Opinion
G044843
01-31-2012
In re RUSSELL B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUSSELL B., Defendant and Appellant.
Renee Paradis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. DL031419)
OPINION
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Nick A. Dourbetas, Judge. Affirmed.
Renee Paradis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court declared Russell B., a minor, a ward of the court after finding true allegations he had committed felony hit and run resulting in permanent injury or death (Veh. Code, § 20001; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated) and vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2)). Minor contends the evidence is insufficient to support his hit and run conviction and the court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's blood alcohol content. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Jesse A., Ruben G. and Nestor B. were walking towards a park when the minor stopped his car by them and started talking to Jesse. The three boys requested a ride, but a person named Daniel M. was already sitting in the front passenger seat and car parts occupied the back seat. Undeterred, Jesse and Ruben climbed onto the trunk while Nestor sat on the hood, and minor started driving slowly down the street.
When minor entered the parking lot of the park, Jessie and Ruben jumped off but Nestor refused. Minor continued driving and as he was turning, Nestor jumped off, fell and hit the back of his head on the ground.
Minor parked his car and went to "check what was going on." He looked at Nestor, who was unconscious and "bleeding from his mouth, nose . . .[,] ears," and the back of his head. The boys circled around Nestor, and Ruben and Daniel used the latter's cell phone to call 911.
Jesse put his jacket underneath Nestor's head and asked the other boys to say Nestor had fallen off a skateboard. Minor agreed, got back into his car, drove out of the parking lot, and parked it nearby in a cul-de-sac by some apartments. He then walked to some basketball courts about 25 yards away and did not return to the accident location until after paramedics took Nestor away in the ambulance. No police responded to the scene. Nestor later died from "anoxic encephalopathy [brain swelling] due to blunt force trauma to the head, due to a mechanical fall."
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence
Minor contends substantial evidence did not support his hit and run conviction. We disagree.
Under section 20001, subdivision (a), "The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or herself, or in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Section[] 20003 [provide personal information and render reasonable assistance to victim] . . . ." "'Although a violation of section 20001 is popularly denominated "hit-and-run," the act made criminal thereunder is not the "hitting" but the "running." The legislative purpose of sections 20001 and 20003 is to prevent the driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-causing accident from leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of medical care and from attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by failing to identify oneself. . . . [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Valdez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 82, 86.)
Minor argues the evidence is insufficient to show he did not satisfy the requirements of sections 20001 and 20003 because it was undisputed he stopped his car immediately after Nestor fell and he and the other boys "gathered around [him] and tried to provide what little help they could," including using the only cell phone they had among them to call 911. Although he asserts "[i]t is difficult to see what more [he] could have done once the paramedics were called," he acknowledges "[i]t could be argued that part of 'reasonable' assistance necessarily requires that after calling for an ambulance, an individual wait to see that the ambulance in fact arrives." But minor did not do that and instead immediately drove away from the scene of the accident after agreeing with the other boys to say Nestor had fallen off his skateboard.
Generally, "criminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person." (People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80, fn. omitted.) Here, minor left the scene despite knowing Nestor was seriously injured. Although in contrast to this case Holford involved a defendant who failed to stop at all at the scene, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that stopping the car briefly to allow the minor to collude with the other boys was the same as not stopping at all (cf. People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1021-1022 [momentary pause after accident did not constitute stopping the vehicle where the defendant refused to stop and accelerated instead]) and that his failure to await the ambulance violated his statutory duties under sections 20001 and 20003.
Minor maintains he returned and "at worst, . . . waited approximately 25 yards away from the scene after the ambulance was called, watching what happened, while his friends stood close by, and at best he moved his car and then returned to the scene." But whether that was sufficient was a question of fact for the court to determine. (People v. Steele (1929) 100 Cal.App. 639, 646 ["Whatever may be required under the circumstances must therefore necessarily be a question of fact to be determined by the [trier of fact]"].) The court implicitly found neither watching from 25 yards away after having left the scene nor the presence of his friends satisfied the minor's obligations to stop and render reasonable assistance and we will not reweigh the evidence. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529-530.) Given our conclusion substantial evidence supports minor's conviction, we need not address his contentions regarding his duty to provide identifying information to the victim and police.
2. Exclusion of Evidence
The prosecution moved in limine under Evidence Code section 402 to exclude evidence Nestor had a blood alcohol content of .07 at the hospital, arguing it was irrelevant because contributory negligence is not a defense to a crime. The court granted the motion. Minor challenges this ruling, contending the evidence was relevant to whether "Nestor's own action[] in jumping off the car w[as] a superseding cause of his death." The contention lacks merit.
'""In general, an 'independent' intervening cause will absolve a defendant of criminal liability. [Citation.] However, in order to be 'independent' the intervening cause must be 'unforeseeable . . . an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding cause.' [Citation.] On the other hand, a 'dependent' intervening cause will not relieve the defendant of criminal liability. '. . . If an intervening cause is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of defendant's original act the intervening act is "dependent" and not a superseding cause, and will not relieve defendant of liability.'"' [Citations.] '"[W]here [an] injury was brought about by a later cause of independent origin . . . [the question of proximate cause] revolves around a determination of whether the later cause of independent origin, commonly referred to as an intervening cause, was foreseeable by the defendant or, if not foreseeable, whether it caused injury of a type which was foreseeable. If either of these questions is answered in the affirmative, then the defendant is not relieved from liability towards the plaintiff; if, however, it is determined that the intervening cause was not foreseeable and that the results which it caused were not foreseeable, then the intervening cause becomes a supervening cause and the defendant is relieved from liability for the plaintiff's injuries."' [Citation.] Thus, '[t]he defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act.' [Citations.]" (People v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1325-1326.)
Minor argues allowing Nestor to ride on the outside of his car created "no 'peril,'" although he concedes it could under other circumstances, because he was driving five miles an hour when Nestor did the "'abnormal'" act of jumping off the moving car when he could have waited another minute and have jumped off after he parked. We are not persuaded. Even if we accept his claim it was unforeseeable Nestor would jump off the car when he did, minor's act of allowing Nestor to ride on top of the car in the first place caused a foreseeable injury. As the Attorney General asserts, "Whether it is from the person falling off, jumping off, or being hit by the car, it is foreseeable that a person could be seriously injured" in allowing a person riding on top of a moving vehicle regardless of the speed. Minor does not contend otherwise. Under these facts, Nestor's conduct was "dependent" and not a superseding cause, making his blood alcohol level irrelevant. The court did not err in excluding the evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
ARONSON, J.
IKOLA, J.