Opinion
2000-09767
Submitted October 25, 2002.
November 25, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), rendered October 11, 2000, convicting her of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Jodi L. Mandel of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was paroled to a drug treatment program as part of a plea bargain in 1994, and she absconded from the program several months later. In September 2000 she was returned on a bench warrant following her arrest for another crime. The Supreme Court initially granted the defendant an 11-day adjournment in order to submit a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the imposition of sentence was unreasonably delayed (see CPL 380.30). The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying her request for a second adjournment for that purpose.
The decision to grant an adjournment is committed to the sound discretion of the court (see People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698; People v. Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402, 405). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the request for a second adjournment to submit a motion which had questionable merit (see People v. Joseph, 273 A.D.2d 61; People v. Savareese, 258 A.D.2d 484).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
SANTUCCI, J.P., FEUERSTEIN, O'BRIEN and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.