Opinion
F086331
04-17-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEONTAE JAVON ROYAL, Defendant and Appellant.
Mark Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Jeffrey D. Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County, Super. Ct. No. F23900050, Gregory T. Fain, Judge.
Mark Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Jeffrey D. Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SNAUFFER, J.
A jury found defendant Deontae Javon Royal guilty of failing to reregister as a convicted sex offender and to file a change of address. The court sentenced him to 25 years to life as a third "strike" offender under California's "Three Strikes" law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). Royal appeals his sentence, arguing that (1) the court abused its discretion by refusing to strike his prior strike convictions and (2) the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States and California Constitutions. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 6, 2023, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an amended information charging Royal with failing to register as a sex offender, a felony (§ 290.011, subd. (a); count 1) and failing to update his address as a registered sex offender, a felony. (§ 290.013, subd. (a); count 2.) The amended information also alleged that he had suffered four prior strike convictions pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d).)
All references to dates are to dates in 2023 unless otherwise stated.
On March 9, the complaint was amended by interlineation to charge count 1 as a misdemeanor (§ 290.011, subd. (b)).
Previously, on January 12, the trial court granted Royal's motion pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, to proceed without counsel. He proceeded without counsel through trial and sentencing.
On March 9, a jury found Royal guilty of both counts. He filed a Romero motion requesting the court to strike his prior convictions. On April 28, the trial court denied Royal's motion and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 2; the court stayed imposition of punishment on count 1 under section 654.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504.
On May 24, Royal filed a notice of appeal.
BACKGROUND
Prior convictions
Royal admitted that he was convicted in Fresno County Superior Court of making criminal threats (§ 422) on August 31, 2005, and two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and one count of making criminal threats (§ 422) on August 28, 2009. After the 2009 convictions, Royal was imprisoned until September 12, 2022.
Failure to register
Prior to his release, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Agent Carlos Segura was assigned Royal's case. On August 31, 2022, Segura and Royal reviewed in detail Department of Justice form CJIS 8047. It contained an explanation of Royal's registration requirements as a convicted sex offender. Royal had signed and initialed the form previously on August 9, 2022. Segura also told Royal that he would be monitored by a tracking device due to his status as a convicted sex offender. Segura believed that Royal understood the registration requirements. The requirements mandated Royal to update his registration within five days if he became transient and, once transient, to update his registration every 30 days. (§§ 290.11, subd. (a); 290.013, subd. (a).)
On September 12, 2022, Segura met with Royal after his release. Segura again informed him of the registration requirements; Royal registered as transient two days later. Soon thereafter, he moved in with his mother, who lived in Fresno County. Segura informed him that he needed to update his registration to reflect that he lived at his mother's address. Segura again confirmed that Royal understood the registration requirements. On October 6, 2022, Royal updated his registration to reflect that he lived with his mother. Both times Royal updated his registration, he signed paperwork containing the registration requirements.
On October 11, 2022, Parole Agent Benitta Molina, who was assigned Royal's case, received a call from his mother. She told Molina that she expelled Royal from her house and that he was no longer allowed to live there. Molina used Royal's tracking device to find and contact him that same day. He told Molina that he would be transient. Molina reminded him to update his registration within five days. Royal failed to update his registration as required.
The next day, Molina received an alert that Royal's tracking device had been tampered with or removed. She went to the last known location: a Chinese restaurant in Fresno where she found the tracking device in a bathroom trash can. Unable to locate Royal in the area, at his mother's house, or by other means, Molina requested an arrest warrant. Between October 12, 2022 and Royal's arrest on January 3, he failed to register, and law enforcement officials were unaware of his whereabouts.
DISCUSSION
Royal argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike his prior strike convictions, improperly keeping him within the Three Strike's law's ambit due to the purportedly technical nature of his crime and (2) his 25-years-to-life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both the United States and California Constitutions because it is disproportionate to his crime, i.e., failing to properly reregister as a sex offender. We disagree in both respects.
I. Refusal to strike prior strike convictions
The purpose of the Three Strikes law is to impose greater punishment upon recidivists falling within its spirit. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140 (Avila).) Trial courts have discretion "to strike or dismiss a prior conviction in the furtherance of justice." (Ibid.) In exercising that discretion, courts consider "whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of the defendant's present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of the defendant's background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though the defendant had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (Ibid.)
Where a trial court decides not to strike or dismiss a prior conviction, the defendant must show that "the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary." (Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140.) "It is not enough that reasonable people disagree about whether to strike a prior conviction." (Ibid.) The defendant must overcome the Three Strikes law's careful circumscription of the trial court's power to depart from its sentencing norms, creating" 'a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.'" (Ibid.) "Only extraordinary circumstances justify finding that a career criminal is outside the Three Strikes law. [Citation.] Therefore, 'the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.'" (Ibid.)
A. Additional background
The trial court explained its discretion under Romero. It noted that it must compare the instant conviction with Royal's prior strikes and consider the remoteness of his prior convictions. Finding no "break in the chain" between Royal's 2005 and 2009 convictions and the intervening 16-year prison term, on the one hand, and his criminal conduct shortly after his release, i.e., removal of his tracking device shortly after his release from prison, failure to register, and failure to contact law enforcement, on the other, the court did not consider remoteness as a basis to strike Royal's prior convictions.
The court found that Royal's criminal history was serious, lengthy, and recidivist in nature. It found the current conviction was no exception given Royal intentionally removed his tracking device, disabling law enforcement from monitoring his location as a transient convicted sex offender. The court found that his conduct posed a serious societal threat. Thus, the court distinguished this case from one where a sex offender makes a good-faith effort to register but fails to comply.
The trial court considered the difficulties associated with Royal's transiency but found that, despite his reasonable level of education, he failed to obtain employment or a steady living situation. The court did not find Royal's circumstances sufficient to warrant striking his prior convictions.
B. Analysis
" 'Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision [conforming to] the spirit of the [Three Strikes] law, we shall affirm the trial court's ruling, even if we might have ruled differently[.]'" (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).) Given the court's analysis of the factors relevant to Royal's Romero motion-comparing the instant conviction with his priors and their remoteness, weighing the nature of his criminal history, and considering his work history, education, and prospects-we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
Though Royal correctly observes that placing undue emphasis on any factor to the exclusion of all others would negate the trial court's statutory discretion under section 1385 (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377), he paradoxically argues that "the nature and circumstances of the case should be the overriding factor justifying the dismissal of his prior convictions in the interest of justice," specifically the nonviolent nature of his current offense. Setting aside the lack of any undue emphasis on any specific factor in the record, the mere nonviolence of the present conviction does not categorically warrant dismissal of prior convictions if, as here, the defendant has a lengthy, serious criminal history. (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 344.) The court acted within its discretion to maintain Royal's prior strikes given his criminal history of making criminal threats and forcible rape.
Nor was Royal's current conviction a mere "technical" violation. The Sex Offender Registration Act (§§ 290 et seq.)"' is intended to promote the" 'state interest in controlling crime and preventing recidivism in sex offenders'"' [citation] and serves 'an important and vital public purpose by compelling registration of many serious and violent sex offenders who require continued public surveillance.'" (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 876-877.) The registration statute ensures that law enforcement can readily locate sex offenders because they pose an ongoing societal threat. (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432 (Thai); Ruelas v. Superior Court (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 374, 379 (Ruelas).) This purpose was significantly undermined when Royal intentionally fled from law enforcement and failed to reregister despite multiple warnings about his registration requirements.
Our Supreme Court upheld a similar sentence in Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th 367. The defendant "failed to register even though he was informed of his duty to do so on several occasions. He had a lengthy and violent criminal record-which included two prior convictions for failing to register. He had also done little to address his substance abuse problems, had a spotty work history, and appeared to have poor prospects for the future." (Id. at p. 379.) Here, the court found that Royal did not properly register despite being informed to do so on several occasions, lacked stable work or housing, and had a violent criminal history.
In our view, this case is unlike People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991. There, the Court of Appeal overturned the lower court's refusal to strike the defendant's prior convictions because there was no evidence of the defendant's "intent to deceive or evade law enforcement." (Id. at p. 1001.) The defendant failed to register his address in one county but registered in other counties in which he resided. (Ibid.) He remained at his last valid registered address and "immediately telephoned [police] and promptly came to the station" after police contacted him about his failure to register. (Ibid.) He "was exactly where he said he would be when he registered ... and the police were able to quickly find him. The purpose of the registration statute was not undermined by his failure to annually update his registration." (Ibid.)
Here, unlike the Cluff defendant, Royal intentionally removed his tracking device and failed to abide by the registration requirements he clearly understood, as evidenced by his prior successful registration. This prevented law enforcement from monitoring his whereabouts for months. The trial court could reasonably conclude that his conduct undermined the registration statute's purpose and was not a technical violation.
Given the record before us, the trial court's refusal to strike Royal's prior convictions was neither irrational nor arbitrary. We affirm the court's decision.
II. Cruel and unusual punishment
A. Forfeiture
We reject the People's argument that Royal forfeited a constitutional challenge to his sentence below. Royal argued in his Romero motion that failure to strike his prior convictions would result in a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights under Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277. This was sufficient to preserve this argument for appeal. Though his Romero motion did not specifically mention the cruel and unusual punishment standard under the California constitution, we address the merits below.
B. Analysis
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains a" 'narrow proportionality principle,'" which prohibits the imposition of a sentence that is" 'grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime'" in noncapital cases. (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20-21 (Ewing).) "Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare." (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 (Rummel).) "The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case." (Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77 (Lockyer.)
Applying this standard to a recidivist sentencing statute, a reviewing court determines whether a challenged sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment "as applied to the specific circumstances involved in the case at issue." (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 553, italics omitted (Coley).) Even life terms for nonviolent offenses are not unconstitutional per se. (See Rummel, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 274 [life sentence for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80, forging a check for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses]; Lockyer, supra, 538 U.S. 63, 77 [50 years to life for stealing video tapes]; Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 18 [25 years to life for stealing golf clubs].)
The California Constitution also prohibits cruel or unusual punishment. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) A sentence violates this prohibition where it is" 'so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'" (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478.) "[I]mposition of a life term for even a nonviolent felony committed by a defendant with a history of serious or violent felony convictions does not violate the California Constitution." (People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172.) Given that the Legislature, not the judiciary, defines crimes and prescribes punishments, we proceed with great deference to the Legislature's sentencing objectives. (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 729.)
Our Supreme Court provided guidance regarding the constitutionality of harsh sentences for failing to properly register one's location as a sex offender. Generally, such sentences are constitutional where the defendant's conduct renders the defendant's location unknown to law enforcement and the defendant has not complied with key aspects of the registration requirements. (Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 551; People v. Nichols (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 428, 436-437 (Nichols) [defendant failed to register and was missing for over eight months]; Crosby v. Schwartz (9th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 784, 794 (Crosby) [defendant's violation of section 290 "impeded the police's ability to find him for surveillance"].) They are generally unconstitutional where the defendant provided accurate information about his or her location, but, despite a good-faith effort to comply and due to negligence, failed to comply. (Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 551; People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078 [defendant's failure to register purely technical where he remained at his last-registered address and did not evade law enforcement]; Gonzalez v. Duncan (9th Cir. 2008) 551 F.3d 875, 884-885 [purely technical violation of section 290 where defendant was" 'readily available for police surveillance'" despite failing to register].)
"[Defendants ... may violate [the registration statute] by intentionally failing to update their sex offender registration .. as part of a more general course of conduct that demonstrates a deliberate general unwillingness to comply with the sex offender registration requirements.... [A] court .. must take into consideration all of the relevant specific circumstances under which the offense actually was committed." (Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 553.)
Here, the trial court distinguished Royal's conduct from other good-faith, negligently unsuccessful efforts to comply with the registration requirements. The record supports this. Royal failed to register as a transient after he moved out of his mother's house. Law enforcement could only readily ascertain his location from the tracking device he wore. By removing the tracking device and failing to contact law enforcement to reregister, despite knowing he had a duty to do so, Royal thwarted law enforcement's ability to readily ascertain his location. This defeated the registration statute's purpose: to enable law enforcement to easily locate sex offenders due to the inherent threat they pose to society. (Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 432; Ruelas, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 379.)
Therefore, Royal's sentence is consonant with similar, constitutionally upheld sentences for intentional violations of the registration statute that render a defendant invisible to law enforcement's monitoring, thereby thwarting the registration statutes' purposes. (Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 561-562; Nichols, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 436-437; Crosby, supra, 678 F.3d at p. 794.) We conclude that Royal's sentence is not cruel or unusual punishment in violation of either the United States or the California Constitution.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PENA, Acting P. J. MEEHAN, J.