Opinion
F085649
10-26-2023
In re RYAN A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. RYAN A., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Jesica Y. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County No. 21JL-00001A. Mark V. Bacciarini, Judge.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Jesica Y. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MEEHAN, J.
INTRODUCTION
In December 2020, appellant Ryan A., then 17 years old, was arrested for allegedly molesting a young child who was in the foster care of his mother. In January 2021, the Merced County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging one count of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). Appellant denied the allegation.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
In December 2022, following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the trial court sustained the allegation. In January 2023, the court declared appellant a ward of the court; ordered him confined for 23 days in the Juvenile Justice Correctional Complex, with credit for time served; and placed him under the supervision of a probation officer, with various terms and conditions. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
During the jurisdictional hearing, appellant repeatedly sought to introduce testimonial and documentary evidence that originated from the dependency case-related investigation into the molestation allegation by officials with Merced County Health and Human Services Agency (agency) and Merced County Sheriff's Department. The trial court excluded the majority of the evidence sought under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040. Appellant claims the evidence was relevant and its exclusion violated his federal and state rights to due process, truth-in-evidence, confrontation, and a fair trial.
We do not describe the information sought in any detail due to its confidential nature, but in general, it included the agency's investigation and determination following receipt of the molestation allegation, including written reports, steps taken, interviews conducted, and statements made; and information reported to, actions taken by, and determinations made by the sheriff's department.
Section 827 was recently amended by Assembly Bill No. 505 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2024, but that amendment is not relevant to the issue raised in this appeal.
The state Constitution provides, "Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2), italics added [formerly art. I, § 28, subd. (d)].) Appellant does not offer any substantive argument on his truth-in-evidence claim (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363-364 ["If a party's briefs do not provide legal argument and citation to authority on each point raised, '"the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration."'"]), but in any event, both Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040 long predated the addition of the provision to the state Constitution (People v. Guzman (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 184, 192 [truth-in-evidence provision added to Cal. Const. by Prop. 8, passed by voters in 1982]).
The People respond that forfeiture applies to claims not raised in the trial court, including appellant's constitutional claims; appellant's rights were not violated; and if there was any error, it was not prejudicial.
Although not acknowledged by either party, the record indicates a petition for disclosure of juvenile records was filed in this case pursuant to section 827 and the matter was referred to the dependency court for resolution months prior to the jurisdictional hearing, in accordance with state procedural requirements. (In re Jenkins (2023) 14 Cal.5th 493, 504-505, 524 (Jenkins) [state statutory- and rule-based "in camera review procedures provide the 'proper mechanism to resolve a defense Brady disclosure request involving information in a juvenile file'"], citing "ing J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1338 (J.E.).) As we shall discuss, the petition process provided for under section 827 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.552, vests in the juvenile court the exclusive authority to grant or deny access to material from confidential juvenile records (Jenkins, supra, at p. 524, citing J.E., supra, at pp. 1337-1338), and this process serves to protect the right to a fair trial, including the right to disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence under Brady (Jenkins, supra, at p. 525, citing J.E., supra, at pp. 1336, 1338-1339). Appellant fails to show that a section 827 petition for disclosure was granted by the dependency court, to which it appears the matter was referred, and that the trial court thereafter improperly excluded evidence, in contravention of the dependency court's order. In the absence of an order under section 827 permitting disclosure, appellant fails to meet his burden of demonstrating error by the trial court in excluding the evidence during the jurisdictional hearing and we affirm the judgment.
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).
All further reference to rules are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise stated.
Given our conclusion that appellant did not meet his initial burden of demonstrating error by the trial court (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 378; People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666), we do not consider whether, or to what extent, he forfeited specific legal claims based on the failure to object in the trial court on the same grounds now advanced on appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
I. Prosecution Case
A. G.
At the time of the jurisdictional hearing, G.L. was eight years old and about to enter third grade. She was living with A., whom she identified as her mother, and her four brothers, D., X., E. and J. Prior to living with A., G. lived with M.; M.'s son, appellant; and her older brothers, D. and X. She was sometimes alone with appellant and "[h]e did bad things."
At the time of the hearing, G. and her four brothers were using different first names than when they lived with M. and appellant.
G. described one incident that occurred when she was lying down in her bedroom at M.'s house watching TV. Appellant closed the door, pulled his pants down, and pulled her pants down. Appellant was next to her on the bed and he moved her on top of him. She testified, "He started doing gross things, things I don't want to talk about." She then described feeling his private part touching her private part, and said she knew "he was going to do gross things." When asked by the prosecutor to mark the areas she was referring to as private parts on diagrams, she drew circles indicating her genitals and appellant's genitals. G. testified appellant did those things to her "[a] lot" before she moved from M.'s house to A.'s house.
On cross-examination, G. testified that she did not like living at M.'s house because of appellant, and that M. spanked her "[a] lot" with a belt or a "chancla." She also testified that D. saw what appellant did to her and X. saw "a little bit." G. explained she knew D. saw them and when he later asked her what was going on, she told him. X. also told G. that he saw them and he described to her what he saw. G. testified that after D. left M.'s house for A.'s house, he told A. what happened. G. subsequently moved to A.'s house, too, and she then told A. what happened.
During her testimony, M. stated D. and X. were removed from her home in July 2019 and G. was removed in November 2019.
G. testified that she told one person that the incident with appellant never happened. She could not recall the person's name, but her denial occurred when she was pointing to where appellant touched her on some drawings. She testified she was scared so she stated it never happened and nothing was wrong. G. did not recall speaking with a police officer, and she did not recall removing the clothing of two other foster children in the home. She denied she would remove her own clothing or remove the clothing of other children in the home.
B. D.
G.'s brother, D., was 11 years old when he testified. He said that appellant sometimes babysat during the time D., G., X., and another brother lived at M.'s house. D. testified that he saw what appellant did to G. He knew appellant had gone into G.'s room and, after the movie he was watching on TV ended, he went in G.'s room, too. He saw G. was on top of appellant and appellant's private part was out. He recalled they were both clothed and they were lying down in the bed. He ran back to his room and told X.
D. did not tell any adults that day because he was scared M. was going to hit him, but he later told J. and A. after he moved to their house. He said that M. threw a shoe at him one time, and she spanked him and his siblings with her hand and with a sandal or a "chancla."
He also described one other incident in which he saw G. and appellant lying down. D. saw appellant had G.'s pants down and he told X. to look, but they did not see anything else. D. said he finally told A. after she saw he looked worried and asked him what was wrong. He told her that he had other siblings still at M.'s house and then disclosed to A. "the bad things that happened over there."
On cross-examination, D. remembered leaving M.'s house for a short time and going to a large house, where he felt sad. He remembered being interviewed by someone about what he saw and being asked to draw what he saw. He said he told the woman the bad stuff appellant did, but answered, "'I don't know,'" to some questions. D. denied he told a social worker that he did not see appellant do anything to G.
M. later testified that in January 2019, D. and X. were moved to a new home out of the area before returning to her home.
C. Law Enforcement Testimony
Detective Zambrano was the lead investigator assigned to the criminal case, but he died between completing the investigation and the jurisdictional hearing. Zambrano was assisted by Detective Martinez, who testified. Martinez did not author any reports or interview any witnesses for the criminal case, as she was not the lead detective. She recalled the sheriff's department received a phone call about a sex crime in August 2019, and she explained that a report based on the call would have been sent electronically to the detectives' division.
Martinez testified that she was present along with Deputy Ortiz for the children's forensic interviews, but she did not interview the children or write the report. She also did not recall hearing G. tell the interviewer she had been molested 100 times or respond no when asked whether something happened that bothered her. Martinez explained that if a sexual assault is acute, meaning within the past 72 hours, they would take the victim directly to the hospital for a forensic exam, but if the assault occurred outside that window, they would not do so. She was unaware what occurred between the children's forensic interviews and appellant's arrest approximately 10 months later.
II. Defense Evidence A. Social Worker
Social worker Cristal X., formerly V., was the first witness called by the defense. She invoked official information privilege under Evidence Code section 1040, as well as Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. The trial court sustained the claim of official information privilege and precluded counsel from questioning her on any investigations she conducted in her official capacity, but took judicial notice that she was a mandated reporter.
B. M.
M. testified that she used to work for agencies and became a foster parent in 2012. G. was in M.'s care from August 2017, when she was three years old, to November 2019, when she was five years old. G.'s brother, E., came with G. in 2017. In January 2019, D. and X. were removed from M.'s home for aggressive behavior and sent to a home out of the area, but she accepted them back 11 days later and they remained in her home until July 2019. G. remained with her until November 2019. She testified that D., X., and G. were all liars.
M. 's house had four bedrooms. She had her own room, E. shared a bedroom with Mi., G. shared a room with S., and appellant had his own room. When M. was asked if she could take D. and X., appellant moved in with his older brothers two blocks away. Approximately five other adults would visit the house per week, and no one reported suspecting appellant of child abuse. Nor did any of the children tell her that appellant was engaged in any inappropriate touching or behavior.
Based on information she received from the agency, M. had to have G. with her at all times because G. would take other children's clothes off. She also testified G. craved attention. She denied she and her partner ever had sex when the children were home. She said he did not live with her, and they would see each other when the children were at school.
Social services employees came to M.'s house on August 2, 2019. When they departed, they left G. in her care, and no one told her she needed to remove appellant because he presented a danger to G. based on inappropriate touching.
M. testified that D. accused her of hitting X., and after G. left her care, G. falsely accused her of physical abuse. The misdemeanor case against her was later dismissed by the district attorney after she succeeded in having her guilty plea withdrawn, which had been entered by her attorney without her knowledge and agreement.
C. Law Enforcement Testimony
Officer Bethel, who worked for a police department in a different county at the time of the hearing, testified that when he was with the sheriff's department, he received a call for service from a child protective services worker on August 2, 2019, concerning appellant and he wrote a report. At his supervisor's direction, he contacted Detective Martinez, which ended his involvement in the matter.
Detective Ortiz listened in on the forensic interviews of G. and her two brothers, and he summarized the interviews in a report, which was the only case-related task he was given. He recalled G. reported there was penetration.
D. Expert Testimony
Sandra Wilkinson testified for the defense as an expert in sexual assault examinations and forensic interviews. Wilkinson opined that G. should have been taken for a forensic examination after reporting penetration and the failure to do so was malpractice. She explained that while the first 120 hours is acute for the purpose of collecting DNA and documenting injuries, an examination of a nonacute assault would detect trauma to the hymen because it does not heal intact.
Wilkinson also testified that the forensic examinations in this case were very poorly done, and deficiencies included asking leading questions that contained information not already disclosed by G. and asking questions with multiple parts that resulted in unclear answers. Wilkinson described G. as "sexualized," meaning she had knowledge of things a typical three- or four-year-old would not, and Wilkinson said the greatest deficiency in the interview was the interviewer's failure to follow up on G.'s statements that the perpetrator did things like they do in movies and the interviewer's acceptance of G.'s description of penetration and what sounded like ejaculation. Wilkinson said these statements from a victim should elicit followup questions, and that because penetration of a young child is exceedingly painful, G.'s response that she did not remember when asked certain questions was "a huge red flag." Wilkinson found "the interview to be totally unhelpful." She said the state standard for forensic interviewing involves a specific 10-step process and although the forensic interviewer initiated the process, it failed because the interviewer quickly abandoned her efforts.
E. Appellant
Appellant spoke with Cristal X. on August 2, 2019, for an investigation, but he was never interviewed by police. He was not arrested then, and he denied ever touching G. inappropriately. When social workers left that day, he remained in the home. He was later arrested in December 2020.
He testified that either his mother or his older brother was always at the house, and social workers, sometimes in multiples, came two or three times a week.
F. G. and D.
G. testified that the bad thing appellant did to her occurred in her room and D. saw it. Neither she nor appellant was wearing any clothes, and she denied previously testifying appellant was wearing a shirt. G. did not report what happened to the woman who came to M.'s house to interview her because appellant told her not to tell anyone, and she told only her mom she was in a lot of pain.
The jurisdictional hearing took two days, with an almost five-month passage of time between the first day, when G. testified for the prosecution, and the second day, when she was called to testify by the defense.
D. testified that he saw appellant with G. two times, once in his room and once in her room. The first time was in his room, when he and X. were in there watching TV. Appellant came in and sat in front of D.'s bed. He called G., and D. and X. saw appellant and G. both had their pants down. G. saw D. watching and said, "'Stop, [D.] You gotta stop, [D.]'"
The second time was when D. went into G.'s room to tell appellant the movie he and X. were watching had ended. He saw G. on top of appellant and appellant's private part was out. He ran back to his room and stayed there.
DISCUSSION
I. Procedural Background
In April 2021, appellant filed a motion seeking pretrial discovery, in accordance with Brady. Among other items, appellant sought G.'s dependency case file, the sheriff department's reports, and the forensic interviews. A minute order from a hearing held on August 31, 2021, reflects that the parties informed the court they resolved their discovery dispute.
The Honorable Margaret Johnson.
It appears appellant also followed the legal procedure in place to obtain confidential juvenile records vis-a-vis filing a petition under section 827, although neither the petition nor the filing date appears in the record. On February 23, 2022, the trial judge, who presided over the jurisdictional hearing, ordered the petition be sent to dependency court for consideration. The disposition of appellant's petition by the dependency court does not appear in the record, but later references to section 827 during the jurisdictional hearing suggest that disclosure of information was denied, given the prosecutor's repeated objections and reference to "lack of a [section] 827 order."
During the jurisdictional hearing, defense counsel sought to question multiple witnesses about G.'s behavioral issues and a statement she made denying the molestation occurred; issues with G.'s brothers; the social worker's investigation into the allegation of sexual abuse and initial conclusion; the number and identity of service providers who visited the house; and the approximately 17-month delay between the social worker's call to law enforcement reporting the allegation and appellant's arrest for the crime. Most of the information sought was part of, or related to, G.'s and her brothers' dependency cases. The trial court limited many of counsel's questions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040, and also rejected counsel's arguments that some of G.'s statements were admissible as admissions and for impeachment.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Kopatz (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 85; People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 131.) "Under this standard, a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 304; accord, People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 26.) "'[W]e review the ruling, not the court's reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.'" (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 351, fn. 11; accord, People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.) Further, "th[e] routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate [the] defendant's constitutional rights" (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545, fn. omitted; accord, People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1116), including the right to present a defense (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203, citing People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103).
III. Legal Principles
"Disclosure obligations in criminal proceedings are governed by both statutory procedures and federal constitutional due process rights. Penal Code section 1054.1 specifies the matters that the prosecution must disclose to the defense, including exculpatory evidence and felony convictions of material witnesses. (Pen. Code, § 1054.1, subds. (d), (e).) Although these statutory discovery procedures are expressly applicable only to criminal proceedings, the juvenile court has the discretion to apply them in juvenile delinquency proceedings as well. (Clinton K. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1248.) The constitutional disclosure obligations, which are delineated in Brady and its progeny, exist independently of these statutory procedures. (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 377-378.)
"To comply with Brady constitutional due process requirements, the prosecution must disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is favorable to the accused and material on the issue of guilt or punishment. (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 7.) Broadly speaking, exculpatory evidence is evidence that tends to exonerate the defendant from guilt. (See Kennedy v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 359, 377.) The impeachment component includes evidence that might undermine a prosecution witness's credibility. (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 518; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 16; People v. Superior Court (Meraz) (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 28, 51 [evidence favorable to the accused is '"evidence that the defense could use either to impeach the state's witnesses or to exculpate the accused"'].) Disclosure may be required even when the evidence is subject to a state privacy privilege, as is the case with confidential juvenile records. (Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 57-58 (Ritchie); see Webb, supra, at p. 518.) The Brady disclosure requirement applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings as well as criminal proceedings. (Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 806, fn. 5; see Robert S. v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1423.)" (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1334-1335, fn. omitted.)
Under state law, "Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), authorizes the trial court to decline to disclose confidential records maintained by a public entity when it finds the 'necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information ... outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest ofjustice.'" (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 73.) Further, "Section 827 of the Welfare and Institutions Code contains protections concerning the confidentiality of juvenile records, whether or not they are covered by other state or federal privileges, and vests the juvenile court with exclusive authority to determine the extent to which those records may be released to third parties." (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 432, citing § 827 &T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 778; accord, Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 524; Lorenza P. v. Superior Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 607, 610-611.)
"There is a strong public policy of confidentiality ofjuvenile records (In re Keisha T. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 220, 231), and section 827 et seq. set forth detailed provisions to protect this confidentiality. Section 827 specifies who is authorized to inspect the files, and it lists the prosecutor as one of the authorized persons. An authorized person, in turn, may not disclose information from the files to an unauthorized person without a court order. (§ 827, subd. (a)(4), (5); see T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 780-781; In re Keisha T., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 234.)" (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337, fns. omitted.)
"Section 827 also contains provisions that permit unauthorized persons to directly petition the juvenile court for access to the confidential records. (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(P); R.S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1053-1054.) Under section 827 the juvenile court has 'exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential juvenile records' to unauthorized persons. (In re Elijah S. [(2005)] 125 Cal.App.4th [1532,] 1541.) This statutory scheme reflects a legislative determination that the juvenile court has 'both the "'sensitivity and expertise' to make decisions about access to juvenile records."'" (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337, fn. omitted, quoting People v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 488, 491; accord, Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 524.)
"To support a section 827 petition, the petitioner is required to make a good cause showing warranting the in camera review. (Rule 5.552(c)(2).) The court is then required to engage in a careful balancing of the competing interests when making its disclosure decision. The court's duty 'is to "balance the interests of the child and other parties to the juvenile court proceedings, the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public." .. To do so, the court "must take into account any restrictions on disclosure found in other statutes, the general policies in favor of confidentiality and the nature of any privileges asserted, and compare these factors to the justification offered by the applicant" in order to determine what information, if any, should be released to the petitioner.'" (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337-1338, fn. omitted, quoting People v. Superior Court, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 &citing rule 5.552; accord, Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 524-525.)
IV. Analysis
As stated, the subject matter of the evidence sought by appellant, both documentary and testimonial in form, related to the agency's initial investigation and determination regarding the allegation that G. had been molested by appellant, including statements made by G. and others during the course of that investigation, the social worker's call to law enforcement, and law enforcement's response. All of this information was contained in, or generated in the context of, G.'s dependency case, and possibly the dependency cases of her brothers. During the jurisdictional hearing, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objections to certain documents and lines of questioning under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040.
Appellant's claim of entitlement to reversal based on the erroneous exclusion of evidence relies on a mischaracterization of his right to access and to disseminate confidential information from juvenile case files; and his contention that "it is unclear how or why the prosecutor and the juvenile court were so convinced section 827 forbid[s] the defense from independently introducing any and all information that was also contained in the siblings' dependency files" is undercut by both the law and the record in this case. The confidentiality of juvenile records and proceedings must be balanced against the rights of those criminally accused to disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence. (Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 504-505, 524-526; J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1334-1337.) As discussed, the record reflects a petition was filed under section 827 and the trial court referred it to dependency court, in accordance with the proper procedure for seeking confidential information contained in juvenile case files. Resolution of that matter rested exclusively with the dependency court. (Jenkins, supra, at p. 524; accord, J.E., supra, at pp. 1337-1338.) Notably, appellant does not claim a Brady violation, and he makes no mention of his petition or its resolution. (Pack v. Kings County Human Services Agency (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 821, 826, fn. 4 (Pack)["The petition for review of juvenile court records is a special proceeding on a collateral matter," and "[a]n order denying the petition is appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding."], citing In re Keisha T. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 220, 229 (Keisha T.).)
Appellant asserts that "the defense already rightfully had access to much of the information, because this was a juvenile case 'involving the' accusing 'minor(s),'" and he reasons that "[b]ecause everyone in the room was entitled to access the confidential information, nothing in section 827 barred the defense's introduction of evidence or the impeachment of witnesses with information simply because it was also contained in a dependency file and/or related to the actions of a social worker." (Italics added.) appellant is incorrect.
A juvenile case file may be inspected by "The attorneys for the parties, judges, referees, other hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement officers who are actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the minor." (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(E), italics added.) In the context of case file access under section 827, the minor was G., or her brothers, not appellant, and given that appellant was not a party in the underlying dependency proceedings, his defense counsel did not have the right to inspect the juvenile case files absent a court order. (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(Q); Keisha T., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 232; see Lorenza P. v. Superior Court, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 611 [criminal defense counsel for mother of minors had right to review minors' underlying dependency records without a court order because mother was a party to the dependency proceeding].) Moreover, a right of inspection by an authorized person does not equate to a right to freely disseminate the information to third parties. (Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 524; accord, J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337; Keisha T., supra, at pp. 233-234.) "[A]llowing individuals with access to juvenile court records ... to disseminate them[] would turn the expressed policy of confidentiality on its head." (Keisha T., supra, at p. 234, citing In re Tiffany G. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 443, 451.)
As explained, the procedures under section 827 "'protect both the defendant's right to a fair trial and the state's interest in confidentiality of the files'" (Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 525, quoting J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338), and that is the "'proper mechanism to resolve a defense Brady disclosure request involving information in a juvenile file'" (Jenkins, supra, at p. 524, quoting J.E, supra, at p. 1338). Here, appellant has not shown that he obtained a section 827 order from the dependency court permitting him to obtain and disclose information from dependency case files, and that the trial court thereafter excluded the evidence, in contravention of the order. Contrary to appellant's position that the trial court erred, the record reflects a section 827 petition was filed and transferred to the dependency court for resolution. Appellant does not acknowledge this referral, let alone challenge it, but any claim of error related to that underlying decision would be subject to timeliness and forfeiture principles. (Pack, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 826, fn. 4.) To the extent appellant's argument is interpreted as claiming the trial court had the authority to simply admit the evidence because the court was presiding over a juvenile wardship proceeding, that position, too, neglects to account for the requisite petition and disclosure order process under section 827.
"'Appellate jurisdiction is limited to the four corners of the record on appeal ....'" (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 743, quoting In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646.) "On appeal, we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, '"[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown."'" (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 666.) The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal (People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 378), including providing an adequate record for review (People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 866). "'[A]ny uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the defendant.'" (Ibid., quoting People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 &citing People v. Chubbuck (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.)
Appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating error on appeal. In the absence of any evidence that appellant obtained an order via the petition process under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, his claim that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence under section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040 necessarily fails.
Appellant sought to introduce some of the disputed evidence on grounds of impeachment and admissions. While these grounds do not supplant the need to comply with section 827, we discern no fault with the court's additional determinations that G.'s out-of-court statements made during the dependency case investigation were admissible neither for impeachment nor as admissions. G. admitted in her testimony that she denied the molestation allegation at one point when asked about it. (Evid. Code, § 1235; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219 ["The 'fundamental requirement' of [Evidence Code] section 1235 is that the statement in fact be inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony."].) Further, she was not a party to the juvenile wardship petition brought against appellant. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Nor do we discern any apparent error with the trial court's rulings on grounds of hearsay or relevance.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: LEVY, Acting P. J., PENA, J.