The court barred inquiry into defendant's misdemeanor convictions and limited the inquiry into his numerous drug-related felony convictions. While the People were permitted to fully inquire into defendant's 1997 conviction for criminal possession of a loaded firearm, that conviction was “material and relevant to the issue of the defendant's credibility” ( People v. Severino, 243 A.D.2d 737, 738, 665 N.Y.S.2d 304 [1997],lv. denied91 N.Y.2d 880, 668 N.Y.S.2d 578, 691 N.E.2d 650 [1997];see People v. Rogers, 163 A.D.2d 157, 158, 557 N.Y.S.2d 375 [1990],lv. denied76 N.Y.2d 943, 563 N.Y.S.2d 72, 564 N.E.2d 682 [1990] ).
There is no basis upon which to disturb the jury's determinations concerning credibility. The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the victim' s treating doctor, a first-year resident in emergency medicine with 10-months experience in that field, to also testify as an expert on that subject (see, People v. Rogers, 163 A.D.2d 157, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 943;see also, Price v. New York City Hous. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 553, 559). The court properly permitted the People to introduce evidence which rebutted defendant's claim that the victim's injury resulted from blunt trauma rather than from a sharp instrument (see, People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345, cert denied 460 U.S. 1047).
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in ruling that the prosecutor could cross-examine the defendant about the facts underlying his prior convictions for grand larceny in the fourth degree and possession of a loaded firearm rather than restricting inquiry to the mere fact of their existence. Those convictions were material and relevant to the issue of the defendant's credibility ( see, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377; People v. Boseman, 161 A.D.2d 601, 602; People v Rogers, 163 A.D.2d 157, 158), and the Supreme Court was not obliged to make use of the " Sandoval Compromise" ( People v. Davis, 173 A.D.2d 634). The defendant's claim that the evidence adduced by the People was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of manslaughter in the first degree for the death of Frank Morales is unpreserved for appellate review ( see, People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 20-21).
Defendant's general objection did not preserve his current claim that the stated qualifications of the People's expert witness were insufficient to warrant his acceptance as an expert in the field of gynecology ( People v. Davis, 226 A.D.2d 125, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 1020), and we decline interest of justice review. Were we to review in the interest of justice, we would find that the witness's stated qualifications permitted his acceptance as an expert ( People v. Rogers, 163 A.D.2d 157, 158, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 943), with the jury properly instructed that the weight of such testimony was a question for its determination ( Meiselman v. Crown Hgts. Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 398). Based on the existing record, we find that defendant received meaningful representation by counsel ( see, People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; see also, People v. Hobot, 84 N.Y.2d 1021).
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Juanita Bing Newton, J.). Defendant's appellate challenge to the court's supplemental instructions on justification was not preserved by appropriate objection (CPL 470.05), and, in any event, is without merit in that the charge, when viewed as a whole (People v St. Martine, 160 A.D.2d 35, 38, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 990), comported with the evidence (see, Penal Law § 35.15, [2]; People v Major, 116 A.D.2d 594). Given the serious and nearly fatal extent of the injuries inflicted, the maximum sentence imposed cannot be deemed excessive (see, People v Rogers, 163 A.D.2d 157, 158, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 943). Concur — Murphy, P.J., Ellerin, Kupferman, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.
New York recognizes that there is an implied promise to perform a contract in a skillful and workmanlike manner (NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 354 citing Bialo v Walter Lawlor, Inc., 160 A.D.2d 559; Mohawk v Overall Co. v Brown, 163 A.D.2d 157; and Fairbairn Lumber Corp. v Telian, 92 A.D.2d 683). As such, in order to recover for negligent performance of the contract