Opinion
G051709
08-18-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN JOSE RUIZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING; NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT.
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on August 18, 2017, be modified as follows:
On page 2, delete the last sentence of the first full paragraph, which begins, "Defendant was also made aware," and replace it with the following:
Defendant was also made aware before he entered his guilty plea that these informants were working on behalf of the police and had received financial compensation for doing so.
On page 2, delete the second full paragraph and replace it with the following:
At the time he pled guilty, however, defendant was not aware of the actual identities of the informants, nor that they were former members of the Mexican Mafia, nor what other benefits they had received in exchange for acting as informants. Further, he was unaware that his constitutional
rights may have been violated. (People v. Dekraai (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1110.)
On page 5, delete the first full paragraph and replace it with the following:
After defendant's guilty plea, but before sentencing, he and his trial counsel learned for the first time that the informants were former members of the Mexican Mafia, and the specific amount they had been provided in cash in exchange for acting as informants. Defendant contends that his guilty plea was the result of his reliance on incomplete information.
These modifications do not affect a change in the judgment. The petition for rehearing is DENIED.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. ARONSON, J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 13NF1564) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, James Edward Rogan, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
The trial court denied defendant Juan Jose Ruiz's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Before pleading guilty, defendant was aware that the prosecution was relying, in part, on testimony from informants who were placed in defendant's jail cell, and to whom defendant had made incriminating statements. Defendant was provided recordings and transcripts of his conversations with the informants, and with information about the crimes of moral turpitude committed by them. Defendant was also made aware at the preliminary hearing that these informants were working on behalf of the police.
At the time he pled guilty, however, defendant was not aware that the informants were former members of the Mexican Mafia, who had been provided cash and other benefits in exchange for acting as informants, and that his constitutional rights may have been violated. (People v. Dekraai (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1110.)
In supplemental briefing, in addition to seeking outright reversal of the order denying his motion, defendant suggested that we reverse the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the matter to allow the trial court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing. The Attorney General has no objection to this disposition. We agree that such a resolution makes sense, and therefore reverse and remand with directions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2013, a man on a bicycle pulled out a gun and shot at a family in a car. The driver sped off and no one was hurt. Two of the people in the car later selected defendant from a photographic lineup as the shooter.
After he was arrested on a parole violation, defendant was placed in a jail cell with two other men. Those individuals were working on behalf of the police. Defendant made statements to these informants implicating himself in the shooting.
Defendant was charged with shooting at an occupied vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246), and possession of a firearm by a felon (id., § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged that defendant committed both offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Id., § 186.22, subd. (b).) As to the first count, defendant was alleged to have personally used and personally discharged a firearm. (Id., §§ 12202.5, subd. (a), 12202.53, subd. (c).) The information also alleged that defendant had a prior strike conviction (id., §§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (id., § 1192.7), and had served a prior prison sentence (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Pursuant to a negotiated plea deal, defendant pled guilty to both counts and admitted all sentencing enhancement allegations. Before sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district attorney opposed. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court then sentenced defendant to 23 years 8 months in prison pursuant to the agreed-upon sentence in the plea agreement. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
"On application of the defendant at any time before judgment . . . the court may, . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. . . . This section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and to promote justice." (Pen. Code, § 1018.) "Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea. [Citations.] But good cause must be shown by clear and convincing evidence." (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) "A decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea '"rests in the sound discretion of the trial court"' and is final unless the defendant can show a clear abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] Moreover, a reviewing court must adopt the trial court's factual findings if substantial evidence supports them." (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)
Defendant argues that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because information regarding the confidential informants who cooperated against him was exculpatory evidence that would have materially affected his decision to plead guilty. (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.)
Whether the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence was prejudicial is informed by our Supreme Court's analysis of this issue: "'[T]he term "Brady violation" is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence—that is, to any suppression of so-called "Brady material"—although, strictly speaking, there is never a real "Brady violation" unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.' [Citation.] Prejudice, in this context, focuses on 'the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence.' [Citations.] Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation], that the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction 'more likely' [citation], or that using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness's testimony 'might have changed the outcome of the trial' [citation]. A defendant instead 'must show a "reasonable probability of a different result."'" (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042-1043.)
As the prosecution admitted in its opposition to defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, after defendant's arrest, he was placed in a jail cell with "other inmates, who were police agents." Defendant was recorded telling the informants he was a gang member, and later telling them he was the shooter. Before he entered his guilty plea, defendant was provided audio recordings and transcripts of the statements between him and the informants, as well as information about the crimes of moral turpitude committed by the informants. At the preliminary hearing, the police officer who investigated the shooting in this case admitted the informants were "individuals that were working on behalf of the police."
The limited record before us does not show whether defendant was represented by counsel when he had communications with the informants. --------
After defendant's guilty plea, but before sentencing, he and his trial counsel learned for the first time that the informants were former members of the Mexican Mafia who were provided cash and jail benefits in exchange for acting as informants. Defendant contends that his guilty plea was the result of his reliance on incomplete information.
Evidence that the informants were used to obtain confessions from inmates (who may have been represented by counsel), in exchange for significant personal benefits, could have been used by defendant, at a minimum, to attack the informants' credibility. Defendant could also have sought other relief. (See People v. Dekraai, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1114, 1120, 1146.)
Had defendant been aware of all the circumstances of his contacts with the informants, defendant may not have pled guilty. We cannot, however, make factual determinations about what defendant would or could have done. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
Our conclusion is bolstered by People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501. In that case, the defendant pled nolo contendre to one count of armed robbery and one count of evading arrest; as part of the plea agreement, other charges, including carjacking, were dismissed. (Id. at p. 1503.) After entering the plea, the defendant's trial counsel learned of the existence of an undisclosed supplemental police report, which reflected that the defendant's neighbor had approached the police and told them another individual, Vladimir Guzman, was responsible for the carjacking. (Id. at p. 1504.) The neighbor provided the police with personal property he had bought from Guzman, some of which belonged to the carjacking victim. (Id. at pp. 1504-1505.) Other personal property the neighbor had obtained from Guzman belonged to the victim of another robbery, who identified Guzman as the man who robbed him. (Id. at p. 1505 & fn. 2.) The supplemental police report also indicated a bystander had identified Guzman near the spot where the defendant was arrested, and stated that Guzman told the bystander he was hiding from the police. (Id. at p. 1505.) The supplemental police report also stated that the victims of the carjacking had identified Guzman as the individual who took their car; they did not identify the defendant. (Ibid.)
After obtaining the supplemental police report, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) The trial court denied the motion, but the appellate court reversed and ordered the trial court to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. (Id. at p. 1503.) The appellate court concluded the information in the supplemental police report "was favorable to [the defendant] and cast the case against him in a different light by significantly weakening the evidence supporting the carjacking charges." (Id. at p. 1506.) The report identified a potential defense witness, and contained other evidence that could have supported defenses to the charges against him. (Id. at pp. 1506-1507.) The withholding of this favorable evidence made the defendant's waiver of his rights involuntary. (Id. at pp. 1507-1508.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded. The trial court is directed to conduct a new evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. ARONSON, J.