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People v. Robinson

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Jan 30, 2020
A155347 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)

Opinion

A155347

01-30-2020

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTWAN ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 17CR018814)

Appellant Antwan Robinson appeals from a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. He contends the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction concerning prior threats by the decedent and prohibiting the defense from presenting evidence of appellant's spontaneous statements to the police after his arrest. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Christopher Hayes died as a result of multiple stab wounds inflicted by appellant in a fight in the early morning hours of June 16, 2017. Hayes suffered four wounds to his "front chest" and one each to his "back chest," abdomen, scalp, and elbow; the knife penetrated his lung twice. He also sustained bruises to his front chest, scrapes on his knees and lacerations and bruises on his hands.

Appellant was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with allegations that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in committing the offense (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, subd. (b)(1); 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). He was tried together with Ebony Lewis, who was also charged with the murder. The jury found appellant not guilty of murder but guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192 subd. (a)), and found true the allegation of personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon. Lewis was acquitted.

The fight occurred on 78th Avenue, near MacArthur Boulevard in Oakland. Lewis's mother and stepfather, Kenitra Gayle Frazier and Terrell Maxies, lived at the corner of MacArthur and 78th; Hayes lived in the apartment building across the street. Earlier on the night of June 15, 2017, an altercation took place between Lewis and Maxies that resulted in the police issuing a citation to Maxies and telling Lewis to leave the family's house. Appellant, a good friend of Lewis's, was present and left the house with her. They went to the house of a neighbor, Shelonnda Davison, a few houses away, and asked if Lewis and her young children could spend the night. Appellant then returned to Frazier's house to get Lewis's children.

Frazier testified that as appellant was leaving with the baby in a carrier, Hayes said, "You stupid motherfucker. You know your motherfucking faggot ass should have stopped that fighting." Appellant turned around and said, "you just mad. You want this booty." Hayes got mad. As appellant and Hayes argued, Lewis came and took her children, and the two men started fighting with their fists. Frazier thought the fight ended and went to her house, then heard someone outside say they were fighting again. She went back outside and saw Hayes coming up the sidewalk, bleeding.

Frazier testified that appellant would "mess with" other men, saying things like "[y]ou want me" or "look at him . . . I could have him." This kind of talk would upset Hayes, but he and appellant usually got along.

Frazier testified that she did not see the stabbing. Noting that she had been very intoxicated at the time, she testified she did not remember talking to the police later that night and denied telling them she saw appellant stabbing Hayes while Hayes was on his back or Hayes was stabbed five or six times while appellant was on top of him. She testified that appellant "constantly has a knife."

Hayes's friend Anthony Crawford was walking on MacArthur Boulevard toward 78th Avenue, shortly before midnight on June 16, 2017. As he approached 78th, he saw Mariono Thomas standing in the street yelling "[k]ick his ass," sounding like he was instigating or cheering on a fight. Crawford saw Hayes and appellant "tussling" in the street and got between them, yelling "break it up," and they stopped, appellant walking down 78th away from MacArthur and Hayes walking toward MacArthur and around the corner.

Mariono Thomas will be referred to by his first name to avoid confusion with his brother, Marlon Thomas, whose testimony at trial will be described.

Hayes then returned, carrying a stick about two feet long and two to two and a half inches in diameter that looked like the handle of an axe or tool, and stood at the place where the fight had broken up. Appellant, about 18 feet away at this point, said, "Oh, you got a weapon, huh?" and walked to where Lewis was standing. Crawford saw Lewis pick up a knife from the back bumper of a parked red truck and give it to appellant, who took it and walked back toward Hayes. When appellant got close, Hayes swung the stick and hit appellant's shoulder. Appellant "rushed [Hayes] with the knife and stabbed him in the chest." Hayes dropped the stick and started backing away, and appellant "[r]ushed him again" and stabbed him in the other side of the chest. As Hayes backed away, "stumbling and falling backward," Crawford tried to grab him and they fell backwards together, Crawford on his back with Hayes on top of him. Appellant ran up, squatted on Hayes, and stabbed him at least two more times, as Crawford tried to get out from under Hayes and grab appellant's wrist, yelling things like, "Stop, you don't have to kill him." Hayes tried to turn his back, and appellant stabbed him about three more times in the back, then stopped and walked back to where Lewis was standing. Hayes got up and walked toward the apartments where he lived, bleeding profusely, then collapsed on the sidewalk, saying "I can't breathe. I'm not going to make it." People were "booing and saying how F'ed up it was." Lewis said, " 'I don't know why you all mad at him because he was just protecting me.' "

Crawford described the knife as a "butcher knife" with a blade about 10 inches long, and acknowledged that he initially told the police he did not know where the knife came from.

After the fight, Crawford was bleeding from his mouth, with his lips split and his teeth "bent back" and loosened as a result of appellant elbowing him in the face, and he had a cut on his finger. When he initially talked to the police, Crawford said he did not know appellant. He explained at trial that he did not know then that Hayes was dead and felt it was up to Hayes to decide whether he "wanted to do something about it," but with Hayes dead and unable to "speak for himself," Crawford was telling the truth about what happened.

Mariono's brother, Thomas was in his car, parked across the street, when he heard a commotion, got out and saw appellant and Hayes "tangling" in the street. Mariono was "in the middle trying to break it up." Thomas had heard someone yell "Kick his ass, Chris," but testified that this was not his brother.

According to Thomas, the fight stopped, appellant walked over to Lewis and Hayes "went around the corner to get a stick." Thomas lost sight of Hayes when he rounded the corner, but Hayes returned with a stick about a meter long and four and a quarter inches around, walked quickly up to appellant and hit appellant in the head with the stick, then started walking away. Lewis handed appellant a knife and appellant ran up to Hayes and started stabbing him. Hayes had already started falling backward, having stumbled as he tried to avoid the stabbing, and had put down the stick. Crawford got between appellant and Hayes, trying to separate them, and he also fell down; according to Thomas, Crawford was on the side, trying to shield Hayes, not underneath Hayes. Thomas saw appellant stab Hayes about four or five times while standing over him. Hayes got up, bleeding "real bad," ran across the street and collapsed. Thomas testified that he was initially hesitant to talk with the police because he did not want to be involved, but when they came back and questioned him later, he told them what he had seen.

Thomas testified that he did not see where Lewis got the knife or how big it was.

Police Officer Kyle Gaskin testified that Thomas initially refused to identify himself but said Lewis had handed appellant the knife. In a subsequent contact, Thomas said he did not actually see Lewis give appellant the knife but believed she did so because appellant did not have it during the first fight, after which he went over to Lewis. Thomas saw appellant take the knife out of his pocket.

Davison testified that she was in her house with Lewis's baby when she heard a commotion outside and someone saying, "Come on, come on, motherfucker." It calmed down "for a minute" and then she heard the same thing again. Looking out her screen door, Davison saw appellant and Hayes "tussling," then when she looked a second time she saw appellant on top of Hayes. She did not see if appellant had anything in his hands; it just looked like a fight. That night, when the police asked if Davison had seen anything, she said she had not.

One of the responding police officers, Timothy Latibeaudiere, located appellant between two cars just south of MacArthur on 77th Avenue, having been directed to that location by a citizen; appellant was behind the rear bumper of one of the cars, and the officer at first saw only his head and shoulder. The officer took appellant into custody and recovered from appellant's pocket a gold foldable pocket knife about three inches long that appeared to have blood on it.

Sergeant Omar Daz-Quiroz interviewed Lewis at the police station after Lewis was arrested at her mother's home. Lewis denied knowing anything about the stabbing, saying she had been with appellant earlier but walked away from him when she went to her neighbor's house.

Defense

Appellant testified that when he returned to Frazier's house to get Lewis's children following the altercation between Lewis and Maxies, Frazier cursed at him and someone from the house passed him the baby in a carrier. As he began to walk away from the house with the baby, he heard Hayes say "[g]ay ass motherfucker" two or three times. Appellant responded, "Man, you want this booty." Hayes approached, appellant stopped and they exchanged words, then appellant started to walk down 78th and Hayes followed. Appellant turned to face Hayes and said, "What the hell are you doing?" Lewis yelled to him to put the baby down; he did so, then took a few steps toward Hayes, who stepped backwards. Hayes stopped walking, took off his shirt and assumed a fighting stance and appellant also got into a fighting stance. Hayes swung and hit appellant in the face, knocking him down. Appellant got up, moved closer and hit Hayes in the face; he explained that he had to move toward Hayes in order to hit him because Hayes was taller and had longer arms. Hayes fell, got up and again hit appellant in the face and knocked him down, appellant got up and hit Hayes and Hayes fell, then got up and walked toward MacArthur and around the corner.

Appellant began to walk down 78th toward Davison's house, but when he got to the driveway he heard a commotion, with people yelling for Hayes to leave him alone. Appellant turned and saw Hayes coming toward him from the corner of 78th and MacArthur, carrying an axe handle about 25-26 inches long and four inches in diameter. Appellant touched his pockets to see if he had anything to defend himself, felt his pocket knife, and walked toward Hayes, who "was adamant about fighting me." When the two were about seven feet apart, appellant stopped and Mariono got between them, holding his arms up as if to stop the fight, then walked to appellant's left side and grabbed him from behind in a "bear hug." Hayes raised the stick and swung it at appellant several times as appellant and Mariono fell down, and appellant struggled to break free and avoid the blows from the stick. Appellant broke free and stood, and Hayes swung the stick, striking the arm appellant raised to block it, then swung again and hit appellant's thumb.

Crawford and Thomas both testified that neither Mariono nor anyone else got into the fight, tackled appellant, or held him down while Hayes swung the stick.

At this point, appellant stepped in and pushed Hayes, who stumbled, walked backwards, then stopped. Appellant walked toward him, Hayes swung the stick and hit appellant's left hand, appellant pushed Hayes again, Hayes fell, got up and continuing to walk backwards, then as appellant walked toward him, Hayes swung the stick and hit appellant in the head. Appellant pushed Hayes down again and continued moving toward him as Hayes got up and backed away until he was backed up against a car. Hayes raised the stick again. Appellant reached into his pocket, got his knife and opened it, and as Hayes swung the stick toward him, appellant blocked the stick with his left hand and stabbed Hayes's arm or shoulder area three times. Hayes stumbled into a driveway, appellant ran in and stabbed him twice more, and Hayes fell down. Hayes started to get up, using the stick to prop himself up, and appellant told him, "Stop playing Chris. Stop playing." Stooping over Hayes, appellant saw he was "flopping around" and stabbed him a couple more times. Appellant then backed away and Hayes got up and ran up 78th. Appellant folded his knife and returned it to his pocket.

Appellant testified that he did not intend to kill Hayes. He acknowledged that he was not afraid for his life at the moment he was standing over Hayes on the ground. He testified that he had no physical contact with Lewis between the fist fight and Hayes's return with the stick or during the ensuing fight, and that Crawford did not get involved in the fight. Appellant testified that he did not try to leave the area before the police arrived, and told the police step by step everything that had happened. After his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital, where his fractured thumb was put in a cast.

Lewis testified that after the initial fistfight, she saw appellant walking toward Davison's house and Hayes coming around the corner holding an axe handle, walking toward appellant with Crawford and Mariono following. She yelled to appellant and saw Mariono grab appellant from behind. Hayes raised the axe handle and swung at appellant, who shielded himself with his arm, Mariono having let go of him. She saw appellant's arm get hit, then turned her baby away from the fight and did not see the rest of it.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant maintained at trial that he could not be convicted of unlawfully killing Hayes because he acted in lawful self-defense. The jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 505 that this defense applied if appellant "reasonably believed" he or someone else was in "imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury, "reasonably believed" the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger, and "used no more force than was reasonably necessary" to defend against that danger. Appellant contends his conviction must be reversed because the trial court denied his request to include language in this instruction informing the jury that if it found Hayes had threatened or hurt appellant in the past, it could consider this information in deciding whether appellant's beliefs and conduct were reasonable, and that someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past is justified in acting more quickly and taking greater self-defense measures against that person.

The jury was given the following CALCRIM No. 505 instruction:
"[Appellant] is not guilty of murder if he was justified in killing someone in selfdefense. The defendant acted in lawful selfdefense if:
"The defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury.
"The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger.
"And defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.
"Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to himself. Defendant's belief must have been reasonable and he must have acted only because of that belief. Defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the killing was not justified.
"In deciding whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.
"Defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of death or great bodily injury has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.
"Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.
"The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not justified. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder." (CALCRIM No. 505.)

The instructions given directed the jury, in deciding whether appellant's beliefs were reasonable, to "consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed." (CALCRIM No. 505.)

The requested additional language would have followed this statement with two optional paragraphs from the pattern instruction: "If you find that Christopher Hayes threatened or harmed the defendant in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant's conducts [sic] and beliefs were reasonable. [¶] Someone who has been threated or harmed by a person in the past, is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person." This language was requested on the basis that the fistfight in which Hayes gave appellant a bloody nose was a " 'past threat' or 'harm' in the context of this instruction."

The trial court denied the request, stating, "You can argue. If you have enough information, you can argue what you like."

Appellant relies upon People v. Garvin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488 (Garvin), which recognized that "it is erroneous to refuse a request for instruction on the effect of the victim's antecedent threats or assaults against the defendant on the reasonableness of defendant's conduct." Appellant argues the evidence supported the requested instruction because he testified that the incident culminating in the fatal stabbing "was preceded by an incident during which Hayes continuously cursed and taunted appellant as he menacingly followed him down the street and then instigated a fistfight in which Hayes repeatedly punched appellant in the face, bloodied his nose, and knocked him down." According to appellant, the evidence showed that Hayes "left the scene following his failure to overcome appellant, but he returned later, armed with a wooden axe handle about 25 to 26 inches long, and seemed 'adamant' about fighting appellant." .

Garvin held the instruction is not required to be given sua sponte because "[t]he issue of the effect of antecedent assaults against defendant on the reasonableness of defendant's timing and degree of force highlights a particular aspect of this defense and relates it to a particular piece of evidence." (Garvin, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.)

The point of the instructions appellant requested is that a defendant who is aware of an individual's previous threats or violence against him or her may perceive danger in circumstances that, absent the prior threats or violence, would not reasonably suggest the need for self-defense or degree of force employed. As the court explained in People v. Pena (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 462, 476, where the fatal incident occurred when the decedent confronted the defendant in a bar, "[a]bsent a clear instruction to consider defendant's knowledge of the uncontradicted antecedent threats made by [the decedent] to him and to others about him, we cannot be sure jurors did not construe instructions which were proffered as narrowing the scope of facts and circumstances which they were entitled to consider to only those perceived by any other 'reasonable man' approached by [the decedent] while sitting in the bar at the Mexican Village restaurant. Suffice it to say, that other 'reasonable man' would view [the decedent] simply as another patron; [the decedent's] entrance and approach would lack the import perceived by one aware of antecedent threats."

Jury instructions on antecedent threats or violence are appropriate when there is evidence that the decedent threatened or harmed the defendant on a previous separate occasion. (Garvin, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 487-488 [victim and other deputies beat defendant inmate on four or five prior occasions which inmate had reported to district attorney's office]; People v. Pena, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 [defendant had longstanding knowledge of decedent's violent conduct with others; specific threat days to weeks prior to fatal incident]; People v. Bush (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 294, 299-301 [most recent of prior beatings and threats by decedent husband four weeks before fatal incident]; People v. Torres (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 146 [decedent threatened to kill defendant two weeks before fatal incident]; People v. Moore (1954) 43 Cal.2d 517 [decedent husband had history of beating and threatening defendant wife].) Unlike the cited cases, however, the antecedent threats and violence appellant sees as demonstrating the reasonableness of his belief in the need for self-defense and corresponding conduct—Hayes's aggression in the first portion of the fight—were separated by only moments from the portion of the fight in which appellant fatally stabbed Hayes. What appellant describes as "past" threats and harm was part of the overall circumstances surrounding the stabbing.

As we have noted, the jury was instructed to consider "all the circumstances" in determining the reasonableness of appellant's belief in the need for self-defense and need to use deadly force. While a jury instructed to consider "all the circumstances" might not recognize that such circumstances could include words and conduct that occurred on prior separate occasions, a reasonable juror in the present case could not have failed to understand that appellant's perception of the second portion of the fight would be influenced by what occurred during the first portion. On the facts here, the instruction to "consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed" told the jury all it needed to know. Indeed, an instruction suggesting the jury could consider whether Hayes threatened or harmed appellant "in the past" would have been confusing and invited speculation about what "past" incidents might have occurred. A trial court "must avoid giving instructions which would tend to confuse the jury." (People v. Gonzales (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1664 (Gonzales); People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246 [proper to refuse requested instruction that incorrectly states law, is argumentative, duplicative, or potentially confusing, or is not supported by substantial evidence].) The trial court did not err in refusing the requested instruction.

Furthermore, any possible error was not prejudicial. In the context of this case, the concept appellant sought to present was "closer to rough and ready common sense than abstract legal principle." (Gonzales, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1664.) Defense counsel emphasized the point in closing argument, arguing that Hayes was the initial aggressor and resumed and escalated the fight after appellant thought it had ended, thereby justifying appellant's use of deadly force. (Gonzales, at p. 1664 [any error in refusing misleadingly worded instruction harmless as counsel argued prior assault colored defendant's perception].) The jury could not have failed to consider appellant's view of the case.

Appellant suggests the jury's request for additional copies of CALCRIM No. 505, defining justifiable self-defense and readback of appellant's testimony, indicate the jury was focused on justifiable self-defense and might have acquitted him entirely if the requested instruction had been given. But the jury also asked for additional copies of CALCRIM No. 520 (first or second degree murder), 522 (effect of provocation on degree of murder), 570 (voluntary manslaughter: heat of passion), 571 (voluntary manslaughter: imperfect self-defense), 3471 (right to self-defense: mutual combat) and 3474 (danger no longer exists or attacker disabled). The requests indicate the jury was carefully considering the instructions on all the possible offenses and defenses, not that they were focused on any one theory.

II.

One of appellant's motions in limine sought to introduce evidence of several statements he made to the police after his arrest explaining that he stabbed Hayes in self-defense. The trial court excluded the statements as inadmissible hearsay, finding them self-serving and unreliable. Appellant argues the statements were admissible as spontaneous statements or excited utterances. (Evid. Code, § 1240.)

The statements were recorded by officers' body cameras and/or related in their incident reports. First, while being handcuffed, appellant said he had been defending himself and Hayes had attacked him with an axe handle. Second, during his detention, appellant stated that Hayes "tried to hit [him] with a stick" and "would have harmed 'her' [referring to Ebony Lewis] or 'hurt or harmed [him].' " Third, while in the rear of a police officer's vehicle, appellant "made several unprovoked spontaneous statements about having to defend himself and not meaning to hurt anyone." Finally, at the hospital, appellant spontaneously summarized the events as follows: "[Hayes] wanted to assault [appellant] because [appellant] is gay. [Appellant] starts getting punched, is held down, and his nose 'busted.' [Appellant] punched back once, and walked away. They called him 'faggot.' [Appellant] gets struck again. [Appellant] mentions swinging once and the guy is on the ground. He then stops talking."

Under Evidence Code section 1240, "Evidence of statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception." Appellant argues his statements qualify for this exception to the hearsay rule because they were made while he was still in an agitated state, before he had time to "contrive and misrepresent" (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318) what had occurred during the altercation. Respondent maintains the trial court's contrary determination was well within its discretion. (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 39-40 [trial court discretion at its broadest in making factual determination whether statement made before there was time to contrive and misrepresent].)

We need not resolve the merits, as it is apparent any possible error in excluding these statements did not prejudice appellant. Appellant sought to introduce evidence of his statements after the stabbing as corroboration of his trial testimony, to demonstrate that his defense was not fabricated after the fact. In convicting appellant of voluntary manslaughter, however, the jury necessarily accepted that appellant believed he was acting in self-defense but determined he was unreasonable in this belief—that is, the jury had to believe appellant "actually believed" he was in danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury and "immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend" himself, but one or both of these actual beliefs was unreasonable (CALCRIM No. 571). The excluded statements, if credited, could have established that appellant actually believed he acted in self-defense, but nothing in those statements addressed the reasonableness of this belief. Accordingly, evidence of appellant's statements after the stabbing could not have allowed a juror who concluded appellant's perception of the threat and/or need for immediate use of deadly force was unreasonable to reach the opposite conclusion and find he acted in justifiable self-defense.

The jury was also instructed on sudden quarrel or heat of passion as a theory of voluntary manslaughter. Appellant's briefs do not address the possibility that the verdict was based on this alternate theory or argue that, if it was, evidence of his statements to the police could have resulted in a more favorable outcome at trial. As appellant's case at trial was based entirely on the theory that he acted in self-defense, it is reasonable to assume the jury would have turned to imperfect self-defense once it rejected justifiable self-defense. The likelihood that the voluntary manslaughter verdict rested on a theory of heat of passion, contrary to appellant's professed defense, appears minimal. --------

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/_________

Kline, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Richman, J. /s/_________
Miller, J.


Summaries of

People v. Robinson

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Jan 30, 2020
A155347 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)
Case details for

People v. Robinson

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTWAN ROBINSON, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Date published: Jan 30, 2020

Citations

A155347 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)