Opinion
KA 02-01210
October 2, 2003.
Appeal from a judgment of Ontario County Court (Harvey, J.), entered May 17, 2002, convicting defendant after a jury trial of, inter alia, driving while intoxicated as a felony.
JOHN E. TYO, SHORTSVILLE, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
R. MICHAEL TANTILLO, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (THOMAS D. REH OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: PIGOTT, JR., P.J., PINE, WISNER, SCUDDER, AND KEHOE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum:
County Court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. At 2:50 A.M., a deputy sheriff observed a motor vehicle pull onto a road that accesses only three businesses. Upon observing that the vehicle had been stopped on the road and that its headlights had been turned off, the deputy sheriff approached the vehicle to investigate. Contrary to defendant's contention, the actions of the deputy sheriff were not the equivalent of "a `stop' that had to be supported by reasonable suspicion. The mere approach by police to an occupied parked vehicle * * * in order to inquire is a minimal intrusion * * *, which is not the equivalent of a `stop'" ( People v. Evans, 175 A.D.2d 456, 457, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 856). Here, given the early morning hour and the fact that the businesses were closed, the deputy sheriff "had adequate reason to approach the vehicle to investigate" ( People v Davis, 182 A.D.2d 770, 771, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 830), "irrespective of whether [he] had any indication of criminal activity" ( Evans, 175 A.D.2d at 457; see also People v. Woods, 303 A.D.2d 1031; People v. Heston, 152 A.D.2d 999, 999-1000, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 858, 940).
Defendant further contends that the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the testimony of a state trooper that was outside the scope of the CPL 710.30 notice and concerned an uncharged crime. We reject that contention. "[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is within the trial court's discretion" ( People v. Ortiz, 54 N.Y.2d 288, 292). Here, "[t]he curative instructions issued by the court were sufficient to alleviate any prejudice to defendant," and the court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion ( People v. Hogan, 292 A.D.2d 834, 834, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 676; see People v. Saracina, 298 A.D.2d 953, 954, lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 564; People v. Bentley, 284 A.D.2d 546, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 916; People v. McGriff, 149 A.D.2d 952, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 814).