Opinion
A156476
09-24-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID SCOTT ROMESBURG, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR7123731)
Appellant David Romesburg was convicted of pimping, pandering, and money laundering. His assigned counsel has filed a brief raising no legal issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel advised appellant that he may file a supplemental brief with the court within 30 days and may request the court to relieve present counsel, but appellant has not taken either course.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
As appellant was convicted on his plea, the facts are all taken from the presentence report.
On November 1, 2017, a Rohnert Park police officer responded to the Parkridge Apartment complex for a report of suspicious circumstances regarding numerous older men coming to and leaving a particular apartment at all hours of the day and night. The unoccupied apartment was sparsely furnished, containing only a massage table in one bedroom and a futon in another room. Several packages of condoms were found in a kitchen drawer. A lease agreement indicated that the apartment was rented to appellant, and that his address on the date of the lease was 2355 Alvarado Avenue, in Santa Rosa. A record search conducted by the police confirmed that appellant and Fay Romesburg, his mother and codefendant, were both "associated" with the Alvarado Avenue house in that the Santa Rosa police department had previously investigated activities at the house after neighbors reported that it had been used for prostitution, human trafficking activities, and used as a brothel by appellant and his mother. When interviewed by the police, appellant's mother denied knowledge of his involvement in pimping or pandering, but indicated her awareness that he rented an apartment in Rohnert Park "to help his friends who could not secure apartments due to the local rental climate" and admitted the possibility women who rented rooms in the apartment may have "participated in sex work or massage."
Police investigation of internet protocol addresses associated with sex advertisement postings referring to the Alvarado Avenue address led the police to several young women who had been recruited by appellant or his mother and worked for appellant in the Rohnert Park apartment.
L.R. described a "tryout interview" involving sex with appellant at a house previously owned by his mother, who also was present at the interview. L.R.'s current arrangement with appellant and his mother was that they paid her to clean up the apartment and do chores. She also drove women from the Alvarado Avenue house to the Rohnert Park apartment, and provided some of them "talk therapy." According to L.R., appellant told his mother "everything," and their "typical arrangement" was for appellant to post advertisements for women online and book clients for them. The women would then pay him for providing a place to have sex. A woman could have the payment waived if she had sex with appellant. L.R. also stated that appellant rented the Rohnert Park apartment after the police "discovered" the use of the Alvarado Avenue house as a brothel.
N.C., who had worked for appellant and his mother for over two years, contacted the police and gave them much the same information as L.R. As stated in the presentence report, N.C "recalled when she spent her first weekend at the [Alvarado Avenue] residence, she observed approximately 20 women all between ages 19 and 21, come and go from the residence. [A]ppellant would not book appointments for women who upset him. . . . N.C. spoke about a time when [appellant] told her she needed to sleep with him. She told him she did not want to sleep with him, and he told her he wasn't going to make her do anything, but if she wanted to keep her job she was going to have sex with him. He reportedly made her smoke 'a joint' [marijuana] and take two Valium pills before engaging in sexual intercourse, an experience she described as 'awful.' "
A woman referred to in the presentence report as "Jane Doe" was 17 when she met appellant and his mother at a pool party at their house that was attended by high school friends Jane Doe knew to be working for appellant. Appellant recognized and took advantage of her vulnerability. When she told him she was homeless and unemployed, appellant and his mother offered to help her. Appellant encouraged her to obtain lingerie and change her hair and nails, and paid several hundred dollars to enable her to do so. Appellant "interviewed" Jane Doe when she was 17, which consisted of him making small talk while engaging in sexual intercourse with her. On her 18th birthday, appellant told Jane Doe that she owed him $1,000 for his expenditures on her hair, nails, and clothing and made her work until she earned that amount, of which she was allowed to keep only $200. Appellant told Jane Doe that "if she ever sought help, she would be arrested and go to prison. [He] told her she was the minority, nobody cared about her, and she needed to hide all of the time. She added, 'Once he . . . has you, he will manipulate you so you cut off all relationships with people and only depend on him.' "
N.G., who was referred to the police by another former victim of appellant, was visibly upset when describing her interactions with appellant and his mother and hid her identity from them after she left the "prostitution lifestyle." When N.G. worked for appellant as a prostitute she paid him $60 for the referral and the use of one of the rooms of his apartment. Appellant told her that if she had sex with him or his mother she would not have to pay the $60 fee. As stated in the presentence report, "[i]n addition to having sex with one of them, she would have to be part of a sex club which they hosted once a month. N.G. also told officers she was raped by [appellant]."
Appellant was charged with one count of human trafficking for a sex act (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c)(1)); one count of pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a)); one count of pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2)); seven counts of money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)); and one count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)). The complaint additionally alleged appellant suffered two prior convictions that qualified as strikes (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12. subds. (b) & (c)).
All subsequent statutory references are also to the Penal Code.
In return for an agreed upon maximum term of 16 years, appellant waived his constitutional rights, pled no contest to three counts alleging, respectively, pimping, pandering, and money laundering, and admitted a single prior strike.
At sentencing, appellant argued for a suspended sentence (or at least the low term) on the grounds that he suffers from social anxiety, bipolar disorder and likely PTSD as a result of childhood trauma caused by an abusive father and his criminal conduct was heavily influenced by his mother, who is a dominatrix, and ran a house of prostitution out of her home. Defense counsel contended appellant should be granted probation because it would enable him to receive mental health treatment.
Rejecting this argument, the court denied probation and imposed the maximum sentence allowed by the plea bargain. The court pointed out that some of appellant's victims were vulnerable, many were sexually exploited, he committed his offenses callously, they involved planning and sophistication, his convictions were of increasing seriousness, and he had a strike prior. The court awarded appellant 364 actual days of confinement plus 364 days good time/work days, for a total presentence credit of 728 days.
The court calculated 16 years as follows: The upper term of 6 years, doubled to 12 years for count 2, plus one-third the mid-term doubled for count 3 (which is 2 years, 8 months), plus one-third the midterm doubled for count 4 (which is 1 year, 4 months). --------
The court stayed all fines and fees under People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 and, relying on section 290, required appellant to register as a sex offender.
Notice of appeal was timely filed on February 11, 2019.
On June 28, 2019, after receiving a so-called Fares letter (People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954) from appellant's counsel pointing out that appellant had not pled guilty to any offense registrable under section 290, the sentencing judge vacated the registration requirement. An amended abstract of judgment was issued on July 3, 2019, to reflect this change.
DISCUSSION
The scope of reviewable issues on appeal after a plea of guilty or no contest is restricted to matters based on constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceeding leading to the plea; guilt or innocence are not included. (People v DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896.) Appellant's change of plea complied with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122. There was a factual basis for the plea. Appellant was at all times represented by competent counsel who zealously protected his rights and interests. The sentence imposed is authorized by law.
Our independent review having found no arguable issues that require further briefing, the judgment, including the sentence imposed, is affirmed.
/s/_________
Kline, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Richman, J. /s/_________
Miller, J.