saechao for malingering by administering a simple standardized test, called the Rey 15 Memory Test (Rey 15), which required the subject to draw 15 figures from memory. If the subject drew fewer than nine figures correctly, then he or she was likely malingering. If the subject drew at least 12 figures correctly, then he or she was probably not malingering. Saechao drew 12 of the figures correctly. Geshuri acknowledged that, according to the DSM-5, which is a full index of all of the psychiatric diagnoses recognized in the United States, malingering should be strongly suspected if there is a "marked discrepancy between the individual's claimed stress or disability and the objective findings of observations, lack of cooperation during diagnostic evaluation, and in complying with the prescribed treatment regimen, and the presence of antisocial personality disorder."
Dr. Thomas Middleton
Dr. Middleton, the prosecution's first witness and the last expert to testify, was a licensed psychologist contracted with CVRC. Middleton evaluated Saechao pursuant to court order to determine if he was eligible for regional center services and to determine if he was competent to stand trial. However, Middleton ultimately was unable to determine either Saechao's intellectual functioning or his competency to stand trial due to his lack of cooperation during the interview.
Middleton spent an hour with Saechao in August 2015. Saechao was slow and distant during the interview and tended to grumble. He was able to say he was raised in Southern California but was unable to say what his ethnic background was or where his parents had learned to speak English and Mien. He also claimed not to know much about his family history. He attended school through the 10th or 11th grade and was in regular classes. He also was able to obtain a driver's license. He reported he experienced a variety of auditory hallucinations and paranoid beliefs, as well as command hallucinations. He appeared to be able to converse quite easily in English "when he wanted to" with Middleton, but at other times he appeared "reluctant."
Saechao initially told Middleton he did not know where he was. When Middleton asked if he was in a school, a jail, or a zoo, he said he thought he was in a zoo with animals.
Middleton had reviewed Geshuri's report and testified that some of the IQ tests Geshuri used were from the 1930's and 1940's, were "old," and were not regarded as highly as other comprehensive standardized IQ tests.
Midldleton administered three tests to Saechao. The first was a "very simple and straightforward" test called the Visual Motor Integration test (VMI) which provided a "developmental age and age equivalent, as well as a standard score." Saechao showed "little effort, little ability to participate meaningfully in [it]" and his results were "extremely impaired." His standard score placed him in less than the first percentile. His age equivalent score was three years 11 months. Middleton testified this was a test for little children as well as adults, and even people with a psychiatric disorder could perform it. Middleton also said of Saechao's VMI test results: "So here is an adult who is 34 years old. He attended high school. He has a driver's license, and now he's responding like a three-year-old."
As a result of Saechao's scores on the first test, Middleton decided to take a closer look at Saechao's believability. Middleton administered the same believability test, the Rey 15, that Geshuri had previously administered. Saechao's score this time was a six, which was "extremely low." Middleton then administered the second part of the believability test and Saechao scored a five, for a combined total score of 11. The usual cutoff score for believability on this test was 22 points. Middleton noted that Saechao scored better on the test given by Geshuri, which indicated to Middleton "that [Saechao] was not responding with [him] in a valid manner."
Middleton then administered another believability test, called the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (MFAST), which tested for the believability of an individual's psychiatric symptoms. The test was a questionnaire comprised of 25 items. As part of the test, Middleton asked Saechao if he had to look under a chair before sitting on it, and Saechao responded that he did. However, Middleton noted Saechao had not done that when he sat down for the interview. Middleton also asked Saechao if it was impossible for him to sit still in a chair and if he was "constantly moving and restless," and Saechao said yes. Again, Middleton noted Saechao was not restless during the interview. Middleton testified: "So [Saechao] responded in a way that appeared to be wanting to impress me with his symptoms. And his reported symptoms were inconsistent with his behavior."
Middleton concluded Saechao was malingering. This conclusion was based on "[Saechao's] general avoidant presentation, his poor performance on the VMI, the MFAST, and the Rey 15. He did not appear to be believable in his involvement and presentation." Middleton was unable to determine either Saechao's intellectual functioning or his competency to stand trial because Saechao was not cooperating as best he could. Middleton also testified: "When [Saechao] was not able to tell me his age or explain his family's history and he seemed reluctant and avoidant, I became increasingly suspicious. So from 15 minutes on, I was trying to prove that he was so impaired that he was believable. Instead, the more time I spent with him, the less believable he appeared."
Middleton also said he showed Saechao a drawing of a courtroom and tried to teach him about the different people in it—including the judge, the witness, and the attorneys—but Saechao was unresponsive to what Middleton was trying to teach him. Middleton explained he did not believe Saechao was making a good effort in learning the picture of the courtroom because even people with severe psychotic disorders, depression, or brain injury could be taught.
Correctional deputies
The final two prosecution witnesses were Deputy Scott Warford and Deputy Mark Sierdsma. Both were county jail correctional deputies who had known Saechao for about nine months. During that time, Warford had seen Saechao interact with others, watch TV, and read the newspaper. Saechao would occasionally ask Warford when his next court day was and if he had money on his books for commissary. Saechao would call Warford "officer" or "deputy" whenever he wanted to speak with Warford and never called him a "zebra" or "giraffe." Warford had never seen Saechao talk to himself or to someone who was not there.
Sierdsma observed Saechao several times talking with other inmates, and he could not recall ever seeing Saechao reading aloud or talking to himself or to someone who was not there. Saechao once asked Sierdsma when his next court date was.
The case was submitted to the jury on May 5, 2016, and on May 6, 2016 the jury found Saechao competent to stand trial.
B. Plea Hearing
On March 28, 2017, almost 11 months after the competency trial, Saechao pled no contest in open court to counts 2, 6, 8, and 9 and admitted the allegations he was armed with a firearm, used a weapon during the offenses, and inflicted great bodily injury for a total indicated sentence of 13 years in state prison. The relevant part of the colloquy between the court and Saechao during the plea proceedings follows:
"THE COURT: You're prepared to change your plea?
"[SAECHAO]: Yes.
"THE COURT: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney about this change of plea?
"[SAECHAO]: Yes.
"THE COURT: Do you have any other questions of your attorney or the Court before we go forward?
"[SAECHAO]: No.
"THE COURT: And have there been any other promises or representations made to you as to what your sentence would be other than this 13 years?
"[SAECHAO]: No.
"THE COURT: And you understand you're going to have to register for life as a sex offender?
"[SAECHAO]: Yes."
The court then explained to Saechao the constitutional rights he was giving up by pleading no contest, and Saechao acknowledged he understood those rights.
"THE COURT: And do you give up those rights?
"[SAECHAO]: Yes.
"THE COURT: [Are you] presently taking any medication or feeling ill that's affecting your ability to think clearly here?
"[SAECHAO]: No.
"THE COURT: Then the Court finds you made a knowing and intelligent and voluntary waiver of your constitutional rights."
Saechao also waived his right to appeal any part of the proceedings, whether of a factual nature or a legal nature, as part of his plea agreement. C. Marsden Hearing and Motion to Withdraw Plea
Saechao wrote a letter to the judge before his sentencing hearing, asking that a new public defender be appointed to represent him and that he be allowed to withdraw his plea because the medication he was taking made him "forget and not care like if [he] was high." He stated in the letter he felt like a "zombie" when he was on the medication and that he was "sure" the medication influenced his decision to accept the plea deal. He asked the court to "give [him] another chance on this case."
We do not know exactly when the letter was written or delivered because it is undated, and the record is otherwise silent. --------
The judge held a Marsden hearing in chambers on the date set for sentencing. The judge also considered the hearing to include a motion to withdraw Saechao's plea. During the hearing, Saechao said he did not want to take the plea deal but his attorney "talked [him] into it." His attorney had a different account. She said Saechao asked her to convey an offer of 12 years to the prosecutor, which she did. A week later, on the morning of trial, the prosecutor countered with 13 years, and Saechao's attorney conveyed that offer to him. She then said Saechao agreed to accept the 13 years because he reasoned it was only one extra year and only one "strike." The judge said he believed defense counsel's account of what happened and he believed Saechao was experiencing "buyer's remorse" over accepting the plea deal.
On the issue of the medication affecting Saechao's mind, the colloquy between the judge and Saechao at the Marsden hearing proceeded as follows:
"THE COURT: Okay. Any other things you want to tell me as to why you should have been allowed to withdraw your plea?
"[SAECHAO]: I guess the medication has an effect on me because I don't take any type of medication before I came in here, not even painkiller for headaches and stuff like that. It's hard for me to think when I'm on it. I don't really care.
"THE COURT: Pardon?
"[SAECHAO]: I don't really care when I'm on medication and stuff. It kind of makes me feel like that, like I'm high.
"THE COURT: Anything else?
"[SAECHAO]: That's all I can think of right now."
The judge noted Saechao had been prescribed psychotropic medication, but during the plea proceeding Saechao denied presently taking any medication that affected his ability to think clearly. Saechao responded: "I was really unsure about what I was saying and stuff."
The court found no good cause to allow Saechao to withdraw his plea, stating: "I think you were thinking clearly and knew what you were doing."
The court then imposed the 13-year indicated sentence pursuant to the plea agreement.
DISCUSSION
I. Challenge to the Competency Verdict
Saechao contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict finding him competent and therefore he was denied his due process rights under the state and federal Constitutions. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' [Citation.] A defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial if he lacks ' " 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding ... [or] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' " ' " (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 690 (Lightsey).)
"The applicable state statutes essentially parallel the state and federal constitutional directives. Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: 'A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.' " (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 691.) There is a presumption of competence to stand trial, and the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she lacks competence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); see Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446 [this burden of proof does not offend federal constitutional principles]; People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 871 (Mendoza).)
"We apply a deferential substantial evidence standard of review on appeal. 'In reviewing a jury's determination that a defendant is competent to proceed to trial, we give due deference to the trier of fact, and therefore view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict.' [Citations.] When the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is challenged, our review is limited to the evidence presented at the competency trial." (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 871-872.) "On appeal a finding of competency to stand trial 'cannot be disturbed if there is any substantial and credible evidence in the record to support the finding.' " (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1111.) Evidence is considered substantial if it is of ponderable legal significance. " ' "It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be 'substantial' proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case." ' " (People v. Olmsted (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 270, 277.)
B. Analysis
Saechao presented some evidence of incompetency, but we disagree with his assertion that his evidence was "virtually uncontradicted." Instead, we conclude the jury's verdict of competence was supported by substantial evidence that Saechao was malingering and not suffering from a mental illness or an intellectual disability that deprived him of the ability to consult rationally with counsel or to understand the proceedings.
Dr. Bindler was the only witness who expressly found Saechao to be incompetent. However, Bindler expressed reservations about his own opinion because he thought there was a possibility Saechao could be endorsing psychiatric symptoms he did not have. Bindler's following testimony illustrates the uncertainty of his opinion: "My reasoning was to say I'm not certain he was competent, in which case I'm going to opine that he is not competent ...." This expression of uncertainty was inconsistent with a firm conclusion.
Bindler also testified that, despite his diagnostic impression that Saechao was schizophrenic, he did not see a psychiatric basis to believe Saechao could not "rationally cooperate" with his attorney. We note that a psychiatric illness is insufficient per se to establish incompetence to stand trial. (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508 ["defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel"]; People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 502 ["mere presence of a mental illness does not mean appellant was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his own defense"].)
Bindler also formed a diagnostic impression of an intellectual disability. However, Bindler called the basis of this impression into doubt by saying he rarely encountered individuals who were as poor a historian as Saechao and by explaining how Saechao's poor results on the cognitive tests were atypical. Bindler also said Saechao showed no signs of confusion on, and gave little effort to, the cognitive tests. This indicated Saechao's poor test results were the product of poor effort rather than mental illness or disability.
Thus, Bindler substantially undermined most, if not all, of the bases for his own opinion, and the jury was not required to accept his opinion. (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 675 ["jury is not required to accept an expert's opinion"].)
Dr. Geshuri did not opine on Saechao's competency to stand trial but did opine Saechao was mildly mentally retarded and displayed symptoms of PTSD—though Geshuri did not testify that he made a PTSD diagnosis. The IQ tests Geshuri administered, which he said were "pretty much" accepted in his discipline, placed Saechao's IQ in the range of 50 to 70. However, Dr. Middleton testified Geshuri used old tests that were not highly regarded, and Geshuri himself admitted there was a more recent version of one of the tests. It can be presumed, based on the jury's verdict, that this weighed unfavorably on Geshuri's credibility in the minds of the jurors. Any conflicts among the experts' opinions were for the jury to resolve, and it is not our place to reevaluate them. (People v. Flores (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 624, 633 ["[t]he credibility and weight of the expert testimony was for the jury to determine, and it is not up to us to reevaluate it"].) Geshuri's opinion, like Bindler's, was not of such weight and character that the jury could not reasonably reject it.
Dr. Middleton was specifically sent to determine Saechao's eligibility for regional center services and his competency to stand trial, and he concluded Saechao was malingering. Saechao stresses in his brief that Middleton failed to evaluate his competency as he was supposed to. This is true, but Middleton testified this failure was because Saechao was malingering and so uncooperative that Middleton was unable to conduct a proper evaluation.
Saechao's standard score on Middleton's administration of the VMI test indicated an age equivalence of three years 11 months, even though Saechao was 34 years old, attended high school in regular classes, obtained a driver's license, and worked as a forklift driver and machinist. Additionally, Middleton testified Saechao did not participate meaningfully in the test.
Middleton's testimony regarding Saechao's performance on the believability test, the Rey 15, struck perhaps the heaviest blow to Saechao's contention that he was incompetent. Not only were Saechao's believability scores extremely low, but they were much lower than when Geshuri had administered the same exact test to him.
Middleton also said he believed Saechao was trying to "impress" him with psychiatric symptoms. For example, Saechao claimed he was restless and had to look under his chair before sitting down, but Middleton did not observe those behaviors in Saechao. Middleton initially gave Saechao the benefit of the doubt after becoming suspicious of malingering and tried to prove Saechao was so impaired that he actually was believable. However, Middleton said that, instead, "the more time [he] spent with him, the less believable he appeared." Middleton's conclusion Saechao was malingering, unlike Bindler's opinion, was without reservation. Furthermore, Bindler said it was almost impossible for him to imagine how incompetence and malingering could coexist.
We conclude Middleton's testimony provided evidence of solid value that Saechao was malingering, and the jury reasonably could accept his opinion over the opinions of the other experts. (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 881 ["jury was not required to accept the conclusion of the defense experts"].)
Moreover, lay witness testimony supported the conclusion Saechao was competent. Deputies Warford and Sierdsma testified about the types of behavior they had observed from Saechao in the nine months they had known him; neither could corroborate any of the psychiatric symptoms Saechao reported experiencing. They both observed him interacting normally with other inmates and never saw him talk to himself or to people who were not there. Saechao claimed he was living in a zoo with animals, but his behavior in jail was inconsistent with such a delusion.
Saechao unconvincingly attempts to analogize this case to People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489 (Samuel). In that case, the defense evidence of incompetence was overwhelming and essentially uncontradicted by any prosecution evidence. "Five court-appointed psychiatrists, three psychologists, a medical doctor, a nurse, and three psychiatric technicians testified to Samuel's incompetency, and four psychiatric reports were admitted into evidence. [Citation.] Each witness and every report concluded Samuel was incompetent to stand trial. [Citation.] In response, the prosecution offered no testimony and only two lay witnesses, neither of whom contradicted any of the defense testimony.... Prosecution witnesses merely testified regarding Samuel's escape from Patton State Hospital and his ability to perform routine manual tasks." (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 808-809 (Stanley).) On that record, the California Supreme Court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could reject the defense evidence of incompetency. (Id. at p. 809.)
In the present case, on the other hand, the prosecution did present evidence of solid value, including substantial evidence of malingering, to undermine the bases and credibility of the defense experts' opinions. The record therefore is "not comparable to the virtually one-sided showing of incompetence found in Samuel." (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 809; accord, People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 219-220.)
C. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude the verdict was supported by Middleton's opinion, which constituted solid, credible evidence from which the jury could conclude Saechao was malingering and not suffering from an intellectual or psychiatric disorder that affected his ability to understand the proceedings or rationally assist his attorney. While Bindler and Geshuri's opinions presented some evidence Saechao was incompetent, the weight and character of the evidence did not compel that conclusion. (See People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755 ["If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trier of fact's] findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding."].) Bindler undermined his own opinion by expressing concerns about Saechao's forthrightness, and Geshuri's opinion was undermined by Middleton's testimony that Geshuri had used poorly regarded, outdated tests. The jury reasonably could have rejected Bindler's and Geshuri's opinions and accepted Middleton's. We affirm the jury's verdict.
II. Constitutionality of Presumption of Mental Competence
Saechao contends the presumption of mental competency codified in section 1369, subdivision (f), denied him due process of law by "irrationally allocating the burden of proving incompetence to someone who may not have been able to assist his attorney prior to and during the hearing." (AOB 47.) Saechao acknowledges this claim has been considered and rejected by the California Supreme Court in People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 885 ("We conclude that section 1369 passes constitutional muster under both the federal and state Constitutions."). We further note that the United States Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court's decision on federal constitutional grounds in Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (allocation of burden of proof to a criminal defendant in a competency trial does not offend federal constitutional principles). Insofar as Saechao thinks the Medina cases were wrongly decided, the argument fails, as we are bound to follow the precedents of both the United States and California Supreme Courts. (James v. City of Boise, Idaho (2016) ___U.S.___, [136 S.Ct. 685, 686]; Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
III. Motion to Withdraw Plea
Saechao argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his no contest plea. We are not persuaded.
Pursuant to section 1018, "[o]n application of the defendant at any time before judgment ..., the court may, ... for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." "To establish good cause, it must be shown that defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of his free judgment. [Citations.] Other factors overcoming defendant's free judgment include inadvertence, fraud or duress. [Citations.] However, '[a] plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his mind.' " (People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 (Huricks).) The defendant has the burden to demonstrate good cause by clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 585 (Wharton).) "Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged." (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103 (Hunt).)
We review the trial court's decision whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea for an abuse of discretion. (Huricks, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208.) The trial court's exercise of discretion "must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.) We review the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations for substantial evidence. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)
Saechao asserted to the trial court the medication he was taking made him feel like he was high. He also said the medication made it hard for him to think and made him forgetful, and he said he was sure the medication influenced his decision to accept the plea deal. However, he presented no evidence regarding exactly what type of medication he was on, how much he had taken, or when he had taken it. He also offered no expert medical evidence—only his own unsworn, terse, self-serving statements about how the medication made him feel. The trial court was not required to accept his testimony regarding his own mental state. (Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 103 [in deciding a defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, "the trial court is not bound by uncontradicted statements of the defendant"].) Additionally, before Saechao entered his plea, he denied in open court he had taken any medication that was affecting his ability to think clearly. After reviewing Saechao's letter to the court and the transcripts of the plea proceedings and Marsden hearing, we conclude the trial court's finding that Saechao's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was supported by substantial evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.
Saechao further contends the trial court had a duty to inquire into whether his free will was overcome by the medication he was taking, as well as a duty to find evidence to rebut Saechao's assertion that his medication "affected [his] free will." Saechao cites no authority for this, and he is wrong: "It is the defendant's burden to produce evidence of good cause by clear and convincing evidence." (Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 585.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
SNAUFFER, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J. /s/_________
SMITH, J.