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People v. Rogers

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Three.
Nov 25, 2003
A098028 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)

Opinion

A098028.

11-25-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PETER QUINCY ROGERS, Defendant and Appellant.


Defendant Peter Rogers appeals from an order extending his commitment to the California Department of Mental Health. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 1995, defendant was found guilty on a no contest plea of assaulting a peace officer with a deadly weapon, driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others while attempting to elude pursuing peace officers, and driving under the influence of alcohol. He was also found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) of reckless driving and failing to report an accident. The court ordered him committed to the state mental hospital for a maximum term of seven years.

On August 31, 2002, the People filed a petition to extend defendants commitment by two years under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b). The petition alleged defendant suffered a mental disability and that he continued to present substantial danger to the physical safety of others. A jury found the allegations true and the court ordered defendants commitment extended until February 15, 2004.

DISCUSSION

I.CALJIC No. 4.17.1

A defendant judged not guilty by reason of insanity may be committed to the Department of Mental Health for a period of time not exceeding the maximum prison term he could have received for the underlying offense. (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) At the end of that time period, the People may petition to extend the commitment by two years. (§ 1026.5, subds. (b)(1), (b)(8).) To extend the period of confinement, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is mentally ill and poses a substantial danger to others. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); People v. Buttes (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 116, 125.)

In a conference out of the jurys presence, defendant asked leave to argue to the jury that he would not be dangerous if released to a supervised facility in the community. The court denied the request and instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 4.17.1, as follows: "[I]t is a defense to a petition to extend commitment that the respondent in a medicated state does not represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others. [¶] The respondent has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to establish, one, in his present medicated condition he no longer represents a substantial danger of inflicting physical harm upon others; and, two, he will continue to take the medication as prescribed in an unsupervised environment." (Italics added.)

CALJIC No. 4.17.1 is based on the People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1600. Bolden holds the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant suffers from a mental condition that causes him to represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others, without regard to the effect of treatment or medication on his behavior. The defendant may assert as an affirmative defense that he can control his dangerousness through taking medication in an unsupervised environment.

While defendant does not dispute that CALJIC No. 4.17.1 accurately reflects Boldens holding, he urges us to extend the law to hold a defendant may defeat recommitment by showing, not that he would take his medications in an unsupervised setting, but that he would do so if released to a supervised program. We need not consider this step here. In the 13 years since Bolden was decided, neither the Legislature nor any California court has expanded the affirmative defense. As Bolden observes, a release under section 1026.5 is unconditional: "[T]he released person leaves the psychiatric facility without further supervision or compulsory treatment." The unconditional release of a defendant who is likely to take medication only in a supervised setting, may well undermine section 1026.5s core policy of safeguarding the public. (See Bolden, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1599-1600.)

Defendant relies on People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888. In Ghilotti, the Supreme Court interpreted specific language in the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600 et seq.) (SVPA) referring to whether "the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (d), italics added; Ghilotti, supra, at pp. 924-925.) The court concluded that in using this language, the Legislature intended that experts evaluating the likelihood of reoffense be permitted to consider whether the person would voluntarily accept community treatment to ameliorate the danger he might pose. (Id. at pp. 924-927.) Defendant argues that section 1026.5, subdivision (b) must be interpreted identically because the NGI and SVPA extension schemes "are similar" and "both impact personal liberty." Accordingly, he reasons, the jury should have been permitted to consider whether he would be amenable to voluntary treatment and, hence, not dangerous, if released to a supervised facility in the community.

We do not reach the merits of this contention because, on this record, there is no probability of a different outcome had the court allowed the jury to consider defendants dangerousness if released to such a facility. The evidence of defendants continued dangerousness even in a supervised setting was overwhelming. The criminal charges underlying his NGI plea arose from a 1995 incident in which he rammed a police car because he thought the officers were Mafia members. That year he also attacked two deputies at the county jail, injuring both. In July 2000 defendant, although medicated, assaulted a staff member at Napa State Hospital because he thought an abduction had occurred on a plane flying overhead and no one was trying to stop it. His medication was subsequently changed, and at the time of the recommitment proceeding he was less threatening and agitated. However, he had also become more paranoid and refused to go out on the grounds with others. Defendant also committed attacks while at Atascadero State Hospital, before he was transferred to Napa.

At the time of trial, defendant was taking antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. He was normally reluctant to take any medication at all, and had to be encouraged to do so by the staff. He was always reluctant to try anything different. At the last team conference before trial, defendant said he would be willing to take medication when he was discharged "if somebody told him he had to." He did not attend groups or avail himself of any of the treatment programs at the hospital.

Defendants personal psychiatrist, Dr. Paul Anderson, had seen defendant on a daily basis for three years and participated in annual psychiatric evaluations and quarterly treatment conferences. Dr. Anderson testified that defendant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, a thought disorder characterized by hallucinations and delusions. The paranoid schizophrenic demonstrates a great and unrealistic fear of being hurt or killed. While not all paranoid schizophrenics are dangerous, defendant has a long history of indiscriminate assaults. His belief that people intend to hurt him triggers assaultive conduct. Defendant also has a long-standing substance abuse problem. Drug and alcohol use aggravates paranoia in schizophrenics.

During the previous year defendant experienced delusions that criminals on the hospital grounds would hurt him if he went out. Dr. Anderson believes defendant also suffered from hallucinations. He sometimes becomes excited when overstimulated and exhibits grandiosity, suspiciousness, and a great deal of paranoia. As recently as a month before the recommitment proceeding, defendant reported that hospital staff were associated with the Mafia.

Dr. Anderson testified that defendant is emotionally withdrawn and does not want to interact with others. He isolates himself, sits on one side of a room, and does not talk to others. He exhibits anxiety, depression, and preoccupation. His speech demonstrates some conceptual disorganization and it takes him a long time to express his thoughts. He expresses tension through his mannerisms. For some time he was twisting and pulling out his hair, a behavior that stopped when the staff increased his antidepressant medication. These are all symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia.

In assessing a patients dangerousness, Dr. Anderson tries to identify the trigger points for the dangerous behavior and help the patient recognize those warning signs so that he can avoid dangerous situations and behaviors. For a patient to be discharged, he must understand that he is mentally ill, what his symptoms are, and what medications will work for each symptom. Because defendant refuses to participate in treatment on a regular basis, he has not gained any understanding of his illness. In Dr. Andersons view, this makes him "a real danger." Defendant poses a substantial risk to the community because he exhibits an increased level of paranoia, leading to aggressive acts.

Because of his paranoia, defendant is not eligible to be on an open ward. The treatment goal is to place him in an open unit where he can demonstrate some self-understanding and stability for a year without any tendency towards assaultiveness. Only then would he be considered for outpatient placement. At this point, however, Dr. Anderson and the entire treatment team firmly believe that defendant poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others.

Defendant relies on the testimony provided by court-appointed psychologist Dr. Thomas Samuels. Dr. Samuels evaluation consisted of reviewing defendants records for a total of four hours and interviewing him for ninety minutes. Based on this evaluation, he does not believe defendant represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. He asserted that defendants records indicate compliance with his medications and increasing insight into his illness. Dr. Samuels found significant that defendant had not committed any assaults or aggressive behavior within the last year and had committed only one assault in the past seven.

Notably, Dr. Samuels was not aware that defendant had also attacked a fellow inmate at Atascadero State Hospital in 1996. Nor did he know that defendants records reported that less than a month before trial defendant was experiencing continuing anxiety, fear, and paranoia; that he was refusing to go onto the grounds because of a fear that criminals would harm him; that he claimed staff members were related to the Mafia; that he had pulled out 10 percent of his hair since the past spring; that he was refusing to interact with staff or other patients; and that he was becoming increasingly isolative.

Dr. Samuels testified that he believed his conclusions about defendants dangerousness were consistent with Dr. Andersons reports. He had not spoken with Dr. Anderson, however. He was unaware that Dr. Anderson believed defendants paranoia was increasing and that he posed a substantial risk of physical harm to others. In fact, from reviewing Dr. Andersons reports he testified he would be "surprised" to hear that Dr. Anderson would say that.

In short, Dr. Samuels opinion that defendant would not be dangerous in a supervised community setting was premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of Dr. Andersons evaluation and an incomplete grasp of defendants records. On the other hand, the countervailing evidence of defendants continued dangerousness even under supervision was overwhelming. Assuming arguendo that the alleged failure to instruct was erroneous, Dr. Andersons unequivocal testimony, based on three years of daily sessions with defendant as compared to Dr. Samuels single interview and four hours of record review, establishes that the assumed error was harmless. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) This case, accordingly, does not present the occasion to examine whether Ghilotti has any bearing on the continued vitality of Bolden. We express no opinion as to whether Ghilotti may warrant reconsideration of Bolden in an appropriate case. Nor, in light of our conclusion here, do we reach defendants related assertion that his dangerousness in a structured community setting is an element of the states prima facie case rather than an affirmative defense.

II.ADA

Defendant further maintains that the court violated Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) (ADA) by precluding the jury from considering whether he would be dangerous if released from the state hospital into a supervised community setting. Because the ADA prohibits unnecessary institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities, he argues, "the state may not unnecessarily confine [him] to an institutional setting if he can demonstrate that he would not be dangerous if allowed to live voluntarily in a structured setting in the community." The argument is unsupported by any directly relevant authority. Whatever its legal merits, however, this claim, like defendants Ghilotti argument, fails on the record. In light of the overwhelming evidence of his continued dangerousness, defendant cannot establish a reasonable probability that a jury would have found in his favor if allowed to consider the option of placement in a community program. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

III.Equal Protection

Defendant next asserts the courts refusal to instruct the jury to consider whether he would present a danger to others if released to a supervised environment deprived him of equal protection under the law because, unlike NGI offenders, individuals subject to recommitment under the SVPA may defeat recommitment by proving they would succeed in such a setting. In response, the People maintain that NGI offenders and individuals committed under the SVPA are not similarly situated for purposes of equal protection jurisprudence; that differences between the two groups provide a constitutionally adequate basis for different treatment; and that insanity acquittees are treated similarly to SVPA committees for equal protection purposes. We do not reach these contentions because the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been no different had the jury been instructed to consider the option of placement in a supervised community setting. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: McGuiness, P.J., Pollak, J. --------------- Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to the Penal Code.


Summaries of

People v. Rogers

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Three.
Nov 25, 2003
A098028 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Rogers

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PETER QUINCY ROGERS, Defendant…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Three.

Date published: Nov 25, 2003

Citations

A098028 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)