Opinion
E066145
01-24-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MELISSA DAWN RYAN, Defendant and Appellant.
Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIF149971) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge. Affirmed. Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Melissa Dawn Ryan pleaded guilty in 2009 to one felony count of receiving stolen property, violating Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison sentence of one year four months. On April 15, 2016, the trial court denied defendant's petition for resentencing (§ 1170.18) because the value of the property exceeded $950.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the proceedings and facts. Defendant has not filed any supplemental briefing
An appellate court conducts a review of the entire record to determine whether the record reveals any issues which, if resolved favorably to defendant, would result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444, 447-448; Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744; see People v. Johnson (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109-112.) Based on our independent review of the record, we affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The complaint, filed on April 8, 2009, alleged in count 1 that, on or about April 6, 2009, defendant received stolen access cards, checks, and laptop computers, in violation of section 496, subdivision (a). Count 2 alleged that defendant unlawfully acquired and retained an access card, intending to sell the card in violation of section 484e, subdivision (c). It was further alleged that defendant was in violation of a grant of probation in case No. SWF021939. Defendant also allegedly violated another probation in case No. SWF010316.
On April 12, 2016, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to count 1, a felony, receiving stolen access cards and checks, and admitted two probation violations, in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 16 months to be served concurrent with the two probation violations, and the dismissal of all remaining charges and enhancements. The factual basis for defendant's plea was set forth orally at the time of the plea when defendant admitted that she unlawfully received and retained access cards and checks, knowing they were obtained by theft in violation of section 496, subdivision (a), a felony. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court imposed a stipulated aggregate sentence of 16 months on all three cases, and count 2 was dismissed.
The laptop was deemed not stolen.
In October 2015, defendant filed a form petition, seeking to reduce her receiving stolen property conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, Penal Code section 1170.18. The value of the property was not identified. The prosecutor opposed the petition, asserting the value of the "laptops, access cards & checks" was unknown and defendant had not met her burden to establish the value was not greater than $950.
On April 15, 2016, at the hearing on defendant's petition, citing an unredacted police report, the prosecutor claimed multiple checks were involved, including one valued at $1,500. Defense counsel said he had received a copy of the unredacted report and agreed to submit. Relying on the police report, the court concluded that the amount of loss related to count 1 was greater than $950, and thus, defendant's offense did not qualify for reclassification as a misdemeanor.
The copy of the police report which is part of the record on appeal is redacted and does not supply information about the value of the stolen property. --------
III
DISCUSSION
The only issue on appeal is whether defendant's offense qualified for reclassification as a misdemeanor under section 1170.18. The prosecution and defense counsel both agreed that the value of the property at issue was greater than $950. Therefore, section 1170.18 does not apply.
In 2009, when defendant committed her crime, the offense of receiving stolen property could be charged as a misdemeanor if (1) such a classification served the interests of justice, and (2) the value of the stolen property did not exceed $400. (Former § 496, subd. (a).) After the passage of Proposition 47, the offense of receiving stolen property is a misdemeanor if "the value of the property does not exceed $950." (T.W. v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 646, 651.)
In requesting a felony conviction be transmuted into a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, a defendant bears the burden of making an initial showing concerning the value of the stolen property, entitling her to a reduction in sentence. Therefore, a "proper petition" should contain proof, such as the defendant's testimony (or other evidence) regarding the nature and value of the items taken. Based upon that initial showing, the trial "court can take such action as appropriate to grant the petition or permit further factual determination." (People v. Sherow (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 875, 880; see People v. Rivas-Colon (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 444, 449-450.)
Defendant provided no proof about the value of the stolen items. Her lawyer agreed the subject property was valued at $1,500. Defendant failed to meet her burden of showing the value was $950 or less. Thus, the trial court could reasonably conclude the police report provided by the prosecutor did not prove defendant received $950 or less. (People v. Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.
IV
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying defendant's petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. MILLER
J.