Whether an object constitutes a dangerous weapon is generally a question of fact. People v. Ross, 229 Ill.2d 255, 275, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008); Skelton, 83 Ill.2d at 66, 46 Ill.Dec. 571, 414 N.E.2d 455; see People v. Elliott, 299 Ill.App.3d 766, 773, 234 Ill.Dec. 303, 702 N.E.2d 643 (1998) (question of whether pepper spray used during robbery constituted a dangerous weapon was one for the trier of fact to determine); Ligon, 365 Ill.App.3d at 116, 301 Ill.Dec. 753, 847 N.E.2d 763 (question of whether BB gun could be used as dangerous weapon was a question of fact for jury to determine). It is only where the character of the object permits only one conclusion that the question becomes one of law for the court.
According to an April 9, 2009, docket entry, the trial court made the following findings: "1) The case the [c]ourt referred to at the conclusion of oral arguments on the [a]mended [p]ost[c]onviction [p]etition in this case is People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255 [, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008)]. 2) Based upon that case, the [c]ourt concludes that the appropriate remedy available to the [c]ourt in this case is to allow [p]etitioner leave to file a late notice of appeal without analysis of likelihood of success on appeal.
A conviction will be reversed where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of [the] defendant's guilt." People v. Ross, 229 Ill.2d 255, 272 (2008).
(Emphasis in original.) People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). The trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony and resolves any conflicts in the evidence.
In support of that argument, defendant relies on People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008). In Ross , the defendant was convicted of armed robbery.
Under this standard, the trier of fact remains responsible for determining the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.People v. Ross, 229 Ill.2d 255, 272, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008). ¶ 27 “A single witness' identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness viewed the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification.
The State contends that the appellate court's decision below conflicts with People v. Washington , 2012 IL 107993, 360 Ill.Dec. 539, 969 N.E.2d 349, and People v. Wright , 2017 IL 119561, 418 Ill.Dec. 866, 91 N.E.3d 826, by erroneously holding that a defendant's criminal possession of a firearm could not be proven by eyewitness testimony. Defendant argues that the appellate court was correct, drawing our attention to People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008), in support. He argues, consistently with Ross , that Fraction's observation of him was too speculative and provided no explanation for why she believed the object he was holding met the statutory definition of a firearm.
When analyzing a witness's testimony, we ignore a witness's subjective beliefs about the nature of the weapon. People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255, 277, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008) ("[t]he trial court incorrectly based its ruling on the subjective feelings of the victim, rather than the objective nature of the gun"). Wright distinguished Ross on its facts ( Wright , 2017 IL 119561, ¶¶ 74-76, 418 Ill.Dec. 866, 91 N.E.3d 826 ) without questioning its objective analytical framework.
Whether an object is sufficiently susceptible to use in a manner likely to cause serious injury so that it qualifies as a dangerous weapon is generally a question of fact. People v. Ross, 229 Ill.2d 255, 275, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008) ; People v. Thorne, 352 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1071, 288 Ill.Dec. 513, 817 N.E.2d 1163 (2004). However, where the character of the weapon is such as to admit of only one conclusion, the question becomes one of law.
Whether an object is sufficiently susceptible to use in a manner likely to cause serious injury so that it qualifies as a dangerous weapon is generally a question of fact. People v. Ross, 229 Ill.2d 255, 275, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008) ; People v. Thorne, 352 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1071, 288 Ill.Dec. 513, 817 N.E.2d 1163 (2004). However, the question becomes one of law where the character of the weapon is such as to admit of only one conclusion.