Opinion
F071681
05-08-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TRINIDAD PADILLA RUESGA, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Anthony P. Capozzi and Anthony P. Capozzi for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Gregory B. Wagner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CRM026622)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. John D. Kirihara, Judge. Law Offices of Anthony P. Capozzi and Anthony P. Capozzi for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Gregory B. Wagner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Smith, J.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Trinidad Padilla Ruesga was charged with attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664 [count 1]) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) [count 2]). The information further alleged he intentionally and personally discharged a firearm in connection with count 1 (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and personally used a firearm in connection with count 2 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Defendant pled nolo contendere to count 2 and admitted he personally used a firearm. Following a trial, the jury found him guilty as charged on count 1 and found he intentionally and personally discharged a firearm. The trial court denied defendant's new trial motion and sentenced him to seven years to life, plus 20 years for the firearm discharge enhancement, on count 1.
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.
Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed execution of punishment on count 2.
On appeal, defendant makes two contentions. First, the trial court should have held a competency hearing. Second, the court should have granted the new trial motion because the verdict was contrary to the evidence. We conclude (1) defendant was not entitled to a competency hearing; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the new trial motion. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Prosecution's case-in-chief.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90 and in order to protect the privacy of the victim and individuals named in this opinion, we refer to certain individuals by their first name and last initial. --------
On the morning of February 24, 2013, Anne B. was "getting [her] horse ready to pull a cart" at her ranch in Turlock. Because the horse was "kind of girthy," she utilized a shovel "to bring the harness up so [she] [could] clip it." Anne B. then noticed a blue car nearby. Defendant was in the driver's seat. With shovel in hand, Anne B. approached the vehicle and asked, "[W]ho are you looking for?" Defendant replied, "Nobody." He "drove out of the property onto the road" and parked next to Anne B.'s horse pens. Anne B., who "ke[pt] the shovel for protection," approached the car again. Defendant exited the vehicle, jumped over the fence, and entered an empty pen. He "crouched down" as if "someone was going to shoot [him]" and "went back and forth" "along the wall of the . . . pen." Defendant then went to another pen and opened the gate, releasing a horse and pony. Anne B. inquired, "[W]hat are you doing here?" Defendant, who stood 48 feet away, "pulled out his gun with his left hand." Anne B. "put up the shovel." She "heard one bullet go right by [her] left ear" and observed two bullet holes in the shovel. Anne B. asked, "[W]hy are you doing this? I haven't done anything to you." Defendant jumped over the fence and drove away.
Roughly three hours after the shooting, at an infield showup, Anne B. identified defendant as the gunman.
b. Miguel V.
Miguel V., Anne B.'s neighbor, has known defendant and his family since the 1980's. Every "[o]nce in a great while," he lent defendant money. About three days before the shooting, defendant visited Miguel V.'s residence. Even though Miguel V. had already advanced him $20, defendant asked for more money. Miguel V. asked, "You got my money?" Defendant replied, "[N]o." Miguel V. retorted, "I got no time for you." Defendant "got upset," uttered "some obscenities," and left.
On February 24, 2013, at around 10:00 a.m., Miguel V. heard multiple gunshots. He and his helper Miguel C. headed in the direction of the noise and encountered Anne B. She had "a shovel with two holes in it" and "excited[ly]" said, "I got shot at."
c. Miguel C.
About three days before the shooting, defendant advised Miguel C. "not to be working with [Miguel V.] because he doesn't pay" and called Miguel V. a "[p]iece of shit." The next day, Miguel C. saw defendant in a blue car "passing by slow" at a speed of five to 10 miles per hour.
On February 24, 2013, at about 10:30 a.m., Miguel C. heard multiple gunshots. He saw defendant's blue car.
d. Law enforcement.
On February 24, 2013, at approximately 1:52 p.m., Deputy Taylor of the Merced County Sheriff's Department (MCSD) was driving westbound on Bradbury Road when he encountered defendant walking eastbound. Taylor stopped in front of defendant, exited his vehicle, and withdrew his firearm. Defendant, who was unarmed, "immediately complied" with Taylor's commands and was taken into custody. Prior to the infield showup, Taylor "tried talking to [defendant]." He testified:
"[I]t was either [defendant] was ignoring me, didn't want to answer me, or he wasn't there. I don't know. It was strange because I'd ask him a question; he would either ignore me, or other times he would answer me, acknowledge what I was saying to him."
MCSD Detective Ruiz investigated the pen at Anne B.'s ranch. He found 36 shell casings, which "appeared shiny" and "new." None of the casings had latent fingerprints. Following the infield showup, Ruiz collected deposits from defendant's hands, which tested positive for gunshot residue. Thereafter, he transported defendant to headquarters for questioning. During the ride, Ruiz heard defendant say "hey" and "over there," but defendant was not speaking to him.
After arriving at headquarters, Ruiz exited his vehicle. Defendant, who remained handcuffed inside the vehicle, grabbed the detective's radio. When Ruiz retrieved the radio, defendant growled, backed up to the side door, opened it, and got out. Ruiz circled the vehicle to prevent an escape. Defendant growled, ignored Ruiz's orders to stop and lie down, and "fast walk[ed]" toward him. Ruiz "used [defendant's] momentum" to "throw him to the ground" and called for backup.
II. Defense's case-in-chief.
a. Dr. Avak Howsepian.
Howsepian, a psychiatrist, reviewed documentation, spoke with defendant's family, and evaluated defendant in October 2013. At trial, he pointed out the following circumstances: (1) defendant abused drugs and frequently hallucinated; (2) at the time of the February 24, 2013, shooting, defendant had ingested amphetamines, Valium, and Vicodin; (3) defendant had no recollection of the February 24, 2013, shooting or his subsequent interaction with law enforcement; (4) defendant had no recollection of a January 11, 2013, incident, during which he abused drugs, possessed a gun, and spoke to an "imaginary person" about killing his wife and children; (5) defendant suffered from depression following the death of his father; (6) at the age of two, defendant was buried alive by relatives; (7) defendant never learned to read or write and dropped out of school; (8) defendant registered an IQ score between 65 and 76, indicative of "borderline intellectual functioning"; and (9) defendant "tended to keep to himself," "didn't have many interests," "was not very verbal," and "had a lot of difficulty interpersonally and cognitively."
In view of the aforementioned circumstances, as well as defendant's actions before, during, and after the February 24, 2013, shooting, Howsepian diagnosed "[a]mphetamine-induced delirium with psychosis"; "dysthymic disorder"; "major depression disorder"; "prolonged bereavement"; "mild mental retardation versus borderline intellectual functioning"; "schizo disorder"; "avoidant personality disorder"; "schizo[typal] personality traits"; and "a possible history of attention deficit disorder." He opined:
"[Defendant] around the time of this offense in February of 2013 . . . [suffered] from . . . primarily methamphetamine induced delirium with psychotic features that were . . . also accompanied by hallucinations and delusions, paranoid delusions, that resulted in his being profoundly impaired with respect to how he can experience his environment, how well
he could control his impulses, and how well he might be able to plan various aspects of his behavior. Very disorganized and psychotic condition at that time, primarily due to methamphetamine, but also involving other substances. [¶] . . . [¶]
". . . There were two other diagnoses. One is that he has a personality disorder called . . . schizoid . . . disorder and schizoid type personality traits. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Somebody who is schizoid and schizo type . . . has personality that places them very close to being schizophrenic. So someone who tends to be a [loner]; someone who tends to primarily choose solitary activities, not have many friends or confidants; someone who might tend to see the world even without drugs in a distorted sort of way; someone whose moods tend to be flat, who don't have much emotional expression. Those kinds of difficulties.
"They might be somewhat odd in their thinking, again, even without using drugs in their speech. They sometimes will think that other people might be talking about them in social contexts. So at baseline, as far as his baseline personality is concerned, he was already in virtue of having those features prone under stress or when affected by substance to become quite psychotic, and in this case, quite delirious in addition to being psychotic.
"[Defendant] also has some intellectual challenges, so I diagnosed him what's called 'borderline intellectual functioning.' It's difficulties in general with how he is able to solve problems and use his thinking to his benefit."
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant was not entitled to a competency hearing.
a. Background.
The jury rendered its verdict on April 22, 2014.
On September 15, 2014, defense counsel asked the court to appoint independent counsel to investigate the possibility of ineffective assistance. On September 22, the court appointed independent counsel for the limited purpose of discovery. On November 24, 2014, independent counsel filed a declaration as well as a memorandum of points and authorities. He opined, inter alia, defense counsel should have "inform[ed] the court that he had a doubt as to [defendant's] competency to stand trial as a result of his apparent developmental delay" and "[gotten] assurance that [defendant] was mentally able and prepared to participate in the trial." Independent counsel added:
"[T]here exists a doubt in the mind of this observer as to whether [defendant] is competent to participate in the trial proceedings due to a developmental disability. In order to answer that question it is argued that the court should suspend proceedings at this time and appoint an alienist and the Central Valley [R]egional [C]enter to examine [defendant] to determine if he is developmentally disabled, and if so whether he is competent to stand trial."
At a December 12, 2014, status hearing, defense counsel indicated "[defendant] provided very [little] or no assistance at all" and he "[ha]d a problem telling the Court [defendant] is a person that's totally competent at the present time to stand trial and understand everything that went on in this courtroom." Thereafter, the court pronounced:
"I think the issue of competency may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. And while, of course, counsel is aware that the issue of competency [is] most frequently raised much earlier in the proceedings, I certainly don't think the law has any bar to raising those issues again post trial. So, you know, in that case, I think the Court has no . . . choice, but to accept that representation and refer it out to appropriate mental health personnel for an evaluation.
"So [the] Court's going to find that defense counsel[] . . . made a declaration under [section] 1368 as to his doubts about [defendant's] competency . . . . Let me . . . appoint Dr[.] [Andrew] Neufeld to examine [defendant]. I know . . . Neufeld is local. He's performed many of these evaluations in the past. And I'll appoint . . . Neufeld to do an examination of . . . defendant and render a report back to this Court. [¶] . . . [¶]
". . . Again, I'm going to refer this to . . . Neufeld for an examination under [section] 1368. Clerk will prepare the appropriate order, and I'll sign it as soon as we can. Further hearing on that . . . here in this court. [¶] . . . [¶]
". . . [N]ormally the procedure is . . . Neufeld will render a report to the Court. I'm going to ask the clerk's office to get that to me as soon as they become aware of it, then copies will be provided to [counsel]. . . . [N]ormally it should be a week or so before the court date. [¶] . . . [¶]
". . . Considering proceedings are suspended under [section] 3168 [sic]."
Neufeld, a clinical psychologist, reviewed documentation and evaluated defendant in February 2015. He concluded:
"1) [Defendant] is presently able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him. Notably, he lacks specific information. However[,] there was no indication of a disturbance of process of thinking. Though he appears to be uneducated and possibly of slightly below average intellectual ability, there is evidence of adequate ability to understand. Lacking specific information, his understanding of the roles of judge, District Attorney, and defense attorney are simplistic but correct. He has a clear understanding of the gravity of his situation. He is presently able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him, though he lacks essential information.
"2) [Defendant] is presently able to cooperate in a rational manner with counsel in presenting a defense. Though he lacks memory of events related to the incident he is able to cooperate and appropriately motivated to cooperate.
"3) [Defendant] is not presently able to prepare and conduct his own defense in a rational manner without counsel."
At an April 3, 2015, motion hearing, defense counsel agreed with Neufeld's findings but reiterated defendant was "very limited in his ability to function intellectually." The prosecutor submitted the matter. Thereafter, the court pronounced:
"My finding, based upon [Neufeld]'s evaluation as well as my own observations, is that insofar as the proceedings to this case, . . . defendant is competent; in that, he's able to understand the nature of the proceedings - in a limited way, perhaps, but still understand the nature of the proceedings - and he's able, in his own way, to assist counsel in a defense. So I'm going to find, . . . under [section] 1368, that [d]efendant . . . is competent."
b. Analysis.
"A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment . . . while that person is mentally incompetent." (§ 1367, subd. (a).) "A defendant is mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner." (Ibid.) "It has long been established that the conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process." (People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 539 (Hale).)
"If, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, . . . a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, he or she shall state that doubt in the record and inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally competent. . . . At the request of the defendant or his or her counsel or upon its own motion, the court shall recess the proceedings for as long as may be reasonably necessary to permit counsel to confer with the defendant and to form an opinion as to the mental competence of the defendant at that point in time." (§ 1368, subd. (a); accord, People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 195.) "If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the defendant's mental competence is to be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to [s]ections 1368.1 and 1369. If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a hearing." (§ 1368, subd. (b).) "[A] competency hearing is required when substantial evidence of the accused's incompetence has been introduced." (Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 539.) " 'Substantial evidence' has been defined as evidence that raises a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial." (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 738.)
"The decision whether to order a competency hearing rests within the trial court's discretion, and may be disturbed upon appeal 'only where a doubt as to [mental competence] may be said to appear as a matter of law or where there is an abuse of discretion.' [Citation.] When the court is presented with 'substantial evidence of present mental competence,' however, the defendant is 'entitled to a section 1368 hearing as a matter of right.' [Citation.] On review, our inquiry is focused not on the subjective opinion of the trial judge, but rather on whether there was substantial evidence raising a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. [Citation.] Evidence may be substantial even where it is contested or presented by the defense. [Citation.] A trial court reversibly errs if it fails to hold a competency hearing when one is required under the substantial evidence test. [Citation.]" (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 195.)
At trial, prosecution witnesses highlighted defendant's strange behavior at or around the time of the shooting and his subsequent arrest. Howsepian, the defense's psychiatrist, diagnosed numerous psychological conditions and noted, inter alia, defendant's substance abuse; his amnesia in connection with the shooting and a prior domestic violence incident; and his "borderline intellectual functioning." In his appellate briefs, however, defendant does not refer us to specific trial testimony concerning his inability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner. "To raise a doubt under the substantial evidence test, we require more than 'mere bizarre actions' or statements, or even expert testimony that a defendant is psychopathic, homicidal, or a danger to him- or herself and others. [Citations.] Rather, the focus of the competence inquiry is on a defendant's understanding of the criminal proceedings against him or her and the ability to consult with counsel or otherwise assist in his or her defense. [Citation.]" (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 202.) Also, defendant did not point to any instances where he exhibited strange behavior during criminal proceedings. (Cf. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 534-535, 540 [the defendant made inappropriate and bizarre comments during pretrial hearings].)
Nearly five months after the jury rendered its verdict, defense counsel asked the court to appoint independent counsel to investigate the possibility of ineffective assistance. The court obliged. Later, independent counsel expressed doubt as to defendant's competency due to developmental disability and recommended further evaluation. At the December 12, 2014, status hearing, defense counsel expressed his own doubt as to defendant's competency. In response, the court stated it "ha[d] no . . . choice" "but to accept that representation"; appointed a clinical psychologist (Neufeld) to evaluate defendant "under [section] 1368"; and suspended proceedings. What is particularly noteworthy, though, is the court did not declare "a doubt ar[ose] in [its] mind . . . as to [defendant's] mental competence" and "state that doubt in the record." (§ 1368, subd. (a); cf. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 535, fn. 5 [" 'In this matter I have observed the conduct and demeanor of the defendant in the courtroom. The record will reflect, hopefully, as much as possible, the statements, many of which appear to be inappropriate conduct, and his manner and demeanor, his speech, has caused a doubt to arise in the mind of the Court as to his present mental competency. I'll state that doubt for the record.' "].) At most, it communicated "preliminary concerns about competency [that] do[] not require the commencement of competency proceedings." (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 397.) " 'Counsel's assertion of a belief in a client's incompetence is entitled to some weight. But unless the court itself has declared a doubt as to the defendant's competence, and has asked for counsel's opinion on the subject, counsel's assertions that his or her client is or may be incompetent does not, in the absence of substantial evidence to that effect, require the court to hold a competency hearing.' [Citations.]" (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 465; see People v. Garcia (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 163, 170 (Garcia) [declaration of doubt by counsel or anyone other than trial court insufficient to trigger statutory right to competency hearing].)
Moreover, given the court did not declare a doubt as to defendant's competency, Neufeld's appointment "did not . . . transform the proceeding into a . . . competency trial." (People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 466.) "Certainly a judge . . . has the legal right to seek expert assistance to inform him as to [the] mental condition of the defendant before he is required to express whether he has the 'doubt' as to that condition as that term is used in section 1368." (People v. Ashley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 339, 363.) Neufeld was appointed simply "to conduct a summary evaluation to help [the court] decide whether to declare a doubt." (Garcia, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 170.)
Based on his assessment of defendant and pertinent documentation, Neufeld concluded defendant, though "[l]acking specific information," was "presently able to understand the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings taken against him" and had "a clear understanding of the gravity of his situation." He also concluded defendant, though "lack[ing] memory of events related to the [shooting]," was "presently able to cooperate" "and appropriately motivated to cooperate" "in a rational manner with counsel in presenting a defense." (Cf. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 536-538, 540 [two psychiatrists determined the defendant was not competent to stand trial].) The parties did not dispute these findings. The court did not declare a doubt and deemed defendant competent.
In short, "there was no substantial evidence of incompetence and no due process right to a competency hearing." (Garcia, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 170.)
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected defendant's new trial motion.
a. Background.
At the April 3, 2015, motion hearing, defense counsel argued a new trial was warranted because the prosecution failed to prove specific intent, deliberation, and premeditation. The court denied the motion. It reasoned:
"I believe the jury heard the evidence. I believe that the matter was properly instructed, and I believe both counsel had a full opportunity to argue their respective points of view to the jury.
"And, you know, we can second guess. And I think it's appropriate, and [defense] counsel is right, that the Court has an independent duty to review the evidence following a verdict and a motion that's made, as in this case, and determine whether sufficient evidence does exist to support the jury's verdict here. [¶] . . . [¶]
". . . I think that the Court cannot find that so little evidence exists so as not to support the jury's verdict in this case. I think that reasonable minds can differ, but I think this jury was properly instructed and reached its conclusion.
"I think sufficient evidence exists to support a finding that . . . the actions taken were intentional, deliberate and premeditated . . . as required by the law . . . .
"Again, I believe that I have reviewed the facts as presented. I recall the arguments made. I recall the psychiatric evidence that was presented by [Howsepian], and I think that those are all things that the jury also heard, took into consideration in reaching its verdict, and I see no reason that forms the basis for support for a motion for new trial . . . ."
b. Analysis.
"When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made against the defendant, the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [w]hen the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence . . . ." (§ 1181, subd. 6.) "In reviewing a motion for a new trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence independently." (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 523 (Davis).) "It is, however, guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict and proceedings supporting it." (Id. at p. 524.) "The trial court 'should [not] disregard the verdict . . . but instead . . . should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
"We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 526.) "A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial, and there is a strong presumption that it properly exercised that discretion. ' "The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears." ' [Citation.]" (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 524.)
We find no such abuse. The record establishes the court "expressly articulated the correct standard of review" (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 524) and "independently determined the credibility of the witnesses and the probative value of the evidence" (ibid.). As to the matters of specific intent, deliberation, and premeditation, it "offered what were clearly its own independent conclusions" (ibid.): "[T]he Court cannot find that so little evidence exists so as not to support the jury's verdict in this case. . . . [¶] I think sufficient evidence exists to support a finding that . . . the actions taken were intentional, deliberate and premeditated . . . as required by the law . . . ." Accordingly, we uphold the court's ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.