We initially note that defendant's contention is only partially preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2] ). In any event, the full recording was properly admitted as a present sense impression, including the characterization that defendant was "drunk" (seee.g.People v Long , 34 Misc 3d 151[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50300[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012] ), because the call contained spontaneous descriptions of events made substantially contemporaneously with the witness's observations, and her descriptions were independently corroborated by other evidence (seePeople v Buie , 86 NY2d 501, 508 [1995] ; People v Brown , 80 NY2d 729, 734 [1993] ; People v Bradley , 73 AD3d 1198 [2010] ; People v Ross , 237 AD2d 467 [1997] ). Moreover, the admission of the recording did not constitute improper bolstering (seePeople v Buie , 86 NY2d at 509 ; People v Bradley , 73 AD3d at 1198-1199 ; People v Carr , 277 AD2d 246 [2000] ).
; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).The County Court did not err in precluding a recording of a phone call made by a police sergeant at the crime scene, as it did not meet the criteria to be admissible as a present sense impression. It was not a spontaneous description of events made substantially contemporaneously with the observations (see People v. Jones, 28 N.Y.3d 1037, 1039, 42 N.Y.S.3d 669, 65 N.E.3d 699 ; People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 734, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 610 N.E.2d 369 ; People v. Ross, 237 A.D.2d 467, 655 N.Y.S.2d 539 ).The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633). The County Court did not err in precluding a recording of a phone call made by a police sergeant at the crime scene, as it did not meet the criteria to be admissible as a present sense impression. It was not a spontaneous description of events made substantially contemporaneously with the observations (see People v Jones, 28 NY3d 1037, 1039; People v Brown, 80 NY2d 729, 734; People v Ross, 237 AD2d 467). The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
The defendant's contention that the admission into evidence of a recording of a witness's telephone call to the 911 emergency number constituted improper bolstering is without merit. The recording was properly admitted as a present sense impression, as the call contained spontaneous descriptions of events made substantially contemporaneously with the witness's observations, and her descriptions were independently corroborated by other evidence ( see People v Buie, 86 NY2d 501, 508; People v Brown, 80 NY2d 729, 734; People v Ross, 237 AD2d 467). Therefore, the admission of the recording did not constitute improper bolstering ( see People v Buie, 86 NY2d at 509; People v Carr, 277 AD2d 246; People v Farrell, 228 AD2d 693; People v Hughes, 228 AD2d 618).
The defendant's contention that the second 911 call, which was made by the same caller approximately 90 minutes later, provided the required corroboration is without merit. The caller initially described a different crime in progress, and the second call was made a substantial amount of time after the first call. Furthermore, the second call was hearsay and, therefore, did not constitute independent evidence sufficient to corroborate the first call (see People v. Brown, supra; People v. Dobbin, 265 A.D.2d 193; People v. Hutchinson, 255 A.D.2d 396; People v. Thompson, 253 A.D.2d 717; People v. Ross, 237 A.D.2d 467). The Supreme Court properly declined to give a missing witness charge regarding the 911 caller.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, his detention by the police immediately after the incident was supported by reasonable suspicion ( see, People v. Sierra, 83 N.Y.2d 928; People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444; People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369; People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106; People v. Lypka, 36 N.Y.2d 210). Accordingly, the hearing court correctly denied those branches of his omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence, identification testimony, and statements made by him to law enforcement officials. As we determined on the appeal of the codefendant, the trial court correctly received into evidence a tape recording of an anonymous telephone call to the 911 emergency number under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule ( see, People v. Ross, 237 A.D.2d 467). The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see, People v. Brooks, 209 A.D.2d 427; People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).