Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. James B. Pierce, Judge. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA074096
Victoria H. Stafford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RUBIN, ACTING P. J.
Everardo Rodriguez appeals from the judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to multiple counts of transporting drugs and possessing drugs for sale, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the drug evidence. We affirm.
Our statement of facts comes from the transcript of the preliminary hearing, where the court took evidence concerning the motion to suppress the evidence.
At around 5:00 p.m. on April 17, 2007, Long Beach Police Detective Hector Cardiel was on patrol in an unmarked police car when he was told by other officers to follow and find a way to stop a car being driven by Everardo Rodriguez. Cardiel first saw Rodriguez’s car when it was about 50 or 60 yards ahead of him, stopped at a traffic light on southbound Gundry Avenue at its intersection with Anaheim Street. Gundry Avenue had one traffic lane in each direction of travel at that point. According to Cardiel, Rodriguez “[l]ooked like he was going to make a left-hand turn because he was in the middle of a lane, and he made a quick right turn going westbound onto Anaheim without signaling.” Believing that Rodriguez had violated the laws governing a motorist’s obligations to signal for a turn, Cardiel pulled Rodriguez over.
Although this fact was not in evidence at the hearing, we have judicially noticed the configuration and width of the roadway at that point. (Hom v. Clark (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 622, 637-638.)
As Detective Cardiel approached Rodriguez’s car, he saw Rodriguez make jerking motions with his hands and also noticed that Rodriguez’s shoulders were moving back and forth. When Cardiel got to the driver’s side door, he saw that pieces of a broken cell phone were in Rodriguez’s hands and were also scattered around the car’s interior. When Rodriguez told Cardiel he did not have a driver’s license, Cardiel began to arrest Rodriguez for driving without a license. Cardiel saw that the fly of Rodriguez’s pants was undone and also noticed a bulge in the waistband area of the pants. A patdown search turned up several packages of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. Rodriguez was charged with six counts: one each for possessing cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11378); and one each for transporting those three substances (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11379, subd. (a)). The information also alleged that Rodriguez had suffered three prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Rodriguez was charged, tried, and convicted under the name Aquiles Solis. After his notice of appeal was filed under that name, his appellate counsel informed the court that Solis’s true name is Everardo Rodriguez.
When cross-examined about the traffic stop, Detective Cardiel was less certain about his statement that Rodriguez had not signaled at all, saying he could not definitively say whether a turn signal had been given “for a second or two.” However, Cardiel was 100 percent certain that Rodriguez had not signaled during the 100-foot distance preceding his turn, as required by Vehicle Code section 22108. Cardiel said there were no other southbound cars between his patrol car and Rodriguez’s car, that Rodriguez’s right turn did not cut off any oncoming traffic, and that Cardiel was not forced to stop quickly in response to the right turn.
Rodriguez moved to suppress the drug evidence found by Detective Cardiel because he violated no traffic laws. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) That motion was denied. He renewed the motion with the trial court by way of a motion to dismiss the indictment. (Pen. Code, § 995.) That motion was also denied. He then pleaded no contest to all six counts and was given a combined state prison sentence of six years. Rodriguez contends the evidence should have been suppressed and that his conviction should therefore be reversed.
We discuss both motions in more detail post.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
If a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress evidence is denied at the preliminary hearing, the defendant may raise the search and seizure issue by way of a motion to set aside the information. (Pen. Code, § 995, subd. (a)(2)(B); People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 528-529.) Under Penal Code section 995, the superior court acts as an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to affirm a judgment. On appeal from a denial of a Penal Code section 995 motion seeking to reverse the denial of a defendant’s earlier motion to suppress, we disregard the Penal Code section 995 motion and instead directly review the magistrate’s denial of the initial suppression motion. (People v. McDonald, at p. 529.) “The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Only evidence admitted at the suppression hearing is to be considered when determining the correctness of the ruling. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 218.) The construction of statutes, however, is a purely legal question. (People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 113.)
DISCUSSION
“[A] police officer can legally stop a motorist only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law.” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 (Miranda); see also People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463.) Detective Cardiel stopped Rodriguez because he believed Rodriguez made a right turn without signaling at least 100 feet in advance, in violation of Vehicle Code section 22108.
All further undesignated section references are to the Vehicle Code.
Section 22107 provides: “No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” Section 22108 provides: “Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” At the suppression motion, Rodriguez contended the two provisions had to be read together, and that because no other cars were affected by his turn, he did not violate the turn signal requirements. The preliminary hearing magistrate rejected that contention because he believed section 22107 applied to only lane changes, while section 22108 applied to turns. Because section 22108 did not include the requirement of an effect on other vehicles found in section 22107, the magistrate concluded section 22108 had been violated.
Rodriguez made the same arguments in his motion to dismiss. The court appeared to accept his interpretation of sections 22107 and 22108, but found they were violated because Detective Cardiel’s patrol car was within the zone of danger and therefore might have been affected by Rodriguez’s turn.
We agree with Rodriguez that sections 22107 and 22108 must be read together so that a motorist must signal for a turn 100 feet ahead of time, but only in the event other motorists may be affected. (See People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1366, fn. 6; Miranda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.) We reject his reliance on two sister-state decisions – State v. Riley (Fla. 1994) 638 So.2d 507, and State v. Malloy (Iowa App. 1990) 453 N.W.2d 243 (Malloy) – which interpreted very similar provisions to require an actual effect on other cars.
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature through the plain language and ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute. (Rash v. Lungren (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1236-1237.) Section 22107 states that a turn signal must be given “in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” As we read it, the phrase “in the event” has the same meaning as “in case,” and “may be affected” has the same meaning as the possibility of an effect. In short, this language denotes the possibility of an effect on other vehicles, not the actual occurrence of an effect.
Our reasoning is confirmed by Miranda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 917, where the defendant was pulled over after making a left turn without a signal. The stop led to the discovery of drugs and, on appeal from his drug conviction, the defendant argued the traffic stop had been illegal because the arresting officer did not testify the turn was actually unsafe or that there was other traffic nearby. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that “the failure to properly signal where another ‘may be affected by the movement’ is prima facie unsafe, for it creates the possible danger the statute was designed to prevent.” (Id. at p. 930, italics added.) Furthermore, the Miranda court noted, the arresting officer was behind the defendant “and the primary benefit of the signal requirement is for the vehicles to the rear of the signa[l]ing vehicle. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 930.)
We also reject Rodriguez’s reliance on In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128 for the proposition that sections 22107 and 22108 are violated only when another car was actually affected. In that case, the prosecutor conceded that those sections had not been violated because no other vehicles were affected, a fact noted by the Supreme Court, but not discussed or analyzed. (In re Jaime P., at p. 131.) Because that issue was not actually raised by the parties and decided by the Supreme Court, Jaime P. is not authority for interpreting the turn signal statutes. (Cochran v. Cochran (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1121.)
Having resolved that purely legal question, the factual question we must answer is whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Detective Cardiel’s patrol car may have been affected by Rodriguez’s conduct. We begin with Malloy, supra, 453 N.W.2d 243. Even though that decision was based on an interpretation of a similar turn signal statute that required an actual effect on other drivers, the facts of that case are instructive. In Malloy, the only other car nearby was that of the arresting officers, who were a block and a half behind the defendant’s car. (Malloy, at p. 244.) The length of a normal city block in Iowa is 300 feet (Erickson v. Thompson (1965) 135 N.W.2d 107, 114 (conc. opn. of Thornton, J.)), meaning that the pursuing officers in Malloy were 450 feet behind the defendant when he turned. Here, Cardiel was perhaps 150 feet behind Rodriguez when he first saw him, and was approaching from behind in his patrol car. According to Cardiel, Rodriguez might have signaled a second or two before turning. Presumably, therefore, the gap between the two cars had narrowed considerably by the time Rodriguez began his right turn. Furthermore, Gundry Avenue had one lane in each direction at its intersection with Anaheim Street. Cardiel testified that Rodriguez’s car was positioned in the “middle” of the lane as if it were about to make a left turn. We infer from this that Rodriguez’s car was positioned in the far left portion of the lane and that he made his turn from there, instead of from the far right edge of the roadway as required by section 22101, subdivision (a).
We believe it is reasonable to infer that cars approaching from the rear, such as Detective Cardiel’s, would be unaware of Rodriguez’s intention to turn right and might be affected by his decision to signal only in the final seconds before his turn in one of two ways: first, by moving to the far right edge of the roadway in order to make their own right turn, then finding themselves cut off or squeezed by Rodriguez’s turn; and, second, by bringing themselves to a stop directly behind Rodriguez in the belief he intended to proceed straight through the intersection after the light changed, only to find themselves delayed by Rodriguez’s maneuver. As a result, Cardiel’s ever-decreasing proximity to Rodriguez triggered the possible danger section 22108 was designed to prevent. (Miranda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.) We therefore conclude there was sufficient evidence that Rodriguez violated section 22108. Accordingly, there was probable cause for the traffic stop and the suppression motion was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: FLIER, J. BIGELOW, J.