The prosecution argued before the district court that defendant should be bound over on a charge of fleeing and eluding, fourth-degree, in violation of MCL 750.479a because defendant's snowmobile was a motor vehicle when it was operated on the roadway. The district court held that the snowmobile was not a motor vehicle under the Michigan Vehicle Code ("MVC"), MCL 257.1 et seq., reasoning that (1) the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA"), MCL 324.101 et seq., has an almost identical section, MCL 324.82135, prohibiting fleeing and eluding on a snowmobile, (2) People v Rogers, 438 Mich 602; 475 NW2d 717 (1991), was not dispositive because it defined a snowmobile as a "vehicle" but not a "motor vehicle," and (3) a snowmobile could not be a motor vehicle under the MVC because it did not require a motor vehicle license to operate and because it was not required to be registered under that act. Plaintiff moved to amend the information in the circuit court to once again include the fourth degree fleeing and eluding charge.

]” MCL 257.79. Defendant's scooter was a device upon which a person was transported upon a highway.In People v. Rogers, 438 Mich. 602, 475 N.W.2d 717 (1991), the Supreme Court clarified that a person using a device that does not fit within the usual definition of a “motor vehicle” may be prosecuted for operating a “vehicle” under the influence of alcohol if the device is operated upon a highway. The defendant in Rogers operated his snowmobile on the shoulder of a highway while intoxicated.

But in overlapping, they share a common goal: to protect people and property from drunk drivers. Cf. People v. Rogers, 438 Mich. 602, 607, 475 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1991) (using in pari materia analysis in concluding defendant could be charged with OWI under state snowmobile act or OWI statute). There are no provisions in chapter 321G to punish repeat offenders of section 321G.13(3).

Further suggesting that the Vehicle Code is not irrelevant, our Supreme Court has explained that "because snowmobiles, albeit under limited circumstances, may be operated on highways," it is proper to charge a person under the provision of the Vehicle Code that penalizes a person for operating a snowmobile on a highway while intoxicated. People v. Rogers , 438 Mich. 602, 607-608, 475 N.W.2d 717 (1991). Our Supreme Court thus explicitly recognized that snowmobiles do operate on roadways, which indirectly supports the conclusion that they are motor vehicles.

The Supreme Court of Michigan reached the same result in a similar case. In People v. Rogers, 475 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 1991), Rogers was arrested and charged under the Michigan D.U.I. statute for traveling on the shoulder of U.S. Highway 23 on a snowmobile while intoxicated. Rogers argued that he should have been charged under the more specific snowmobile statute.

The argument fails to consider the fact that the Legislature simultaneously amended the same sections in chapters 3 and 4. Statutory amendments enacted by the same Legislature to become effective on the same date and relating to the same subject matter must be construed together for purposes of determining legislative intent. People v Rogers, 438 Mich. 602; 475 N.W.2d 717 (1991); Reed v Secretary of State, 327 Mich. 108; 41 N.W.2d 491 (1950). The body of legislative reforms enacted in the early 1980's, including the significant manner amendments, were designed to impose on claimants a higher standard of proof, whether the claim is brought under chapter 3 for specific injuries or under chapter 4 for occupational diseases.

Moreover, even if the majority opinion is correct on this point, I cannot conclude that the snowmobiles in this case are sufficiently similar to the cars, buses, and trucks of 1964 to meet that standard. The majority also relies on People v Rogers, 438 Mich 602; 475 NW2d 717 (1991), for the proposition that our Supreme Court has implicitly deemed snowmobiles to be motor vehicles. That case required the Court to consider whether the defendant could be prosecuted under two different sections of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq, for operating a snowmobile on a public highway while intoxicated.

Further suggesting that the Vehicle Code is not irrelevant, our Supreme Court has explained that "because snowmobiles, albeit under limited circumstances, may be operated on highways," it is proper to charge a person under the provision of the Vehicle Code that penalizes a person for operating a snowmobile on a highway while intoxicated. People v Rogers, 438 Mich 602, 607-608; 475 NW2d 717 (1991). Our Supreme Court thus explicitly recognized that snowmobiles do operate on roadways, which indirectly supports the conclusion that they are motor vehicles.

There being no Michigan precedent addressing that question in the zoning context, we turn to a brief review of such precedents from other jurisdictions. People v. Rogers, 438 Mich. 602, 609, 475 N.W.2d 717 (1991). The ZBA argued that worship would not be open to the general public, but would be limited to a relatively closed group.

Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) (citing as examples, "active member" and "active account").People v Rogers, 438 Mich 602, 609; 475 NW2d 717 (1991). Most notably, in In re KD, the Colorado Court of Appeals explicitly concluded that the "`active efforts' required by § 1912(d) of the ICWA need not be part of a treatment plan offered as part of the current dependency proceedings."