(quoting People v. Minniweather, 301 Ill. App. 3d 574, 578 (1998))). A relationship between a defendant and narcotics giving rise to an inference the defendant intends to maintain control over the narcotics may be established where the defendant attempts to secrete the contraband (see People v. Brown, 277 Ill. App. 3d 989, 998 (1996)) or to dispose of it (see People v. Rouser, 199 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1065 (1990)). However, such a relationship is not established where the defendant is merely in proximity to the narcotics but is "not engaged in any activity suggestive of control over the contraband."

It has been held that a reasonable inference of intent to deliver is permitted when the amount of the controlled substance possessed could not be viewed as designed for personal consumption. ( People v. Rouser (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1062, 1065, 557 N.E.2d 928; People v. Friend (1988), 177 Ill. App.3d 1002, 1021, 533 N.E.2d 409.) Evidence that the defendant possessed a weapon, a combination of drugs, and large amounts of cash also provides support for the inference that the defendant intended to sell the controlled substances rather than to keep them for his own use.

• 4 To support a conviction for unlawful possession of cannabis, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the substance and that it was under his immediate and exclusive control. ( People v. Rouser (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1062, 557 N.E.2d 928.) Possession may either be actual or constructive.

A reasonable inference of intent to deliver is permitted when the amount of the controlled substance possessed could not be viewed as designed for personal consumption. ( People v. Rouser (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1062, 1065, 557 N.E.2d 928; People v. Friend (1988), 177 Ill. App.3d 1002, 1021, 533 N.E.2d 409; People v. Marshall (1988), 165 Ill. App.3d 968, 976, 521 N.E.2d 538; People v. Hunter (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 516, 526, 464 N.E.2d 659; People v. Atencia (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 247, 250, 446 N.E.2d 1243.) Evidence that the defendant possessed a weapon, a combination of drugs, and large amounts of cash also provide support for the inference that the defendant intended to sell the controlled substances rather than to keep them for his own use.

Aside from its use as an intoxicant, grain alcohol has also been used in a multitude of criminal activities. See People v. Rogers, 584 N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ill.App.Ct. 1991) (poured on skin and ignited, grain alcohol burned for over ten minutes and caused major burns to the skin); People v. Ortiz, 565 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ill.App.Ct. 1990) (grain alcohol used to clean bullets); People v. Rouser, 557 N.E.2d 928, 930 (Ill.App.Ct. 1990) (grain alcohol used for free-basing cocaine); State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Mo. 1999) (grain alcohol used to manufacture methamphetamine). And while one court has found the risk of death associated with ingesting Everclear too common of knowledge to require a warning from the manufacturer, bottles of Everclear include a warning label.

; People v. Schaefer (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 697 (21.9 grams of cocaine and 578.8 grams of cannabis in various containers, marijuana pipes, vials, ether, a scale and six guns); People v. Hunter (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 516 (350 pills in trunk of defendant's car and scattered on front seat, police officers' observation of exchange between defendant and several persons approaching defendant's car); cf. People v. Thomas (1994), 261 Ill. App.3d 366 (loaded shotgun and testimony of police that defendant was filling small packets from a pile of white powder insufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver 5.5 grams of cocaine in 27 packets); People v. McLemore (1990), 203 Ill. App.3d 1052 (four or five $100 bills insufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver 3.3 grams of cocaine divided into 15 packages); People v. Crenshaw (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 432 (loaded weapon insufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver 11.2 grams of cocaine divided into 22 packages); People v. Rouser (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1062 (large amount of cash, small amount of cannabis and presence of paraphernalia insufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver 0.3 grams of cocaine).) We note that in each of the cases cited above, there was greater circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver than in the present case.

¶ 28 First, we agree with the State that the court explicitly found the "Weed World" magazine probative of intent to deliver, and because the magazine in question is not before us on review, we will not substitute our judgment on this matter. Weathersby, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 229. Next, defendant cites People v. Rouser, 199 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (1990), to argue that where a relatively small quantity of drugs is found in the presence of a smoking pipe, as in the instant case, "a trial court stretch[es] the....evidence beyond a reasonable inference in finding intent to deliver." However, we find defendant's reliance misplaced.

People v. Mason, 211 Ill. App. 3d 787, 790 (1991). See also People v. Roppo, 234 Ill. App. 3d 116, 127-28 (1992) (no accountability for delivery of a controlled substance where defendant was seen passing an object to a co-defendant who made a cocaine delivery to an undercover agent, but the defendant was not present or mentioned at other drug transactions involving the co-defendant and the undercover agent); People v. Rouser, 199 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1066 (1990) (insufficient evidence of intent to deliver where the defendant possessed $250 in marked money, but "no evidence was presented that the defendant had anything to do with the sale" of drugs). ¶ 17 In reaching this result, we are not persuaded by the State's reliance on People v. Tinoco, 185 Ill. App. 3d 816 (1989). There, the defendant's position "transcended that of a mere observer" where, beyond collecting funds used to purchase drugs, defendant was an active participant during multiple transactions.

” Harmon, 2012 IL App (3d) 110297, ¶ 17, 362 Ill.Dec. 366, 973 N.E.2d 466. Based on the facts presented at trial, I would find that the trial court “ stretched the limited circumstantial evidence beyond a reasonable inference.” People v. Rouser, 199 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1066, 145 Ill.Dec. 949, 557 N.E.2d 928 (1990); cf. People v. Moreira, 378 Ill.App.3d 120, 130, 316 Ill.Dec. 785, 880 N.E.2d 263 (2007). ¶ 80 Here, as in People v. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 16, 377 Ill.Dec. 525, 2 N.E.3d 441, since “the State presented no physical evidence connecting [respondent] to the [bike]”, and no evidence that the respondent knowingly intended to permanently deprive the owner of her specific bicycle, we should find that the State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent is guilty.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970) (standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt impresses upon the fact finder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused); People v. Nyberg, 275 Ill. App. 3d 570, 579 (1995) (a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence requires proof of a conclusive nature that produces a reasonable and moral certainty that defendant and no one else committed the crime); see also People v. Kostatinovich, 98 Ill. App. 3d 611, 614 (1981) (where no one actually witnessed the theft from a store and defendant was one of several patrons in the store, the circumstances raised little more than a suspicion that defendant was involved in the crime; conviction reversed). Under these circumstances, the trial court stretched the limited circumstantial evidence beyond a reasonable inference. See People v. Rouser, 199 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1066 (1990). Respondent's guilt could be based only on possibility and conjecture, which is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.