Opinion
H050602
11-07-2023
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. R.R., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 21JV000439)
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.)
BROMBERG, J.
The minor R.R. appeals from the juvenile court's order granting the prosecution's motion to transfer his juvenile delinquency petition to adult court. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 707.) Because the Legislature amended the controlling statutory provision after the juvenile court court issued the transfer order, we reverse the order and remand to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing.
R.R. was 17 years old at the time of the offense. On August 28, 2021, Y.R. was visiting his aunt and three cousins at their house when he and his cousins got into a verbal altercation with the next-door neighbors, which included R.R. and three others. The exchange included gang-related utterances, and R.R. displayed a gun in his waistband.
The next day, the two groups began arguing again, and a fight ensued. Y.R. approached R.R., who tried to attack Y.R., but Y.R. punched R.R. in the face and knocked him to the ground. R.R. got up and started shooting at Y.R., while two other members of R.R.'s group opened fire on others. Y.R. suffered six gunshot wounds to the abdomen, and another victim suffered a gunshot to the arm.
The prosecution filed a juvenile wardship petition which, as amended, alleged five counts: counts 1 and 2-willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 189); counts 3 and 4-assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)); and count 5-carrying a loaded firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a)). As to each of counts 1 and 2, the petition alleged three enhancements: that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (street terrorism) (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1) &(b)(5)); that R.R. personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and that he was a principal in the commission of the offense who was subject to the first two enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)). As to each of counts 3 and 4, the petition alleged three enhancements: street terrorism (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)); that R.R. personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In July 2022, the prosecution moved to transfer the matter to a criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a). In November 2022, after a contested hearing on the transfer motion, the juvenile court ordered the matter transferred to criminal court.
Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, changing the criteria by which juvenile courts must adjudicate transfer motions. (See generally In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1284 (S.S.).) First, the new legislation added the language, "In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court." (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1 (Assem. Bill No. 2361).) Under the prior version of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, the prosecution only had to meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. (Former Welf. &Inst. Code, § 707, Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1 (Sen. Bill No. 1391), as amended by Stats. 2022.) Second, under the prior version, amenability to rehabilitation was only one of five factors for the trial court to consider. (Id., § 707, subd. (a)(3).) Under the new version, amenabililty to rehabilitation is the ultimate determination the trial court must make (ibid.), although the court considers all five factors as part of this analysis. (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416 (E.P.).) Third, under the new version of the statute, if the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the order "shall include the reasons supporting the court's finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court." (Id. at p. 416; see Welf. &Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
R.R. contends these amendments apply to his case retroactively and that we must reverse the transfer order and remand for a new hearing because the trial court did not find by clear and convincing evidence that he is not amenable to rehabilitation. The Attorney General concedes the amendments apply retroactively, but he argues R.R. was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to apply the standard set forth in the amended version of the statute.
We agree with the parties that the amended statute applies retroactively to this case. "[T]he recent amendments have similar ameliorative effects to amendments made to [Welfare and Instititutions Code] section 707 by Proposition 57, which prohibited prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in a court of criminal jurisdiction and gave the prosecution the burden of proof at transfer hearings." (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1288.) "The possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court-where rehabilitation is the goal-rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment." (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303.) Because R.R.'s case is not final on appeal, the amendments are applicable to his case under the doctrine of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and its progeny. (E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 416; see also Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 303-304 [holding Proposition 57 applies retroactively].)
The Attorney General contends that R.R. has not been prejudiced because it is not reasonably probable that R.R. would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome had the juvenile court applied the amended statute. In so doing, the Attorney General relies on S.S., and In re T.A., (Mar. 23, 2023, E079346) review granted, and opinion ordered nonpublished July 26, 2023, S279635. However, in S.S., the Court of Appeal reversed the transfer order and remanded for a new hearing based in part on the fact that both parties urged remand, "implicitly agree[ing] a more favorable result for minor is reasonably probable." (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289.) Even more important, in In re T.A., after granting review and ordering the opinion not be published, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712-716 (F.M.), and E.P., at page 416, which remanded for a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 as amended. (In re T.A., S279635, Supreme Ct. Mins., July 26, 2023.)
We conclude that F.M. sets forth the proper standard for determing whether remand is required here. According to that decision, "[w]here the record in a case shows 'that the juvenile court ... was aware of, and exercised its discretion'" in applying the relevant standard, the failure to comply with the statute would amount to harmless error. (F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th. at p. 712.) The" 'key issue'" is whether the juvenile court" 'was aware of its discretion'" under the relevant standard. (Ibid.) Similarly, where the statute requires the trial court to state the basis for its decision, whether the failure to do so is harmless turns on "whether a trial court understood the full extent of its lawful discretion and its obligation to exercise it." (Id. at p. 715.) "[W]here the concern is that no discretionary decision was made, attempting to discern the likelihood of a 'more favorable' decision is a more speculative inquiry. Instead of hypothesizing what decision the juvenile court would have made if it had understood the extent of its lawful authority, reviewing courts have consistently held that remand is appropriate in these circumstances." (Id. at p. 716.)
Here, the juvenile court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard after weighing the five factors set forth under the prior version of the statute. The court characterized its analysis as "independently evaluat[ing] whether each criterion weighs against or in favor of transfer." With respect to whether R.R. was amenable to rehabilitation, the court assigned this factor "medium weight" and found that it weighed in favor of transfer. The court found that R.R. had "at times availed himself of rehabilitative services available in juvenile hall, showing some willingness to rehabilitate" but found these facts outweighed by other facts. In weighing three of the other four factors-R.R.'s prior delinquent history, the success of prior attempts at rehabilitation, and the circumstances and gravity of the offense-the court gave these factors "high weight" against juvenile court suitability.
By contrast, the amended statute requires the determination to be made ultimately on the basis of whether the juvenile is amenable to rehabilitation, and the prosecution must show otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. While the record shows the court exercised discretion in making the transfer determination, nothing in the record shows the court applied the criteria for lawfully exercising that discretion subsequently adopted and defined by the amended statute. The analysis set forth in the transfer order thereby fails to show that the juvenile court "understood the full extent of its lawful discretion and its obligation to exercise it" as would be required under current law. (See F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 715.)
Accordingly, we conclude the transfer order must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new transfer hearing under the amended version of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.
Disposition
The order granting the prosecution's Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 transfer motion is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing under current law.
WE CONCUR: BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.