Opinion
2021-07448
12-23-2021
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANET C. SOMES OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (KAYLAN PORTER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANET C. SOMES OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (KAYLAN PORTER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Francis A. Affronti, J.), rendered March 21, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant upon a plea of guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree (Penal Law § 215.51 [b] [v]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in issuing a no-contact order of protection on behalf of the victim, who indicated at sentencing that she wanted only a no-offensive-contact order of protection. We reject that contention. The sentencing court had authority "to issue an order of protection, and set the terms thereof, even in the absence of the victim's consent" (People v Richardson, 134 A.D.3d 1566, 1567 [4th Dept 2015] , lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1074 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Lilley, 81 A.D.3d 1448, 1448 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 860 [2011]). Under the circumstances of this case, including the nature of the underlying crime, the court did not err in issuing the no-contact order of protection (see People v Walker, 151 A.D.3d 1730, 1731 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1135 [2017], reconsideration denied 30 N.Y.3d 984 [2017]).
Defendant further contends that the court erred in setting the expiration date of the order of protection by failing to take into account the time he served in jail prior to sentencing. As defendant correctly concedes, his contention is unpreserved for our review inasmuch as he did not object to the duration of the order of protection at sentencing (see People v Hoyt, 107 A.D.3d 1426, 1426 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 21 N.Y.3d 1042 [2013]), and we decline to exercise our power to review the contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]).