Opinion
E073153
06-22-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC ARMANDO ROBLEDO, Defendant and Appellant.
Doris M. LeRoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FVA1201269) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Mary E. Fuller, Judge. Affirmed. Doris M. LeRoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, defendant, Eric Armando Robledo, was charged with robbery (count 1, Pen. Code § 211), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (counts 2 and 4, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), murder (count 3, § 187, subd. (a)), and it was alleged that defendant suffered a prior strike and a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(c)). However, in 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior strike (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) for a robbery out of Los Angeles County. Defendant was sentenced to 22 years, the upper term for voluntary manslaughter doubled by the prior strike.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, but the petition was denied because defendant had not been convicted of murder. Defendant appeals, contending that defendants who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter to avoid a murder conviction under the felony murder rule are eligible for relief under section 1170.95. Defendant also contends that it is a violation of equal protection to deny resentencing under 1170.95 to persons who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter to avoid a murder conviction under the felony murder rule.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
According to the record available to the court, the charges arose from the following events.
The facts recited here are not relevant to the issue of defendant's eligibility for relief under section 1170.95 but are included to show that the prosecution intended to prosecute defendant under the felony murder rule.
Defendant robbed a woman of her purse. She called 911. A detective responded and was given a description of the SUV in which the robber fled. The detective saw a matching SUV and chased it.
The facts are taken from defendant's opening brief as there is no formal record of them. Defendant explained in a footnote that such facts were taken from the district attorney's informal response to the petition and track with the information filed in the case, though, their true source is unclear. --------
During the chase, defendant, who was driving with his brother in the passenger seat, pulled into a cul-de-sac. The detective followed defendant into the cul-de-sac, got out of his vehicle and yelled at defendant to stop his car. However, defendant revved his engine and accelerated towards the detective. In response, the detective opened fire and fatally struck defendant's brother. Defendant was then apprehended and identified by the victim as the person who stole her purse.
On August 1, 2013, defendant was charged with robbery (count 1, § 211), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (counts 2 and 4, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and murder. (count 3, § 187, subd. (a).) It was further alleged that defendant suffered a prior strike and a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(c)).
On December 22, 2017, without defense counsel joining, defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter in count 3. Defendant also admitted the prior strike. All other charges were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 22 years in prison, consisting of the upper term for voluntary manslaughter of 11 years, doubled by the prior strike, for a total of 22 years in prison.
On April 5, 2019, defendant filed a petition for relief pursuant to section 1170.95 and an attorney was appointed to represent defendant.
The San Bernardino District Attorney's Office filed a motion to strike the petition on the grounds that Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional. Additionally, the district attorney's office filed an informal response to the petition, asserting defendant was ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of a qualifying offense. Defendant's attorney filed an opposition to the motion to strike the petition.
On July 1, 2019, the trial court denied defendant's 1170.95 motion, holding that he was not eligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder. The trial court did not address the constitutional issue posed by the People.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on July 2, 2019.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder. Defendant also argues that it is a violation of equal protection to deny resentencing under section 1170.95 to persons who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter to avoid a murder conviction under the felony murder rule. We disagree.
1. Section 1170.95, Generally
Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 1170.95, which permits a person with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have been convicted of murder as a result of the other legislative changes implemented by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a); People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and, absent a waiver and stipulation by the parties, hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
2. Defendant Is Ineligible for Resentencing Under Section 1170 .95
This appeal requires that we determine whether section 1170.95 provides relief to persons who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter to avoid a murder conviction under the felony murder rule. When interpreting statutes "[w]e begin with the statute's text, assigning the relevant terms their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme." (People v. Hubbard (2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 386.) If the language is not ambiguous, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless doing so would result in absurd consequences not intended by the Legislature. (People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887, citing People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 60.) "Where the statutory text admits of more than one reasonable interpretation, we may consider various extrinsic aids — including the legislative history — to the extent they are helpful in illuminating [the Legislature's intended] purpose." (People v. Hubbard, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 386.)
Contrary to defendant's ambiguity argument, the courts "[r]elying on the clear language of the statute . . . have concluded that section 1170.95 is unambiguous and does not provide relief to persons convicted of manslaughter." (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435-436; People v. Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887 ["The plain language of the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions."], accord, People v. Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.) Therefore, we turn to the plain language of section 1170.95.
By its own terms, section 1170.95 states that only "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . ." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a), italics added.) "Through its repeated and exclusive references to murder, the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder." (People v. Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.) If the Legislature had intended to make relief under section 1170.95 available to defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter, it easily could have done so. (Ibid.) Yet, there is no mention of manslaughter anywhere in the language of section 1170.95. (See § 1170.95.) Thus, "[t]he absence of reference to manslaughter implies the omission was intentional." (People v. Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
Here, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. It makes no difference that he was originally charged with murder and could have been prosecuted under the felony murder rule where the Legislature passed a resolution highlighting the need for reform for persons convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences theory. (Sen. Conc. Res. No. 48, Stats. 2017 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 175, p. 1 (Senate Concurrent Resolution 48); People v. Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 [where defendant was originally charged with murder under the felony murder rule but pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was determined to be ineligible for relief under section 1170.95].) The language is clear: only defendants convicted of murder may petition for relief under section 1170.95. (See People v. Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.) Therefore, because defendant was not convicted of murder, defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.
Defendant argues that the legislative intent was to include manslaughter convictions within the reach of section 1170.95, referring to the language of subdivision (a)(2) which refers to a defendant who "was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." (Italics added.) However, in making this argument, defendant ignores the introductory language in section 1170.95, subdivision (a), which limits petitions to persons "convicted of . . . murder." (People v. Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 436, italics added.) In our view, the language relating to plea offers in lieu of trial was intended to refer to defendants who pleaded guilty to first degree murder pursuant to a plea bargain affecting the length of the sentence, such as by striking a special circumstance allegation or a gun discharge enhancement pursuant to sections 190.2 or 12022.53, or a plea bargain allowing defendant to plead guilty to second degree murder as opposed to first degree murder. As the Turner court concluded, section 1170.95's legislative history does not demonstrate an intent to provide relief to defendants who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. (Ibid.)
We also reject defendant's argument that absurd consequences would result by interpreting the statute to exclude convictions for manslaughter. This argument assumes that persons convicted of murder who are resentenced under section 1170.95 would be released, while persons convicted of manslaughter, a lesser offense, would remain incarcerated. (See People v. Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) As the court in People v. Flores, supra, concluded, "there is no merit to [defendant's] claim that successful petitioners would invariably 'be released from custody,' while persons who pleaded guilty to manslaughter would remain incarcerated." (Ibid.)
Lastly, defendant argues that we should interpret section 1170.95 as applying to manslaughter convictions by applying the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity applies only where the statute is ambiguous. (See Maracich v. Spears (2013) 570 U.S. 48, 76 [rule of lenity applies where there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute].) However, section 1170.95 is not ambiguous. (See People v. Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 435-436.) Thus, defendant's lenity argument is inapplicable.
3. There Is No Equal Protection Violation
Finally, defendant argues that to deny him relief under section 1170.95 would violate equal protection principles. Both the United States Constitution and California Constitution guarantee that no person shall be denied equal protection under the laws. (U.S. Const. 14th Amend.; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) Equal protection of the laws simply means that similarly situated persons shall be treated in like manner unless there is a sufficiently good reason to treat them differently. (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408.) The first step in evaluating any equal protection claim is determining whether there are two groups of individuals that are similarly situated but treated differently under the laws. (People v. Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.) Defendants convicted of different crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. (Cervantes, supra, at p. 888, citing People v. Morales (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 800, 808.) "Where two or more groups are properly distinguishable for purposes of the challenged law, it is immaterial if they are indistinguishable in other respects." (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1107.) "If the two groups are not similarly situated or are not being treated differently, then there can be no equal protection violation." (People v. Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
In accordance with the principles of equal protection, we start by determining whether the defendant is similarly situated to those who qualify for relief under section 1170.95. (See People v. Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.) Here, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter carries a very different punishment from murder. (Ibid.) Defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter are not similarly situated to defendants convicted of murder. (Ibid.) Therefore, defendant is not similarly situated to those defendants who qualify for relief under section 1170.95. Since defendant is not similarly situated to those who qualify for relief under section 1170.95, there is no equal protection violation. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: FIELDS
J. RAPHAEL
J