Opinion
September 23, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pincus, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that statements he made to law enforcement authorities should have been suppressed because they were allegedly the product, inter alia, of coercion. We disagree. The hearing court properly credited the testimony offered by the People's witnesses and rejected the defendant's assertions that his statements were obtained by unlawful means. It is well settled that the determination of a hearing court, which saw and heard the witnesses, should be accorded great weight on appeal (see, People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761; People v. Almodovar, 168 A.D.2d 454). Here, the court properly weighed the conflicting evidence presented and concluded that the defendant's inculpatory statements were voluntarily made after he had knowingly waived his Miranda rights (see, e.g., People v. Pacheco, 168 A.D.2d 465; People v. Almodovar, supra; People v. De Vito, 166 A.D.2d 606; People v. Glasper, 160 A.D.2d 723).
Further, although the court erred in admitting the inculpatory confessions of the defendant's nontestifying codefendant, we find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The case at bar is distinguishable from that of the codefendant Kareem Abdul Latif, whose conviction we reversed on Confrontation Clause grounds (see, People v. Latif, 135 A.D.2d 736; Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186). Here, as in People v. Hamlin ( 71 N.Y.2d 750, 758-759), the defendant's confessions were comprehensive, satisfactorily explained his part in the crime without reference to his codefendant's statements, and were corroborated by other objective evidence (see, People v. Nelson, 171 A.D.2d 702; People v. Rivera, 171 A.D.2d 708).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Kooper, J.P., Harwood, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.