Opinion
2012-03-23
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher RUMPH, Defendant–Appellant.
Kristin F. Splain, Conflict Defender, Rochester (Joseph D. Waldorf of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Christopher Rumph, Defendant–Appellant Pro Se.
Kristin F. Splain, Conflict Defender, Rochester (Joseph D. Waldorf of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Christopher Rumph, Defendant–Appellant Pro Se. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Nancy Gilligan of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of three counts of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15[4] ) and one count of robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10 [3] ). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we reject defendant's contention in his main and pro se supplemental briefs that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Although an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, it cannot be said that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded ( see generally Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Defendant was identified by both the victim and another witness, and the jury was entitled to reject the alibi testimony ( see People v. Phong T. Le, 277 A.D.2d 1036, 1036, 716 N.Y.S.2d 189, lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 762, 725 N.Y.S.2d 289, 748 N.E.2d 1085). Although there were discrepancies between the victim's description of the perpetrator to the police and the physical appearance of defendant, the victim's identification of defendant was not “ incredible and unbelievable, that is, impossible of belief because it [was] manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory” ( People v. Wallace, 306 A.D.2d 802, 802–803, 760 N.Y.S.2d 702 [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and the jury's resolution of credibility issues is entitled to great deference ( see People v. Witherspoon, 66 A.D.3d 1456, 1457, 885 N.Y.S.2d 829, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 942, 895 N.Y.S.2d 333, 922 N.E.2d 922; People v. Harris, 15 A.D.3d 966, 967, 788 N.Y.S.2d 745, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 831, 796 N.Y.S.2d 586, 829 N.E.2d 679; see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention in his main and pro se supplemental briefs that he was deprived of a fair trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during summation inasmuch as he did not object to any of the alleged improprieties ( see People v. Smith, 90 A.D.3d 1565, 1567, 935 N.Y.S.2d 775; People v. Mull, 89 A.D.3d 1445, 1446, 932 N.Y.S.2d 635). We decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( see CPL 470.15[6][a] ).
Contrary to the contention of defendant in his main brief, “ there was no error under People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, 113 N.E.2d 841 because the [investigator's] testimony describing the lineup procedure and stating that the victim viewed a lineup in which defendant was included, without stating that the [victim] actually identified defendant, does not constitute bolstering” ( People v. James, 262 A.D.2d 139, 692 N.Y.S.2d 50, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 1020, 697 N.Y.S.2d 579, 719 N.E.2d 940; see People v. Tucker, 25 A.D.3d 419, 419–420, 807 N.Y.S.2d 85, lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 839, 814 N.Y.S.2d 87, 847 N.E.2d 384; People v. Jiminez, 22 A.D.3d 423, 424, 805 N.Y.S.2d 2). We conclude that defendant was not denied a fair trial based upon cumulative error ( see People v. Lucie, 49 A.D.3d 1253, 1253, 853 N.Y.S.2d 761, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 936, 862 N.Y.S.2d 343, 892 N.E.2d 409).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention in his main brief that County Court's Allen charge was coercive inasmuch as defendant failed to object to the charge on that ground ( see People v. Vassar, 30 A.D.3d 1051, 1051, 816 N.Y.S.2d 260, lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 796, 821 N.Y.S.2d 826, 854 N.E.2d 1290). In any event, we conclude that the charge as a whole was not coercive ( see People v. Ford, 78 N.Y.2d 878, 880, 573 N.Y.S.2d 442, 577 N.E.2d 1034; see e.g. People v. Harrington, 262 A.D.2d 220, 220, 694 N.Y.S.2d 354, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 823, 702 N.Y.S.2d 593, 724 N.E.2d 385; People v. Gonzalez, 259 A.D.2d 631, 632, 687 N.Y.S.2d 170, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 970, 695 N.Y.S.2d 56, 716 N.E.2d 1101). We reject defendant's contention in his main brief that the court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial on the ground that the jury was deadlocked ( see CPL 310.60[1][a]; People v. Love, 307 A.D.2d 528, 530–531, 762 N.Y.S.2d 162, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 643, 769 N.Y.S.2d 209, 801 N.E.2d 430; People v. Novak, 179 A.D.2d 1053, 1054, 579 N.Y.S.2d 509, lv. denied 79 N.Y.2d 922, 582 N.Y.S.2d 82, 590 N.E.2d 1210). Contrary to the further contention of defendant in his main brief, he was not denied his statutory right to testify before the grand jury, and thus the court properly refused to dismiss the indictment on that ground ( see e.g. People v. Perez, 67 A.D.3d 1324, 1325, 888 N.Y.S.2d 689, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 941, 895 N.Y.S.2d 331, 922 N.E.2d 920; People v. Smith, 18 A.D.3d 888, 796 N.Y.S.2d 655, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 794, 801 N.Y.S.2d 815, 835 N.E.2d 675). A defendant has the right to testify before the grand jury “if, prior to the filing of any indictment ..., he [or she] serves upon the district attorney of the county a written notice making such request” (CPL 190.50[5][a]; see People v. Evans, 79 N.Y.2d 407, 409, 583 N.Y.S.2d 358, 592 N.E.2d 1362; Perez, 67 A.D.3d at 1325, 888 N.Y.S.2d 689; Smith, 18 A.D.3d 888, 796 N.Y.S.2d 655) and, here, “[t]here is no evidence in the record that defendant or his attorney gave the requisite written notice to the District Attorney that defendant intended to testify before the grand jury” ( Perez, 67 A.D.3d at 1325, 888 N.Y.S.2d 689).
Finally, we reject the contention of defendant in his pro se supplemental brief that he was denied effective assistance of counsel ( see generally People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.