Opinion
April 16, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County, Herbert J. Adlerberg, J., Dorothy Cropper, J.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference (People v Malizia, 62 N.Y.2d 755, lv denied 469 U.S. 932), the eyewitness testimony naming defendant as one of the knife-wielding robbers was sufficient as a matter of law to establish defendant's guilt of each of the elements of the counts charged (see, People v Arroyo, 54 N.Y.2d 567, cert denied 456 U.S. 979). The court's Sandoval compromise limiting the prosecution's cross-examination of defendant to whether he had been convicted of two misdemeanors and two felonies was a proper balancing of the probative value of such evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to defendant (People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 375), and we reject defendant's argument that the court abused its discretion by permitting inquiry into too many of defendant's prior convictions (see, People v Coe, 165 A.D.2d 721). Concerning the comment by one of the jurors to another juror questioning the accuracy of the translation, the inquiry conducted by the court was adequate to determine that there had been no premature deliberations or predetermination of guilt (People v Guillory, 168 A.D.2d 357, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 961), and that the comments "were not lengthy discussions but merely terse asides." (People v Horney, 112 A.D.2d 841, 843.) Nor did the court err in refusing the jury's request to "hear" the original police robbery report, the report in question not being in evidence (People v Velasco, 160 A.D.2d 170, affd 77 N.Y.2d 469). Finally, the court did not abuse its sentencing discretion (People v Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305).
Concur — Carro, J.P., Kupferman, Asch and Smith, JJ.