Opinion
C099411
04-16-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRANDON RUIZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 02F08094
RENNER, J.
Defendant Brandon Ruiz appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Defendant argues the trial court erred when it denied his petition because the jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We will affirm the trial court's order denying the petition.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Although defendant's petition refers to former section 1170.95, we will refer to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2004, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The jury also found true allegations defendant personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death as to both counts (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), along with a multiple murder allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). In the direct appeal from defendant's conviction, we summarized the facts of the case. In short, one of the victims bought drugs from codefendant Andrew Florencio Limones using counterfeit money. Defendant and codefendant confronted the victim in a bedroom; the second victim, a person who lived in the house, was also in the room. "At some point, defendant Ruiz pulled out a gun and fired at least eight times, killing both [victims].... [Codefendant] fled the house." (People v. Limones et al. (April 12, 2006, C048306) [nonpub. opn.].) The jury found codefendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter of the first victim, and not guilty on any charge as to the second victim. The jury also found not true an allegation codefendant was armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) We affirmed the judgments. (People v. Limones, supra, C048306.)
In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The parties submitted briefing and attached the jury instructions used at trial. As relevant here, the jury was instructed on deliberate and premeditated malice murder, as well as aider and abettor liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
For the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the trial court used CALJIC No. 3.02, which stated, in part, "In order to find defendant ANDREW LIMONES guilty of the crime [of] murder, as charged in Count Two, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: [¶] 1. The crime of murder of [first victim] was committed; [¶] 2. That the defendant ANDREW LIMONES aided and abetted that crime[]; [¶] 3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of murder of [first victim]; and [¶] 4. The crime of murder of [second victim] was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crime of murder of [first victim]."
The trial court also used CALJIC No. 3.03A, which stated, "Those who aid and abet a crime and those who directly perpetrate the crime are principals and equally guilty of the commission of that crime and any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crime or crimes originally aided and abetted. You need not unanimously agree whether a defendant is an aider and abettor or a direct perpetrator. In order to find the defendant guilty of the charged crime or any lesser offense, individual jurors do not have to choose among the theories of liability so long as each of you is convinced [of] that individual's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
After a hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying the petition. The trial court observed CALJIC No. 3.02, the natural and probable consequences doctrine instruction, had been tailored to codefendant, and that codefendant had been acquitted of the murder of the second victim. Thus, defendant could only have been convicted of first degree murder as the actual killer and was ineligible for relief.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court incorrectly denied his petition because the jury could have used portions of CALJIC No. 3.02 and 3.03A to find him guilty using the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We disagree.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) was enacted "to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) Senate Bill No. 1437 "amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that '[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.' (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)" (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51.) This language eliminated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine in murder prosecutions. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846.)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) later made various amendments to section 1172.6.
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a petition process in section 1172.6 under which defendants convicted of murder who "could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019" could apply to have their convictions vacated. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Once a defendant has filed such a petition, the trial court must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case that he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) "If the trial court determines that a prima facie showing for relief has been made, the trial court issues an order to show cause, and then must hold a hearing 'to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence.'" (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960.)
When making a prima facie determination under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), a trial court may "rely on the record of conviction in determining whether that single prima facie showing is made." (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 970.) Thus, if the record of conviction establishes the petition lacks merit, the trial court may deny the petition without conducting further proceedings. (Id. at p. 971 ["The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court's prima facie inquiry under section 117[2.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless"].)
"While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 117[2.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings,' "the court takes petitioner's factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause."' [Citations.] '[A] court should not reject the petitioner's factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.' [Citations.] 'However, if the record, including the court's own documents, "contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition," then "the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner." '" (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) "In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in 'factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.' [Citation.] . . . [T]he 'prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.'" (Id. at p. 972.)
Here, the jury instructions and verdicts demonstrate the jury necessarily found defendant was the actual killer. The trial court used CALJIC Nos. 3.02 and 8.20 to instruct the jury on malice murder and murder as an aider/abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The natural and probable consequences instruction expressly applied only to codefendant's liability on count two, however, and the jury could not have used that instruction to reach guilty verdicts as to defendant's two murder counts. Thus, the only remaining avenue for the jury to find defendant guilty of first degree murder was under a theory of malice murder, which required findings of a "willful[], deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice aforethought," according to CALJIC No. 8.20. Likewise, the jury found true the allegations defendant personally discharged a firearm causing the victims' deaths, indicating he was the actual killer. (People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 58; People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 55.) Defendant was therefore not convicted under a theory of imputed malice, could still be convicted of first degree murder, and is ineligible for relief.
Defendant asserts the jury could have used the portions of CALJIC No. 3.02 that did not expressly name codefendant, or the aiding and abetting language from CALJIC No. 3.03A, and applied that language to find defendant guilty of first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. But, as noted above, the instruction expressly limits its application to codefendant and count two, so defendant's argument would require the jurors to ignore the limiting portion of the instruction. As both parties note, we presume the jury understood and followed all instructions. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30.) And, defendant's conclusion to this argument, that the jury could use these instructions to find defendant "aided and abetted a target crime (such as threatening or assaulting a person)," cannot be the case because neither of these crimes were charged as a target crime and the jury was not instructed accordingly. The jury could not have concluded defendant intended to aid and abet a target crime for which it was not instructed. Defendant was only charged with, and only convicted of, first degree murder. We conclude the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's section 1172.6 petition.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant's petition for resentencing is affirmed.
We concur:DUARTE, Acting P. J., BOULWARE EURIE, J.