Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super.Ct.No. FF616420
Duffy, J.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Rogelio May Ruiz pleaded guilty to the following charges: four counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)) and one count of forcible oral copulation (id., § 288a, subd. (c)(2)). In conformity with the agreement, the court sentenced defendant to full consecutive (id., former § 667.6, subd. (d); Stats. 2002, ch. 787, § 16) eight-year terms on each count, for a total sentence of 40 years in state prison.
Counsel for defendant has filed an opening brief that states the case and facts but raises no issue. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf. Defendant has filed a supplemental letter brief in which he raises a number of claims. We have reviewed the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, keeping in mind that our review is limited to grounds for appeal that occurred after entry of defendant’s guilty plea and do not affect the plea’s validity. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1), (b)(4)(B).) For reasons that we will explain, pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, we agree with counsel for defendant that there is no arguable issue on appeal. Therefore we will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because defendant was convicted by guilty plea, we set forth the factual background by reviewing and summarizing the record.
Defendant, a native of Mexico, made his way to the United States a decade before the crimes and at the time of the crimes was living in a pickup truck on the premises of the 12-year-old victim’s family, with the family’s permission.
On June 30, 2006, defendant, perspiring and smelling of alcohol, sexually assaulted the victim, who was home only with her elderly and disabled grandmother and her one-year-old niece. Defendant fondled the victim, rubbed against her, kissed her, stuck his tongue in her mouth, licked her vagina, attempted to insert his penis in her vagina, and inserted his fingers and tongue in her vagina. The victim fought defendant vigorously, kicking, biting, and throwing objects at the defendant and screaming. She also tried to get help on a telephone, which defendant tossed aside. Defendant stated in an interview with the police that he was drunk and did not recall what he had done.
The victim suffered lasting psychological harm and, according to her mother, attempted suicide. She had to withdraw from school. The quality of the lives of the victim’s family also deteriorated after the assault.
Defendant wrote letters of apology in Spanish to the victim and her family and to the court. In the letter to the victim and her family he said he felt great shame as he recalled little by little what he had done.
DISCUSSION
In his supplemental letter brief, dated April 20, 2007, defendant raises several claims.
First, defendant claims that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We will assume that he invokes the guaranties of the United States and California Constitutions.
Because a sentence that is constitutional under the California criteria for cruel and unusual punishment is also constitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we evaluate defendant’s claim that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under California Supreme Court authority. Our high court has identified three factors to be considered in this inquiry: (1) “the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425); (2) a “compar[ison of] the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different offenses which, by the same test, must be deemed more serious” (id. at p. 426); and (3) “a comparison of the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional provision” (id. at p. 427). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that the punishment prescribed for his offense is unconstitutional. (People v. King (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 567, 572.)
Applying the Lynch factors, we see no constitutional requirement to reverse the judgment against defendant. Defendant brutalized the victim. In committing these offenses, defendant took advantage of the victim’s relative physical weakness, youth, immaturity, and vulnerability to inflict enormous harm on her for his own personal gratification. The victim suffered lasting emotional damage as a result of his sexual offenses against her. And convictions for multiple sexual offenses can result in sentences that could not possibly be served in a human lifetime. Yet such sentences are routinely upheld when challenged as unconstitutionally disproportionate. (See, e.g., People v. Wallace (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 651, 666 [283-year sentence for 46 sex crimes against seven victims]; People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 532 [129 years for 25 sex crimes against one victim); People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382 [115 years plus 444 years to life]; People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1134-1137 [375 years to life plus 53 years].)
Second, defendant states a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694.) The Strickland standards also apply to defendant’s claim under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (E.g., People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 718.)
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be resolved on the record before us. If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged—and the record here does not—then unless counsel was asked for an explanation for counsel’s acts or omissions and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation for those acts or omissions, the claim on appeal must be rejected. The claim may be raised again in a habeas corpus petition. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
Third, defendant states that he would like to withdraw his guilty plea and be retried. We treat this contention as an argument that we should set aside the judgment for the limited purpose of remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether it should permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. (See People v. Osorio (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 183, 188.) But because defendant does not give us any reason to believe that his request is based on events postdating the plea, his argument amounts to an attack on the plea itself, and defendant has not obtained a certificate of probable cause. Therefore we cannot entertain his claim. (See People v. Emery (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 560, 565.)
Fourth, defendant requests, “I would like everything in Spanish.” He further states (albeit in English), “I can’t read or write English.” In the proceedings below, he was aided by an interpreter, and he wrote his letters of apology to the trial court and to the victim and her family in rudimentary Spanish.
If defendant is referring to our disposition of his appeal, we cannot comply with his request. “Every written proceeding in a court of justice in this state shall be in the English language, and judicial proceedings shall be conducted, preserved, and published in no other.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 185, subd. (a).) Indeed, we are unaware of any California appellate decision that has ever been rendered in Spanish or in any language other than English since California became a part of the United States.
Fifth, our own review of the whole record before us discloses no arguable issue on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR, Mihara, Acting P. J., McAdams, J.