Opinion
F077237
09-12-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. IRVIN STANLEY RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Alexandr Satanovsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Tracy Yao, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. PCF324186)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Michael B. Sheltzer, Judge. Alexandr Satanovsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Tracy Yao, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Irvin Stanley Rodriguez was subjected to a warrantless search of his residence and property after officers were dispatched based on reports of shots fired and people arguing and screaming. The magistrate denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the search, concluding the search was justified as a welfare check for victims. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of firearm and ammunition charges. On appeal, he contends the magistrate erred in denying his suppression motion. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On September 18, 2015, the Tulare County District Attorney charged defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1), being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and being under the influence while in possession of a loaded, operable firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e); count 3). The complaint further alleged defendant had suffered one prior conviction within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
The filing date of the complaint is illegible, but the parties agree it was filed on September 18, 2015, which was the date the document was executed.
On March 21, 2016, at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied defendant's motion to suppress and bound him over on counts 1 and 2 only.
On December 5, 2016, defendant renewed his motion to suppress before the trial court and it was denied again.
On December 19, 2017, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts 1 and 2, and the trial court found the special allegations true.
On March 6, 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant to four years in prison as follows: 32 months on count 1 (16 months doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law), and a consecutive term of 16 months on count 2. The court originally stayed the prior prison term enhancements, then apparently ordered them stricken.
The hearing transcript demonstrates the court initially stayed the enhancements. This was error. (See § 1385, subd. (c); People v. Jordan (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 349, 368 ["Prior prison term enhancements may be imposed or stricken but not stayed."]; People v. Jones (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 756, 758 ["such an enhancement, if not imposed, must be stricken"].) The trial court apparently recognized the error and, on March 10, 2018, the sentencing hearing minute order was amended to reflect that the enhancements had been stricken. The abstract of judgment (also filed on March 10, 2018), however, still reflects that the enhancements were stayed. We will order the abstract amended. (People v. Bradley (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 386, 391 ["The failure to impose or strike an enhancement is a legally unauthorized sentence subject to correction for the first time on appeal."].)
FACTS
The facts are taken from the hearing on the suppression motion. (In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 78, fn. 18, ["in reviewing the [magistrate's] suppression ruling, we consider only the evidence that was presented to the [magistrate] at the time it ruled"].)
Deputy Sheriff Osvaldo Gomez testified that on September 16, 2015, he was dispatched to two specific cross streets in Tulare County based on several calls reporting shots fired and people arguing and screaming. The area consisted of houses spread out amid open fields. Gomez was flagged down by a "harried" female who pointed to the house where she heard the shots. She refused to give her name. She told him, " 'Go that way.' "
Gomez and his supervisor, Sergeant Mandel, (together, the officers) went to the house the female pointed out. Because the officers were dispatched due to reports of shots fired and people screaming, they intended to check for possible victims, to see if anyone was hurt and needed their assistance. When they looked over the six-foot-tall wooden fence that surrounded the front yard, they did not see or hear anyone. The officers went through a hole in the fence. They had their handguns and flashlights out because they were unsure if they would find a suspect or a victim. The front door was ajar and the lights were on inside. As they approached, they saw broken class and broken pieces of wood near the front door. They announced themselves and knocked on the door. They waited and shined their lights through the windows. Nobody came out. The officers went inside. The house looked like it had been ransacked. There were black trash bags of clothing on the couch and on the floor. Trash was everywhere, and there was a bed in the living room that "just looked out of place." The officers cleared the house and found no one. One of the bedrooms had a net on the wall containing marijuana stem leaves.
When the officers reached the backyard, they continued looking for victims who might be injured and in need of help. As they did, they called out and announced themselves, saying they were Tulare County Sheriff's deputies, and if anyone was on the property, they should make themselves known. The officers observed a few sheds on the property. Near one shed, Gomez saw five spent shotgun shell casings on the ground. The officers continued clearing the property to make sure there were no victims. Inside a shed, they found live shotgun shells. They continued further into the property, entering through an opened chain link gate into a 40-by-60-foot area enclosed by a chain link fence and pieces of wood. Inside they observed about 90 five- to six-foot-tall marijuana plants. The officers continued to announce themselves as they walked. They searched the entire property, which was approximately five acres of mostly open, undeveloped land. They searched the marijuana field last because they knew how dangerous those fields could be. As they proceeded through the marijuana plants, defendant appeared from the corner of the field, quite close to the house. He had been kneeling to hide behind the plants. He stood up and raised his hands. The officers called him over and he approached. He had scratches on his face. The officers detained him because they did not know who he was. They asked him if he was okay and if he needed an ambulance. He said no, he was fine. When the officers searched the area where defendant had been hiding, they found a loaded shotgun. It had one shell in the chamber and four in the magazine. The officers found no one else on the property.
Gomez spoke to defendant after reading him his Miranda rights. Defendant said the shotgun belonged to him, and he shot it into the air to scare the dogs from chasing the chickens. Gomez did not observe any chickens on the property.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
After hearing this testimony, the magistrate stated:
"As to the motion to suppress, I didn't hearing any argument—quite frankly, what [Gomez] testified to me was he was there on [reports of] shots fired and screaming and that essentially to me it sounded like the entirety of their search was a welfare check looking for either victims or suspects, mostly victims from what I heard, and I think that was perfectly reasonable based on what he knew and based on what the individual that directed him toward the house told him that she had heard the shots fired at that home.
"He entered through the gap of the fence and found the front door ajar and based on the fact that the house was ransacked and they were looking for victims, I think all the steps were appropriate and reasonable and I will deny the motion to suppress based on those grounds."
DISCUSSION
I. Law
"Where, as here, a motion to suppress evidence is submitted to the superior court on the preliminary hearing transcript (see § 1538.5, subd. (i)), ' "the appellate court disregards the findings of the superior court and reviews the determination of the magistrate who ruled on the motion to suppress, drawing all presumptions in favor of the factual determinations of the magistrate, upholding the magistrate's express or implied findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and measuring the facts as found by the trier against the constitutional standard of reasonableness." ' " (People v. Cruz (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 764, 769; see People v. Hua (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1033 [we review the propriety of the magistrate's decision, not that of the superior court that affirmed the magistrate's decision].) "We ... decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search [or] seizure." (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.) "We may sustain the [magistrate's] decision without embracing its reasoning." (People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) Thus, we may affirm the ruling if it is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the ruling was in fact based on an incorrect reason. (Ibid.)
"Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures must be reviewed under federal constitutional standards." (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 794.) "The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement and other government officials." (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345, fn. omitted.) "It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586; People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 817.) That presumption, however, can be overcome—"the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' [and thus] the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." (Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 (Brigham); Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. 45, 47 (Fisher).) When police conduct a search or seizure without a warrant, the prosecution has the burden of showing the officer's actions were justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.)
One exception is a search conducted due to exigent or emergency circumstances. For example, the emergency aid exception is based on "the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. ' "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." ' " (Brigham, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 403; People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 606.) Pursuant to the emergency aid exception, "police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury." (Brigham, at p. 400; People v. Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 606.) This well-recognized exception "require[s] that articulable facts support a reasonable belief that an emergency exists." (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1048.) "Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." (Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. at p. 49.) "[T]he test ... [is] whether there was 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger ...." (Ibid.)
The search of a residence for victims is limited to places where a victim could be found. (People v. Pou (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 143, 152 ["under the emergency aid exception, the officers were entitled to conduct an emergency search of all places in the house where a body (victim or suspect) might have been hiding or lying in wait"].) "[T]he police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities." (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392-393.)
If the prosecution cannot meet the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for a warrantless search, the exclusionary rule generally requires the suppression of evidence obtained from the search. (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053.) "The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent effect." (Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1, 10.) This is why the reasonableness of a search "must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted"; otherwise, the test would be inconsistent with "the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct." (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 332.)
For this reason, exclusion is not a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation; rather, it applies only where it results in "appreciable deterrence" to police misconduct. (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 141.) "Indeed, [the Supreme Court has stated,] exclusion 'has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,' [citation], and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule." (Id. at p. 140, quoting Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591.)
II. Analysis
In this case, defendant contends the "lengthy, probing" search of his residence and five-acre property was not justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement because the "uncorroborated, anonymous tip did not provide [the officers] with 'an objectively reasonable basis' of an imminent emergency." (Capitalization omitted.)
We disagree for three reasons. First, the multiplicity of telephone tips to the officers increased the reliability of the information contained in those tips—that shots were fired, and people were arguing and screaming at a residence near two specific cross streets. Second, the telephone tips were corroborated by the female on the scene who flagged down Gomez and provided more specific information by identifying the precise residence that was the source of the shots she had heard. She was a percipient witness with first-hand knowledge of the source of the shots, even though she refused to identify herself. Together, the tips and her corroboration presented sufficiently reliable information for the officers to reasonably believe shots, arguing, and screaming had come from that particular residence.
Third, the gravity of the information reported by the tips and the female diminished the need for indicia of reliability in assessing the anonymous tips. (See People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 466 (Dolly) ["the interest in protecting human life, even if insufficient in this case to dispense entirely with the need to demonstrate the anonymous tip's reliability [citation], is nonetheless an important factor to consider in assessing the requisite level of reliability]; U.S. v. Holloway (11th Cir.2002) 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 ["when an emergency is reported by an anonymous caller, the need for immediate action may outweigh the need to verify the reliability of the caller"], citing Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, 273-274.) Because the facts " 'involved a serious threat to human life' " and a "grave and immediate risk ... to anyone nearby" (Dolly, at p. 465), the officers were compelled to immediately investigate the reports and check the welfare of possible victims.
Dolly defended the value of anonymous tips by neighbors: " 'There is the equal danger, moreover, that according no weight to "anonymous" tips in the reasonable suspicion calculus will undermine the ability of concerned residents to report illegal activity and to thereby make their neighborhoods more safe. Residents of neighborhoods are in the best position to monitor activity on the streets. But residents, also fearful of the consequences, may not always wish to identify themselves and volunteer their names. According no weight as a matter of law to such "anonymous" tips would only discourage concerned residents from even calling the police, would burden the rights of ordinary citizens to live in their neighborhoods without fear and intimidation, and would render citizens helpless in their efforts to restore safety and sanctity to their homes and communities.' " (Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 468, fn. omitted.) --------
As the officers proceeded in their investigation, they gained more information that confirmed the need for a search of the entire property. When the officers knocked on the front door, announced themselves, and waited, they heard nothing. At this point, it was reasonable for them to believe that any possible victim who needed their assistance was unable to respond or summon help. The officers' observation of the open front door, the broken glass and broken wood near the door, and the ransacked interior suggested a significant disturbance had occurred and raised further concern that someone might have been hurt or was still in danger of being hurt. After the officers cleared the house and found no one, they still had reason to believe a victim might exist somewhere on the large property, including inside the sheds they observed. When they found both spent and live shotgun shells on the property, the need to continue searching the entire property was further supported.
In sum, the facts known to the officers were sufficient to provide them with " 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger" such that a warrantless search of the residence and five-acre property were justified by the emergency aid exception. (Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. at p. 49.) Accordingly, the magistrate did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the search.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions to the clerk to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that the prior prison term enhancements were stricken, not stayed. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.