"[T]o prove a violation of the duty to report a change of address, the State was required to prove that defendant: (1) was previously convicted of an offense subjecting him to the Act; and (2) established a new 'fixed residence' or 'temporary domicile'; (3) which he knowingly failed to report in person to the law enforcement agency with whom he last registered. 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2008)." People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 14, 994 N.E.2d 212.¶ 19 In Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 1, 994 N.E.2d 212, the State charged the defendant with violating section 6 of the Act (730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2008)), alleging he knowingly failed to report a change of address to the police.

"Inherent in each definition is the idea of a specific location." People v. Robinson , 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 23, 373 Ill.Dec. 727, 994 N.E.2d 212. ¶ 16 In order to prove a violation of section 3(a)(1) in this case, then, the State was required to prove both (1) that the defendant resided or was temporarily domiciled at a specific location within Chicago, and (2) that the defendant failed to register there.

¶ 56 When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not our role to retry him. People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 11. Rather, the proper inquiry is " 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' "

¶ 16 To prove a violation of the duty to report a change of address, the State must prove that defendant "(1) was previously convicted of an offense subjecting him to the Act; and (2) established a new 'fixed residence' or 'temporary domicile'; (3) which he knowingly failed to report in person to the law enforcement agency with whom he last registered." People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 14, 994 N.E.2d 212. Section 2(I) defines a "fixed residence" as "any and all places that a sex offender resides for an aggregate period of time of 5 or more days in a calendar year." 730 ILCS 150/2(I) (West 2012).

See, e.g. , People v. Pearse , 2017 IL 121072, ¶ 38, 417 Ill.Dec. 674, 89 N.E.3d 322 (expressing, in a sex offender registration case, a concern that even after the proofs had been closed, the parties and the court were still debating "what statutory section applied, the parameters of the charge, what had to be proven, and what had been proven," and holding that "[a] defendant in a criminal prosecution has a fundamental due process right to notice of the charges against him" (emphasis omitted) ).¶ 27 Furthermore, we find the Second District's decision in People v. Robinson , 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, 373 Ill.Dec. 727, 994 N.E.2d 212, to be instructive regarding the change-of-address provision. In Robinson , the defendant had registered his residence in Aurora with the police department in October 2008 and October 2009.

See 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2012).¶ 21 Defense counsel then pointed out that section 3 defines a "fixed residence" as "any and all places" that a sex offender resides for the statutorily required aggregate period of time and cited People v. Robinson , 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, 373 Ill.Dec. 727, 994 N.E.2d 212, for the proposition that an offender may have more than one fixed residence at a time, arguing that was the case here. She observed that defendant had registered all "fixed residences," i.e. , those places he had arguably "resided at" for the statutorily specified number of days.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues concerning the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 11, 373 Ill.Dec. 727, 994 N.E.2d 212. We may reverse a conviction if the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt or when proof of an element is wholly lacking.

In other words, the State failed to meet its "affirmative obligation to investigate the charge." People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 21. Consequently, there was no evidence establishing that defendant knowingly provided false information to law enforcement.

The State failed to meet its "affirmative obligation to investigate the charge." People v. Robinson , 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 21, 373 Ill.Dec. 727, 994 N.E.2d 212. As a result, the evidence presented was insufficient to prove that James had established a residence or temporary domicile as defined under SORA.

Defendant filed this timely appeal. ¶ 14 Defendant contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating the reporting requirements of section 6 of the SORA. To prove a violation of the duty to report a change of address, the State was required to prove that defendant: (1) was previously 5 convicted of an offense subjecting him to the SORA; (2) established a new fixed residence or temporary domicile; and (3) knowingly failed to report within three days to the law enforcement agency with whom he last registered, i.e., the Chicago Police Department. See 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2018); People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 14. Defendant does not dispute on appeal that the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish the first two elements, specifically, that he was previously convicted of public indecency subjecting him to the SORA, and that he established a fixed residence or temporary domicile at the apartment.