People v. Rutledge

63 Citing cases

  1. People v. Morales

    2012 Ill. App. 101911 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 54 times
    Finding the defendant's claim that eyewitness's identification was undermined to be “a proposition we find unsupported by the evidence” due to his testimony on direct examination

    Manuel, 294 Ill.App.3d at 124, 228 Ill.Dec. 472, 689 N.E.2d 344. See also People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill.App.3d 22, 25, 350 Ill.Dec. 236, 948 N.E.2d 305 (2011) ("if the evidence of the other offenses and the evidence of the crime charged are inextricably intertwined, the rule relating to other crimes is not implicated and ordinary relevancy principles apply"); People v. Figueroa, 341 Ill.App.3d 665, 672, 275 Ill.Dec. 941, 793 N.E.2d 712 (2003) ( "where the trial court properly admitted evidence of other criminal acts that occurred at the same time and place and that were related to the criminal action for which the defendant was being tried, no limiting instruction is required").¶ 25 Stated differently, if the prior crime is part of the "course of conduct" leading up to the crime charged, then it constitutes intrinsic evidence of the charged offense and its admissibility is not analyzed as "other crimes" evidence, requiring proof that the defendant committed or participated in the uncharged offense.

  2. People v. Lopez

    2013 Ill. App. 102938 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    The State contends testimony about the December 4 incident was intrinsic evidence that showed a course of conduct resulting in the December 24 murder and, therefore, was not subject to traditional other—crimes analysis. For support, the State relies on People v. Manuel, 294 Ill.App.3d 113, 228 Ill.Dec. 472, 689 N.E.2d 344 (1997) and People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill.App.3d 22, 350 Ill.Dec. 236, 948 N.E.2d 305 (2011).

  3. People v. Hensley

    2014 Ill. App. 120802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 58 times
    In People v. Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 52, on which the State relies, we upheld the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes where the defendant had previously brandished or fired a gun of the same caliber as the gun he fired during the offense under review.

    Similarly, the failure of a defendant to show that error occurred at all defeats both an ineffective assistance claim and a claim of error under either prong of the plain error doctrine. People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25 (2011). As explained hereafter we conclude that defendant has failed to show error.

  4. People v. Pikes

    2012 Ill. App. 102274 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 7 times
    In Pikes, the defendant was charged with first degree murder for a drive-by shooting at a group of rival gang members that killed one man.

    Morales, 2012 IL App (1st) 101911, ¶ 24, 359 Ill.Dec. 160, 966 N.E.2d 481. Relying on three established cases wherein a defendant's other crimes evidence was found to be properly admitted against him, the Morales court distinguished between contested evidence that concerned “ ‘a necessary preliminary to the current offense,’ ” and that which did not. Morales, 2012 IL App (1st) 101911, ¶ 24, 359 Ill.Dec. 160, 966 N.E.2d 481 (quoting People v. Manuel, 294 Ill.App.3d 113, 124, 228 Ill.Dec. 472, 689 N.E.2d 344 (1997), and citing People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill.App.3d 22, 25, 350 Ill.Dec. 236, 948 N.E.2d 305 (2011), and People v. Figueroa, 341 Ill.App.3d 665, 672, 275 Ill.Dec. 941, 793 N.E.2d 712 (2003)). It reasoned that, if the other crimes evidence sought to be admitted could be considered “part of the ‘course of conduct’ leading up to the crime charged, then it constitutes intrinsic evidence of the charged offense and its admissibility is not analyzed as ‘other crimes' evidence, requiring proof that the defendant committed or participated in the uncharged offense.”

  5. People v. Watson

    2016 Ill. App. 132789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    As we have noted, it is "not all prejudicial evidence that must be excluded but, rather, only that which is unfairly prejudicial." People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25 (2011) (emphasis in original). Permissible purposes for use of "other crimes" evidence include, amongst others, motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake.

  6. People v. Ringer

    2016 Ill. App. 133877 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Consequently, counsel's performance was not deficient because the failure to challenge properly admitted evidence is not ineffective assistance. People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25 (2011) (counsel not ineffective for failing to object to properly admitted evidence of other crimes). Additionally, we cannot say that counsel's performance prejudiced defendant, as evidence of defendant's other crimes would have been properly admitted for purposes of identification regardless of whether counsel objected on the issue of lack of mistake.

  7. People v. Lopez

    2014 Ill. App. 120956 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    Defendant's argument that the State could prove its case by simply introducing evidence of "bad blood" between the opposing groups is not persuasive. "Although the State possibly could have proved its case without this evidence, there is no rule that requires the State to present a watered-down version of events simply because otherwise highly probative evidence is unflattering to defendant." People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011). The incident in the Emery's backyard is highly probative of material questions other than defendant's propensity to commit crime.

  8. People v. Franklin

    2013 Ill. App. 103013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    Defendant concedes this court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. See People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); People v Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). Nevertheless, defendant claims that our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), dictates that a defendant convicted of a Class 2 felony, but sentenced as a Class X offender, should receive the term of MSR for Class 2 felonies. ¶ 35 Defendant argues that Pullen stands for the proposition that Class X sentencing eligibility under section 5-5-3(c)(3) will not trump a sentencing statute written in terms of felonies committed.

  9. People v. Carter

    2013 Ill. App. 112024 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    Although defendant suggests that the length of the MSR term imposed should be based on the classification of the underlying felony conviction rather than the classification of the requisite sentencing range, this argument has been repeatedly rejected by reviewing courts. See, e.g., People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶¶ 36-38 (recognizing that defendant's subject to Class X sentences are subject to the Class X three-year MSR term); People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62 (same); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011) (same); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010) (same); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 82-83 (2010) (same); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541 (1995) (same). Courts have reasoned that "the gravity of the conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires lengthier watchfulness after prison release than violations of a less serious nature."

  10. People v. Pikes

    2013 IL 115171 (Ill. 2013)   Cited 251 times
    In Pikes, our supreme court ruled earlier gang-related events were properly admitted as a continuing narrative to explain why the defendants attacked the victim.

    ¶ 19 The State argues that the scooter shooting incident was connected to the charged crime and was thus admissible under a line of authority allowing admission of evidence of other crimes that are “intrinsic” or related to the charged offense in some way, or are part of a “continuing narrative” of the events giving rise to the charged offense, or are “ intertwined” with the charged offense. It notes that some courts have recognized a distinction between traditional other-crimes evidence (extrinsic) and evidence of an uncharged crime that is related to the charged offense (intrinsic). See, e.g., People v. Manuel, 294 Ill.App.3d 113, 123, 228 Ill.Dec. 472, 689 N.E.2d 344 (1997); People v. Morales, 2012 IL App (1st) 101911, ¶ 24, 359 Ill.Dec. 160, 966 N.E.2d 481; People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill.App.3d 22, 25, 350 Ill.Dec. 236, 948 N.E.2d 305 (2011); People v. Allen, 184 Ill.App.3d 438, 449, 132 Ill.Dec. 671, 540 N.E.2d 411 (1989), overruled on other grounds,172 Ill.2d 154, 216 Ill.Dec. 664, 665 N.E.2d 1221 (1996). Other courts have treated “intrinsic” evidence as an exception to the general exclusion of other-crimes evidence.