Opinion
February 16, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brill, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was arrested for the sale and possession of heroin in a so-called "buy and bust" operation after he passed 15 glassine envelopes of heroin to another, who in turn sold one to an undercover police officer.
The defendant's contentions that the court's instructions to the jury constituted reversible error by shifting or lessening the burden of proof and coercing the jury to agree on a particular verdict were not preserved for appellate review (see, People v Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245). In any event, these contentions lack merit. The charge, when viewed as a whole, adequately conveyed the proper standards (see, People v Coleman, 70 N.Y.2d 817; People v Jones, 173 A.D.2d 487). Additionally, the instructions given did not attempt to "coerce or compel the jury to agree upon a particular verdict, or any verdict" (People v Faber, 199 N.Y. 256, 259). Rather, the instructions concerned that part of the court's charge dealing with the jury's duty to engage in deliberations with an open mind (see, People v Ali, 47 N.Y.2d 920).
Nor was the court's Sandoval ruling erroneous. The court may permit inquiry into prior similar offenses without improvidently exercising its discretion (see, People v Rahman, 46 N.Y.2d 882; People v Hendrix, 44 N.Y.2d 658). Although the defendant had three prior convictions involving criminal sale or possession of a controlled substance, the court limited inquiry on cross-examination to one conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree with no elicitation of the details of the crime. The record indicates that the trial court weighed the competing considerations and determined that the probative value of the crime concerning the defendant's tendency to put his self-interest above that of society outweighed any prejudice (see, People v Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282).
Additionally, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we are satisfied that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon exercise of our factual review power, we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). Sullivan, J.P., O'Brien, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.