Therefore, the record reflects that Trooper Waters developed his initial findings prior to the blood draws.¶ 27 Grassi nevertheless argues that our decisions in People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo.1982), and People v. Reynolds, 895 P.2d 1059 (Colo.1995), compel us to conclude that the police in fact lacked probable cause.
Therefore, the police as a whole possessed “that degree of certainty” that constitutes probable cause to believe that Grassi had committed an alcohol-related offense at the time of the blood draws. ¶27 Grassi nevertheless argues that our decisions in People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982), and People v. Reynolds, 895 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1995), compel us to conclude that the police in fact lacked probable cause. We disagree.
A. This court has stated that probable cause to arrest exists "when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer are sufficient to warrant the belief by a reasonable and prudent person, in light of that person's training and experience, that an offense has been committed and the defendant committed it." People v. Thompson, 793 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo. 1990); accord, e.g., People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo. 1982).
1. Roybal and Reynolds Defendant argues that this case is analogous to People v. Reynolds, 895 P.2d 1059 (Colo.1995), and People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo.1982). In Reynolds, the defendant admitted to drinking three beers more than six hours before the accident.
We are without guidance from our case law on whether the evidence mentioned above is sufficient to sustain a conviction for driving under the influence. The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo. 1982) (en banc), provides persuasive guidance for the instant case. In Roybal, the issue was whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant after a collision, when there was no evidence that defendant's misconduct caused the collision.
The lack of additional indicia of intoxication is a result of the fact that the officers did not administer a roadside sobriety test because Shepherd was seriously injured and in need of medical attention. The defendant cites People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982), for the proposition that the odor of an alcoholic beverage and the fact of an accident alone cannot give rise to probable cause to arrest. In Roybal, the evidence merely indicated that an accident took place, the defendant was driving one of the cars involved, and the defendant had the odor of an alcoholic beverage on him. Roybal, 655 P.2d at 413.
The district court found, and the record supports its determination, that the decision to obtain a sample of Reynolds' blood was based solely on evidence that an accident had occurred in which Reynolds was involved and that Reynolds had admitted to drinking three beers some six to nine hours prior to the accident. Such evidence, while sufficient to create a "mere suspicion," does not meet the standard of probable cause, i.e., facts available to a reasonably cautious officer to warrant his or her belief that an offense has been or is being committed, People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo. 1982). We are well aware of the possibility that in any given situation a nexus may exist between driving while drinking and automobile accidents.
Both parties agree that whether facts similar to those presented here are sufficient to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual was driving under the influence of alcohol is an issue of first impression in Colorado. Nevertheless, Mersman relies on People v. Reynolds, 895 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1995), and People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982), in support of his contention that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence that he drove under the influence of alcohol on the night he visited G.D. He argues that because the supreme court did not find probable cause in Reynolds and Roybal that the defendants there drove under the influence of alcohol, a fortiori, he could not have been under the influence of alcohol, because "probable cause" is a lower standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt" and the evidence of impairment in those cases was equivalent to or greater than the evidence presented here. We disagree.
As a result, the cases on which Riley relies lose whatever persuasiveness they may be afforded in other jurisdictions. Riley also relies on State v. Taylor, 44 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981), People v. Royball, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982), and State v. Kliphouse, 771 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). These cases address issues of probable cause, not reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, they do not support Riley's position that the smell of alcohol alone is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion that one is driving under the influence.
In People v. Reynolds, 895 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Colo. 1995), we held that a driver's one-car accident buttressed by the driver's admission to drinking three beers, six to nine hours before the accident, did not meet the standard of probable cause, in the absence of evidence that the accident occurred as a result of the driver's misconduct or due to the influence of alcohol. InPeople v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo. 1982), we held that the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant was insufficient to support probable cause when there was no evidence that the collision occurred as a result of the defendant's misconduct. On the other hand, inPeople v. Shepherd, 906 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Colo. 1995), we held that probable cause existed based on evidence that the defendant was at fault for a traffic accident resulting in death and serious injury, the presence of empty beer cans near the accident scene, and the odor of an alcoholic beverage on defendant's breath.