¶ 12 Although defendant did not challenge the statute's constitutionality in the trial court, a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at any time. People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 938, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011). We review a statute's constitutionality de novo.
¶ 12 Although defendant did not challenge the statute's constitutionality in the trial court, a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at any time. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 938 (2011). We review a statute's constitutionality de novo.
Recently, a different panel of the Sixth Division considered and rejected a similar constitutional challenge of the armed habitual criminal statute. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931 (2011). In Ross, the defendant, like defendant in the instant case, challenged the constitutionality of the armed habitual criminal statute based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald.
ople v. Montgomery , 2016 IL App (1st) 142143, ¶ 17, 403 Ill.Dec. 447, 53 N.E.3d 1084 ("Although the second amendment does not categorically exclude felons from its protection, this court has found that laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does [not] run afoul of the second amendment."); Campbell , 2014 IL App (1st) 112926, ¶ 60, 380 Ill.Dec. 687, 8 N.E.3d 1229 (holding "felon-based firearm bans, like the [unlawful use of a weapon by a felon] and [armed habitual criminal] statutes, do not impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the second amendment"); People v. Garvin , 2013 IL App (1st) 113095, ¶¶ 33, 40, 374 Ill.Dec. 139, 994 N.E.2d 1076 (considering the constitutionality of both the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and armed habitual criminal statutes); People v. Black , 2012 IL App (1st) 110055, ¶ 13, 363 Ill.Dec. 680, 975 N.E.2d 706 (holding the armed habitual criminal statute could prohibit defendant felon from possessing a firearm in his own home); People v. Ross , 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 942, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011) (holding the armed habitual criminal statute is a constitutionally permissible restriction of the second amendment right to bear arms). The breadth of authority supports a conclusion that dispossessing felons from bearing arms is outside the scope of the second amendment.
We affirmed on direct appeal, where we found that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant had constructive possession of a handgun found in plain view behind the driver's seat of a vehicle he had been driving which supported a conviction for being an armed habitual criminal. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931 (2011). Defendant now appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se postconviction petition at the first stage, contending that he raised two claims of arguable merit.
¶ 28 The State argues that by applying only to felons, the UUWF statute does not impose any burden on conduct falling within the scope of the second amendment. In support, the State cites People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011), and People v. Coleman, 409 Ill.App.3d 869, 879, 350 Ill.Dec. 515, 948 N.E.2d 795 (2011). In Ross, the court cites with approval United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.2010), in which the court found the need to apply intermediate scrutiny to a statute that barred felons from possessing firearms.
The defendant's flight also supports the inference that he knew there was contraband in the vehicle. See People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 936 (2011).
¶ 24 Second, knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence of the defendant's acts or conduct, from which it may be inferred that he knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found. Faulkner , 2017 IL App (1st) 132884-B, ¶ 39, 411 Ill.Dec. 311, 73 N.E.3d 25 ; People v. Ross , 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 936, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011). ¶ 25 " ‘Knowledge and possession are factual issues, and the trier of fact's findings on these questions will not be disturbed unless the evidence is so unbelievable, improbable, or palpably contrary to the verdict that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.’ "
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934 (2011). A judgment of conviction will be overturned on appeal only when the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
Furthermore, we will not retry the defendant nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact regarding the weight given to or the credibility of a witness. People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 935, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011). We must, however, keep in mind that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he is charged.”