People v. Ross

79 Citing cases

  1. People v. Robinson

    2011 Ill. App. 100078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 13 times
    Determining that “the mere fact that the handgun defendant possessed in this case was recovered from inside his own home does not warrant departing from our previous decisions finding the [UUWF statute] constitutional”

    ¶ 12 Although defendant did not challenge the statute's constitutionality in the trial court, a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at any time. People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 938, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011). We review a statute's constitutionality de novo.

  2. People v. Robinson

    2011 Ill. App. 100078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)

    ¶ 12 Although defendant did not challenge the statute's constitutionality in the trial court, a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at any time. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 938 (2011). We review a statute's constitutionality de novo.

  3. People v. Coleman

    409 Ill. App. 3d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 23 times
    In People v. Coleman, 409 Ill. App. 3d 869, 873 (2011), a case with remarkably comparable facts, the State provided a certified copy of a prior conviction with an identical last name and a first name spelled similarly to the name of the defendant, and this court held the trier of fact could conclude the defendant was the same person as the individual named in the certified copy.

    Recently, a different panel of the Sixth Division considered and rejected a similar constitutional challenge of the armed habitual criminal statute. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931 (2011). In Ross, the defendant, like defendant in the instant case, challenged the constitutionality of the armed habitual criminal statute based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald.

  4. People v. Martin

    2018 Ill. App. 152249 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 18 times

    ople v. Montgomery , 2016 IL App (1st) 142143, ¶ 17, 403 Ill.Dec. 447, 53 N.E.3d 1084 ("Although the second amendment does not categorically exclude felons from its protection, this court has found that laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does [not] run afoul of the second amendment."); Campbell , 2014 IL App (1st) 112926, ¶ 60, 380 Ill.Dec. 687, 8 N.E.3d 1229 (holding "felon-based firearm bans, like the [unlawful use of a weapon by a felon] and [armed habitual criminal] statutes, do not impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the second amendment"); People v. Garvin , 2013 IL App (1st) 113095, ¶¶ 33, 40, 374 Ill.Dec. 139, 994 N.E.2d 1076 (considering the constitutionality of both the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and armed habitual criminal statutes); People v. Black , 2012 IL App (1st) 110055, ¶ 13, 363 Ill.Dec. 680, 975 N.E.2d 706 (holding the armed habitual criminal statute could prohibit defendant felon from possessing a firearm in his own home); People v. Ross , 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 942, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011) (holding the armed habitual criminal statute is a constitutionally permissible restriction of the second amendment right to bear arms). The breadth of authority supports a conclusion that dispossessing felons from bearing arms is outside the scope of the second amendment.

  5. People v. Ross

    2015 Ill. App. 120089 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 24 times
    In Ross, after a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal and sentenced to 80 months in prison.

    We affirmed on direct appeal, where we found that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant had constructive possession of a handgun found in plain view behind the driver's seat of a vehicle he had been driving which supported a conviction for being an armed habitual criminal. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931 (2011). Defendant now appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se postconviction petition at the first stage, contending that he raised two claims of arguable merit.

  6. People v. Garvin

    2013 Ill. App. 113095 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 34 times
    Holding felon-based firearm bans do not impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the second amendment but also examining whether the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute passed constitutional scrutiny

    ¶ 28 The State argues that by applying only to felons, the UUWF statute does not impose any burden on conduct falling within the scope of the second amendment. In support, the State cites People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011), and People v. Coleman, 409 Ill.App.3d 869, 879, 350 Ill.Dec. 515, 948 N.E.2d 795 (2011). In Ross, the court cites with approval United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.2010), in which the court found the need to apply intermediate scrutiny to a statute that barred felons from possessing firearms.

  7. People v. Montgomery

    2024 Ill. App. 3d 220326 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    The defendant's flight also supports the inference that he knew there was contraband in the vehicle. See People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 936 (2011).

  8. People v. McCurine

    2019 Ill. App. 160817 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 24 times

    ¶ 24 Second, knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence of the defendant's acts or conduct, from which it may be inferred that he knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found. Faulkner , 2017 IL App (1st) 132884-B, ¶ 39, 411 Ill.Dec. 311, 73 N.E.3d 25 ; People v. Ross , 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 936, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011). ¶ 25 " ‘Knowledge and possession are factual issues, and the trier of fact's findings on these questions will not be disturbed unless the evidence is so unbelievable, improbable, or palpably contrary to the verdict that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.’ "

  9. People v. Murphy

    2012 Ill. App. 103658 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934 (2011). A judgment of conviction will be overturned on appeal only when the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

  10. People v. Wright

    2013 Ill. App. 111803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 35 times
    In Wright, 2013 IL App (1st) 111803, the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon because the State failed to prove, for purposes of constructive possession, that he knowingly possessed the firearm in question.

    Furthermore, we will not retry the defendant nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact regarding the weight given to or the credibility of a witness. People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 935, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011). We must, however, keep in mind that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he is charged.”