Opinion
2020-318 Q CR
02-25-2022
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jahquay ROWE, Appellant.
New York City Legal Aid Society (Harold V. Ferguson, Jr. of counsel), for appellant. Queens County District Attorney (Johnnette Traill and Sharon Y. Brodt of counsel), for respondent.
New York City Legal Aid Society (Harold V. Ferguson, Jr. of counsel), for appellant.
Queens County District Attorney (Johnnette Traill and Sharon Y. Brodt of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, P.J., MICHELLE WESTON, DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.
Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree ( Penal Law § 220.03 ) in satisfaction of an accusatory instrument that had originally charged him with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree ( Penal Law § 220.09 [1] ), criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree ( Penal Law § 170.25 ), criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree ( Penal Law § 170.20 ), and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree ( Penal Law § 220.50 [2] ). Pursuant to the plea and sentencing agreement, defendant was sentenced to three years’ probation. On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and that it should be reduced as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice.
As a general rule, a defendant who has been sentenced according to the terms of a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement will not be heard to complain that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive (see People v Galvez , 72 AD3d 838 [2010] ; People v Ubiles , 59 AD3d 572 [2009] ; People v Cheme , 70 Misc 3d 129[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51519[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; People v Silverio , 63 Misc 3d 139[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50571[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). Under the circumstances presented, we find no basis to deviate from that rule. The sentence imposed did not constitute an abuse of sentencing discretion or a failure to observe sentencing principles, and defendant has not demonstrated the existence of mitigating or extraordinary circumstances warranting a modification of the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see People v Farrar , 52 NY2d 302 [1981] ; People v Vega , 73 AD3d 1218 [2010] ; People v Suitte , 90 AD2d 80 [1982] ; Cheme , 2020 NY Slip Op 51519[U] ; People v Ma , 63 Misc 3d 159[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50874[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).
Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.
ALIOTTA, P.J., WESTON and GOLIA, JJ., concur.