Opinion
D041450.
11-21-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUBEN ROSAS, Defendant and Appellant.
Ruben Rosas appeals his conviction for attempted robbery and misdemeanor battery. Rosas contends the judgment should be reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior robbery conviction. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Prosecution Evidence
On a summer afternoon, Rosas was sitting near several people and drinking beer in Memorial Park in Chula Vista. Christopher Svehla was riding his mountain bike through the park when Rosas motioned for him to come over. Svehla had not previously met Rosas. Rosas asked Svehla if he had a "hookup" for marijuana. Svehla responded that he did not. Svehla answered a few more questions, and then got off his bicycle and sat down nearby. Rosas soon began talking with some other people who were sitting nearby. These people left a few minutes later, leaving Svehla, Rosas, Pedro V. and an unidentified person in the area.
Rosas again asked Svehla if he could provide any marijuana. Rosas also indicated he had a gun nearby in the bushes and identified himself as "Villain from Logan Heights." Rosas then asked if he could see the mountain bike that Svehla had ridden to the park. Svehla agreed, and Rosas walked the bicycle a short distance and started to mount the bike. At this point Svehla stood up and approached Rosas and Rosas dismounted the bike and walked away. A few seconds later, Rosas came back and told Svehla, "Well, this is my bike. This is Villain from Otay. This is my bike. Im Villain from Logan Heights. This is my bike." Svehla and Rosas both grabbed the bike and Rosas struck Svehla across the face. Svehla pushed the bike into Rosas, pulled it free and rode away. As Svehla left he told Rosas, "Ill be back with the cops." Svehla then rode his bike to a nearby phone booth and telephoned the police.
Svehla testified that while he waited for the police by the phone booth, Rosas and Pedro approached him. According to Svehla, Rosas indicated he had a firearm under his shirt. Svehla stated that Rosas robbed him of $100.
Shortly after the telephone call, the police detained Rosas based on Svehlas description. Svehla identified Rosas at a curbside line-up and Rosas was placed under arrest. During the ensuing search of Rosas, police officers found a marijuana pipe and $293 in cash.
Defense Evidence
Pedro testified on Rosass behalf. He testified that Rosas wanted to buy marijuana, and Svehla indicated he had some connections for a marijuana purchase. According to Pedro, Svehla did not take any money from Rosas, but did show them a marijuana pipe.
Pedro also testified that he never saw Rosas get on Svehlas bike, or pick up the bike or struggle with Svehla over the bike. Pedro admitted that he heard a "slapping sound" from where Rosas and Svehla were standing, and when he looked over, he saw Svehla shove the bike into Rosas. At this point, Pedro heard Rosas say, "Im Villain from Logan," and "You dont know who youre messing with."
According to Pedro, Svehla rode away and five minutes later he and Rosas left the park. Pedro testified that they did not encounter Svehla between the time Svehla left the park and when they were arrested and thus could not have taken his money.
Prior Conviction
During trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior robbery conviction to demonstrate Rosass intent to permanently deprive Svehla of his bike. The victim of the prior robbery testified that when he was 16 years old, he encountered Rosas by Chicano Park, where Rosas asked him for a cigarette and then asked him for money. When the victim said he did not have any money, Rosas demanded the victims jacket and pointed to some nearby friends and said, "Do you want problems? I got my homies right here." The victim testified that he felt intimidated by Rosass threat and gave up his jacket. The victim identified Rosas as the individual who had robbed him of his jacket.
Jury Verdict
Rosas was charged with attempted robbery and misdemeanor battery for the incidents at the park and for robbing Svehla at the phone booth. The jury convicted him of attempted robbery and misdemeanor battery, but acquitted him of robbing Svehla.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Rosas argues that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior robbery conviction. Specifically, Rosas contends the trial court failed to "examine the precise elements of similarity between the uncharged offenses and the charged offenses and satisfy itself that each link in the chain of inferences from the former to the latter was reasonably strong . . . ." Moreover, according to Rosas, the trial court abused its discretion when it found the probative value of the prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect.
When determining the probative value of prior misconduct evidence the court determines whether the evidence is material, relevant, and necessary. (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318, fn. 20, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 260.) The court considers the importance of the issue that the evidence is offered to prove, the extent to which the evidence tends to prove the issue, and the necessity of this particular evidence to prove the issue. (People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 318, fn. 20.) We review the trial courts decision under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.)
Rosas concedes that his intent was a material fact at issue. However, he contends that the evidence of his prior robbery "did not tend to prove [his] intent in this case except through the impermissible chain of inferences . . . ." We disagree.
A defendants prior acts may show intent because when "a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance . . . ." (People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879.) Where the evidence of prior misconduct is offered to show intent, the prior misconduct must only be "sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant "probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance."" (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402, bracketed material in Ewoldt.) Here, Rosas asserts that there was not enough similarity between the prior robbery and the charged attempted robbery for the trial court to infer that he intended to steal Svehlas bike.
Rosas claims the two incidents were not similar because the items taken were different, he did not threaten Svehla that his "homeboys were backing him up," and he was intoxicated during the charged, but not the prior, offense. We disagree with Rosass contention that these distinctions defeated the otherwise strong indicia of similarity. In both the prior and charged incidents Rosas approached a teenager in a public park, made a seemingly innocuous request, and then demanded property from the victims. In both offenses Rosas used the threat of gang contacts as an element of force to support his demands. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding sufficient similarity. (See, e.g., People v. Brandon (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048-1049; People v. Wilson (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1210, 1216-1218; People v. Denis (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 563, 567-568.)
The evidence of prior misconduct was necessary to prove Rosass intent. Intent is usually proved through circumstantial evidence. Here Rosas did not complete the act of robbing Svehla, and his actions leading to the attempted robbery were equivocal. Where a defendants actions are equivocal in demonstrating intent, the ability to demonstrate intent through prior conduct is important to the Peoples case and not cumulative. (See People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 172 [holding evidence of other crimes not cumulative where defendant claimed lack of intent and presented evidence of diminished capacity]; People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 991-992 [holding evidence of prior abuse not cumulative to show intent where testimony of expert and lay witnesses was in conflict].) Because the prior robbery evidence was material, similar, and necessary, the trial courts finding that the evidence had sufficient probative value to warrant admission was well within the bounds of reason.
Rosas also contends the admission of the prior misconduct evidence was "unduly prejudicial and just inflammatory enough to turn the tide for the prosecutions weak case." Rosas points to his acquittal of robbery as evidence that the prior misconduct was inflammatory and prejudicial. However, the test for undue prejudice is whether the evidence evokes an emotional bias against the defendant with little effect on the issues. (People v. Brogna (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 700, 709-710.) As we have stated, the evidence was important to the issue of intent. The testimony of the prior robbery victim included no inflammatory or highly emotional details and did little more than show that Rosas had committed a very similar robbery.
Furthermore, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the evidence could only be considered for the limited purpose of determining Rosass intent. We presume that the jury followed this admonition. (People v. Brogna, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 710.) Moreover, the jurys acquittal of Rosas on the robbery charge shows the jury was not emotionally biased but rather examined the evidence with a critical eye.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., OROURKE, J.